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7Voorwoord (preface in Dutch)
VOORWOORD (PREFACE IN DUTCH)
Naar deze momenten heb ik uitgekeken. Het moment waarop ik mijn voor-
woord kon gaan schrijven bij mijn proefschrift. De momenten dat lezers mijn 
proefschrift openslaan of door scrollen. Het moment dat ik mijn proefschrift 
mag verdedigen. Iets meer dan vier jaar hard werken hebben deze momenten 
mogelijk gemaakt. 
Het is een promotietraject geweest dat ik voor een belangrijk deel naar eigen 
smaak heb kunnen inrichten. Zo heb ik ervaring kunnen opdoen met kwanti-
tatieve en kwalitatieve methoden, zodat ik me tot een allround onderzoeker 
heb kunnen ontwikkelen. Daarbij heb ik met veel plezier het Netherlands 
Institute of Government-PhD programma gevolgd, met als hoogtepunt de  goede 
en complete cursus Network Governance gegeven door de Nederlandse guru’s op 
het gebied, Erik-Hans Klijn en Joop Koppenjan, en de Deense meta-governers 
Jacob Torfing en Eva Sørensen.  Daarnaast heb ik de kans gekregen mijn werk 
te presenteren op conferenties in binnen- en buitenland (zoals in Londen, Bour-
nemouth, Rome, Dublin en Praag). Bovendien heb ik de laatste anderhalf jaar 
van mijn traject in een detacheringsconstructie gewerkt bij de Raad voor de 
Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling. Stuk voor stuk heel goede ervaringen die mij 
enorm hebben verrijkt. Ik heb echt het gevoel dat ik de kansen heb gegrepen die 
zich voordeden en dat is een goed gevoel.
In mijn promotietraject heb ik er zeker niet alleen voor gestaan, dit voorwoord 
wil ik daarom gebruiken om hen te bedanken die er voor me zijn geweest. Te 
beginnen bij mijn promotoren, Erik Hans en Steven. Erik Hans kan gekenmerkt 
worden als een zeer betrokken promotor. Soms iets té betrokken misschien, 
maar ik kan niets anders zeggen dan dat hij wel altijd het beste met me voor 
had. Ook al waren we het niet altijd eens en kijken we toch wat anders aan 
tegen de wetenschap die we willen bedrijven, we konden het daar wel goed met 
elkaar over hebben. Dank Erik-Hans, voor het feit dat je me zo zelfstandig hebt 
laten werken, je hebt me daarmee veel zelfvertrouwen gegeven. En erg fijn dat 
je mijn eigenwijsheid wel kon waarderen. Steven was een tweede promotor op 
de achtergrond, bij wie ik altijd terecht kon als ik dat wilde. Ik heb daar niet al te 
vaak gebruik van gemaakt, maar wanneer ik dat wel deed had hij goede tips. Op 
mijn werk gaf hij bovendien altijd duidelijke, constructieve kritiek, veel dank 
daarvoor, Steven! 
Verder was er in Rotterdam een flinke groep van promovendi die belangrijk 
voor me was omdat ik bij hen terecht kon voor gezelligheid, leuke discussies, 
lieve peptalk en goede tips. Ik heb aan alle aio’s wel wat te danken (al was het 
maar geld voor een cadeautje voor een van de collega’s als ik weer eens om 
donaties vroeg), maar ik wil een paar lieverds uitlichten. Allereerst Ingmar, met 
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wie ik al snel een hele leuke klik had. We hadden altijd lol om van alles en nog 
wat, het meeste toch eigenlijk wel werk gerelateerd. Heerlijk om achteraf even 
te kunnen lachen om moeizame gesprekken, (reorganisatie)stress op de afdeling 
of onze ietwat optimistische planningen :-). Het leukste was dat we ook samen 
onderzoek hebben gedaan. We vulden elkaar daarin goed aan en door samen na 
te denken kwamen we echt verder. Zo zou samenwerking altijd moeten gaan! 
Bovendien hebben we ook daarin natuurlijk het nuttige gecombineerd met het 
aangename, ik denk even aan dat mijmeren over onze toekomst op dat heerlijk 
zonnige terrasje in Heerlen na een topinterview. 
Ook aan Lieselot heb ik veel gehad, waaronder natuurlijk de fijne wandelin-
getjes zo tussendoor, waarin we goede gesprekken hadden over ons onderzoek, 
het proces daaromheen, de onderzoeksgroep, het werken in de wetenschap en 
andere dingen die ons bezighielden. En dan Brenda, wie van cruciaal belang was 
in mijn promotie. Allereerst maakte zij mij attent op een fout bij bestuurskunde 
waardoor mijn sollicitatie op de verkeerde stapel was beland. Vervolgens heeft 
zij mij in mijn promotietraject wegwijs gemaakt in het land van AMOS en mij 
heel goed bijgestaan op moeilijke momenten in het proces. Ten slotte was zij 
degene die zei: gewoon doen Iris, dat traject bij de RMO, volgend jaar zit je 
daar niet meer op te wachten. Ik ben je heel dankbaar voor al die fijne tips en 
ondersteuning op precies die momenten dat het zo nodig was! En Ruth, ik kende 
je al vanuit mijn tutorschap bij bestuurskunde. Een nuchtere superwoman! Wat 
heb ik jou bewonderd in hoe jij doorgezet hebt in werk en privéleven. Ik kom 
je zeker opzoeken in Duitsland. Daarnaast wil ik mijn kamergenootjes nog even 
uitlichten. Ik begin met Warda en Rianne, wat een superfijne gesprekken over de 
actualiteit - en dan met name over media, beeldvorming en ongelijkheid – heb 
ik met jullie kunnen voeren. Ook kwam ik zeker geen lekkers of zorgzaamheid 
tekort met jullie, heel veel dank voor alles wat jullie voor me hebben gedaan, 
meiden. Maar wat heb ik ook fijne discussies en gesprekken gehad met William, 
Mark, Natalya, Nanny en Diana (mijn eerdere roommate). Ten slotte wil ik Lasse 
nog bedanken voor de bijzondere gesprekken die we hebben gevoerd tijdens 
onze interviews aangaande het Stadionpark in Rotterdam. Veel dank voor je 
luisterend oor, de kracht die je me gaf om door te gaan op de weg die ik was 
ingeslagen en ook voor de ervaringen die je met mij deelde. 
Ten slotte wil ik de Rotterdamse collegialiteit nog even illustreren aan de 
hand van de International Review In Science of Perfect Marriages (IRISPM), een speciaal 
uitgegeven tijdschrift, ge-edit door Erik-Hans en Lasse, uitgegeven door van de 
Walle University Press ter gelegenheid van mijn bruiloft (Geweldig hè!). Hierin 
stonden fantastische artikelen, geheel in wetenschappelijk format en weten-
schappelijk discours. Zoals het QCA onderzoek naar het falen van huwelijken 
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van beroemdheden van Stefan (wie anders, het gaat om QCA) en Joris, met zeer 
goede lessen voor de praktijk natuurlijk. Of het onderzoek over vakantieliefdes 
waarin zelfs de tijdmachine zeer geloofwaardig werd toegepast door Jolien, Ruth 
en Danny. Of de lange termijn effecten van een romantisch huwelijk van Tessa 
en Brenda. Echt een fantastisch cadeau, dat ik koester.
Naast die lieve collega’s in Rotterdam kreeg ik er ook nog nieuwe collega’s 
in Den Haag bij. Het werken bij de RMO was ontzettend leuk en het gaf me 
ook weer energie voor mijn promotietraject. Tijdens het adviestraject over ge-
dragsbeïnvloeding en nudging heb ik heel leuk samengewerkt met onder andere 
Jasper. Het traject verliep soepel en voorspoedig, en ja, ook gezellig natuurlijk. 
Met Jasper heb ik heerlijk kunnen praten over onze ambities en ervaringen 
tot nu toe. Daar ben ik hem erg dankbaar voor. Vervolgens, in het traject over 
journalistiek heb ik zeer prettig gewerkt met Rienk, Willemijn en Frank. Het 
gezamenlijk nadenken over de rol van de overheid met betrekking tot journal-
istiek en  het formuleren van een Raadsadvies was van grote waarde. Daarnaast 
wil ik jullie bedanken – en Rienk in het bijzonder – voor het in mij gestelde 
vertrouwen. Bij de RMO had ik dus ook topcollega’s, incluis de stafleden met wie 
ik niet direct heb samengewerkt Lotte, Albertine, Anke, Dieneke en Annet: dank 
voor jullie tips, steun en gezelligheid!
Ten slotte richt ik graag het woord tot mijn man, familie en vrienden. Dank 
voor jullie steun, afleiding, interesse en liefde! Lieve pap en mam, wat is 
het heerlijk om met jullie te spreken over politiek, mijn promotietraject 
en alle andere dingen die ons bezighouden. Jullie zijn een enorme steun en 
geven me altijd een energieboost! En mam, dank voor het checken van de 
‘laatste dingetjes’ in dit proefschrift. Daarnaast wil ik Sander graag bedanken 
voor het checken van de drukproef tijdens wintersport! En voor de mentale 
steun en het het bieden van afleiding ben ik in het bijzonder ook Stef, Sandra, 
Frits, Marije, Tom, Carola en Anneloes dankbaar!   Ten slotte, lieve Paul, als ik 
thuis kwam na een dagje zwoegen, stond er vaak een bord heerlijk eten klaar en 
een fijne man om even goed te knuffelen. Wat ben ik je enorm dankbaar voor 
de zaken die je mij uit handen nam in drukke periodes, de rust die je altijd uit-
straalt en aan mij overbrengt en alle leuke dingen die we hebben ondernomen 
in de tussentijd (ik noem een bruiloft :-)). Wat ben ik een enorm gelukkige vrouw 
van jou!
Iris 
Februari 2015
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1.1. GOVERNED BY THE NEWS? 
“Media alluded to emotion, not to facts or the content of the plan. (…) Although it [citizen 
group’s statement] was bullshit - because we can prove that it is incorrect - we had to react 
to their story, while the tone was already set. And if media do not hear you at the same 
time, but the next day after, your story comes second. Then, things become complicated.” 
(Alderman - Chapter 5)
News media not only report and comment on politics, but their news reports 
also have an impact on politics. This interconnection between news media 
and politics is subject of much societal and scientific debate. One of the main 
concerns is that news media are biased because they highlight emotions and 
controversy. This focus on emotions and controversy, an important character-
istic of the news media logic, simplifies and downplays political issues. Other 
concerns have to do with the power of news media in political processes. News 
reports are often followed by dramatic reactions by politicians, as they want 
to show their responsiveness to public opinion. News media thereby set the 
political agenda. Lastly, politicians are criticised for using and misusing news 
media for their own interests. Politicians are said to sell and to put a spin on 
their own actions with the emotions and controversy required for news media 
coverage. Many of such critical evaluations come from the United States and 
the United Kingdom (e.g. Blumler & Gurevich, 1995; Davis, 2002; Cook, 2005; 
Bennett, 2009). However, comparable analyses can be found for other Western 
democracies, including the Netherlands (Brants, 2002; RMO, 2003; Esser & 
Strömbäck, 2014). 
In Dutch public debates, grand statements are made to decry the power that 
news media have in Dutch democracy; many contributors claim the Nether-
lands has become a mediacracy or drama democracy. To illustrate, more than 800 
reports in Dutch newspapers and journalistic magazines contain the term ‘me-
diacracy’, while some 300 reports have been written on the topic of the ‘drama 
democracy’1. Already in 1995, the editorial office of the Dutch newspaper NRC 
Handelsblad stated: “However fundamental the presentation in Parliament may 
be, the summary shown on television is more important. The same goes for the 
political agenda. To an important extent the media determine this agenda. They 
make a selection of topics, [and] their degree of attention is important for the 
1. This search in Lexis Nexis (including newspapers and some weekly journalistic magazine 
from 1980) was performed via the general search page using the term ‘mediacratie’, which 
resulted in 830 publications, and with the term ‘dramademocratie,’ which resulted in 293 
publications, on 8 October 2014.
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further progress of the debate. It is all part of a full-grown democracy, which is 
increasingly and not unjustly referred to as a mediacracy.”2
The terms ‘mediacracy’ and ‘drama democracy’ suggest that the power of 
news media is not only present in politics, but in other stages of the democratic 
process as well – such as decision-making processes. Many policies are formed 
and implemented through political decision-making processes organised in 
governance networks (Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Ansell & 
Gash, 2008). These are networks of public, private and societal actors, such as 
representatives of municipalities, provinces, private enterprises and interest 
groups. Remarkably, possible implications of media and their logic for gov-
ernance processes in such networks are not explicitly part of the discussion 
on media and politics. The question whether governance processes are also 
dominated by media and their logic is rarely raised. 
An important exception is Hajer (2009: 38), who claims that governance is 
mediatised through the “interpenetration and interdependence of media and 
governance”. He states that media and their logic shape citizens’ perceptions of 
governance processes. Furthermore, media logic has a structuring influence on 
governance processes and affects the way governing authorities communicate 
about policies (Hajer, 2009). Similarly, the alderman quoted above also pointed 
out that media have certainly been relevant in the governance process for 
which he was responsible. Even though the news reporting was not accurate 
or at least highly dramatised, he felt the pressure to respond to it. It is thus not 
unreasonable to assume that news media and their logic have an impact on 
governance processes as well. 
In prior research I already showed how a national media hype with many 
dramatic statements can have substantial effects on policy outcomes (Kortha-
gen, 2013). This case study was however a unique case concerning a national 
mediahype around a policy issue, which does not show how decision-making 
processes on policies in general are affected by media and their logic. How effects 
of media on governance processes work in practice is still under-researched. It 
is therefore the goal of this research project, titled ‘Complex decision-making in the 
drama democracy’ and financed by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific 
Research (NWO), to gain a deeper understanding of the impact of media and 
their logic on governance processes. 
2. Redactie (1995). De mediacratie. In: NRC Handelsblad, 25 March 1995, my translation.
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1.2 MEDIATISATION: THE GROWING IMPACT OF MEDIA 
AND MEDIA LOGIC 
News media have both democratic and commercial tasks3. This applies to both 
publicly and privately financed media companies, although the degree may dif-
fer to a certain extent. Publicly financed media organisations are formally man-
dated to supply democratically relevant information (such as the Dutch NOS or 
the British BBC), but private companies may contribute to this public task just 
as much (e.g. newspaper companies). At the same time, publicly and privately 
financed news media share an interest in the marketability of information: 
they both need to reach mass audiences. Private companies must gain all their 
income from subscription fees and advertising revenues, but publicly financed 
media are also evaluated on their audience ratings and need to procure adver-
tising revenues. The democratic and commercial interests of news media can 
be at odds with each other. A common complaint is that commercial interests 
increasingly dominate, resulting in a commercially motivated, uniform media 
logic that determines the content of news coverage (RMO, 2003; WRR, 2005; Ben-
nett, 2009; Landerer, 2013). The selection and tone of news reporting is claimed 
to be biased due to the commercial criteria of marketability and efficiency. It 
seems that negative news, human interest stories and drama in particular can 
be efficiently made and successfully sold (Bennett, 2009). 
Such characteristics of the news media logic determine who gets access to 
the public through media and how their ideas are framed (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 
1999; Tresch, 2009). For instance, claims and sound bites by the Dutch populist 
politician Geert Wilders are often negative and dramatic and are widely covered 
in news reports (Schaper & Ruigrok, 2010). Formulating a message that chimes 
well with media logic characteristics is thus important for political actors who 
seek to reach a larger audience through the media. In scientific literature, the 
growing power of media and their logic in political processes is referred to 
as mediatisation. Studies on mediatisation describe how the media have gained 
greater social prominence and how media logic has been integrated into other 
institutional logics (Hjarvard, 2008; Lundby, 2009b). Although much attention 
has been devoted to the mediatisation of politics (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; 
Kepplinger, 2002; Strömbäck, 2008; Landerer, 2013), mediatisation in the con-
text of governance processes has scarcely been examined (Hajer, 2009). 
3. Besides, news media have social tasks as well, as Costera Meijer (2010) emphasizes. These 
will however not be part of this research. 
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1.3 STUDYING MEDIATISATION IN THE CONTEXT OF 
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES
Just as the media operate according to a certain media logic, political systems 
have a logic as well. Studies on the mediatisation of politics analyse to what 
extent media logic overrides the political logic (cf. Strömbäck, 2008). More and 
more scholars have acknowledged that the notion of a political logic is often 
understood too narrowly in these studies, as they mainly focus on political 
authorities or political representatives (Schrott & Spranger, 2007; Hajer, 2009; 
Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012; Esser & Matthes, 2013; Marcinkowski, 2014). Con-
temporary political decision-making processes do not have such a clear centre 
(Hajer, 2009); for many policy issues, political decision-making takes place in 
negotiations between public, private and societal actors, which is referred to 
as governance processes. This research focuses on mediatisation in these gover-
nance processes.  
Governance processes
Although ‘governance’ has different meanings (see Rhodes, 1996; Kooiman, 
1999), three principles distinguish how the word is used in this thesis from 
other approaches to government or politics: 
1) The approach is pluricentric rather than unicentric (such as state-centred 
models);
2) Networks play an important role in organising the relations between inter-
dependent actors; and
3) Governance processes are characterised by negotiation, accommodation 
and cooperation rather than by coercion, command and control (e.g. Van 
Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004: 151-152).
A governance approach is necessary in the context of complex societal prob-
lems characterised by knowledge and value conflicts that cross institutional 
boundaries (Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer, 1995; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 
1997). Institutional boundaries are increasingly challenged by societal prob-
lems, particularly because government entities are increasingly specialised and 
fragmented (Torfing, 2007; Klijn, 2008a). For many policy issues, government 
entities therefore need to collaborate with other government, business and civil 
society organisations. 
This might seem somewhat abstract to many readers. Why would a govern-
ment organisation not be capable of solving policy problems on its own? An 
illustration: the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment seeks to take 
measures against floods in a specific area. However, the municipality in the area 
was aiming to build new houses in the same area, which would form a nice bud-
Chapter 1
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getary solution. A private investor might certainly be interested in investing in 
the area, but for a lower price than the municipality offered. Farmers that now 
use the area for their agricultural activities want to keep their land, of course. 
And citizens who like to recreate in the area would like to have some restau-
rants nearby. Although such a situation might appear quite complex already, 
this is actually a rather simplistic illustration of the actors and interests usually 
involved in governance processes in spatial planning (e.g. Hajer & Zonneveld, 
2000; Healey, 2006; Torfing, Sørensen & Fotel, 2009) and water management 
policies (see Termeer et al., 2011; Edelenbos, Bressers & Scholten, 2013). In 
many policy domains, examples of governance processes can be found with the 
same characteristics.  Also around safety issues (Prins, 2014) or health policies 
(Wehrens, 2013), government entities do not possess enough finances, produc-
tion resources, authority and/or know-how to develop solutions on their own, 
nor are they capable of dealing with controversies regarding these policies. This 
makes it necessary to collaborate with other actors. Collaboration moreover has 
the potential of generating innovative solutions that better suit the complexity 
of the issues (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Sørensen & Torfing, 2012). 
Government organisations and other private and societal actors are thus 
mutually dependent on developing solutions for complex societal issues. At the 
same time, actors who are involved in governance processes operate relatively 
independently; they cannot be commanded to think or act in a certain way by 
one of the other actors (Torfing, 2007: 5). Relations between actors in governance 
processes are therefore described as horizontal rather than vertical and can be 
modelled in governance networks. In series of interactions, actors negotiate, 
collaborate and decide to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective 
goal (Provan & Kenis, 2008; Ansell & Gash, 2008). Such interaction patterns can 
be referred to as games, to conceptualise the competition that exists between 
different strategies of individual actors (Klijn, 2008b: 129). In sum, governance 
networks can be defined as: “more or less stable patterns of social relations between 
mutually dependent actors, which form around policy problems and/or clusters of means 
and which are formed, maintained and changed through a series of games” (Koppenjan 
& Klijn, 2004: 69-70). Many policies are nowadays formed and implemented 
through governance networks (Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; 
Ansell & Gash, 2008).
Mediatisation in the context of governance processes
Governance processes in networks often take a long time. The decision-making 
processes therefore require a long-term dedication on the part of network ac-
tors and trust relations between them in order to achieve collective decision-
17
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making (Klijn, Edelenbos & Steijn, 2010; Ansell & Gash, 2008). At the same time, 
news reports complain about sluggish governmental performance, zoom in on 
conflicts and demand swift measures (Klijn, 2008b). This puts pressure on the 
functioning of governance networks. Moreover, since processes of mediatisa-
tion are not limited to political institutions but take place in bureaucracies 
(Thorbjørnsrud, Ustad Figenschou & Ihlen, 2014) and public service organisa-
tions (Schillemans, 2012) as well, it is relevant to ask how news media and their 
logic affect decision-making processes in governance networks in general.
The degree of mediatisation varies across governance processes, depending 
on the policy issue, the process, and the decision-making phase (cf. Esser & Mat-
thes, 2013).  We must thus bear in mind that many governance processes might 
not even be covered by the media, as scholars also say applies to legislative 
processes in parliament (Van Aelst, Melenhorst, Van Holsteyn & Veen, forthcom-
ing; Van Santen, Helfer & Van Aelst, 2013); or the governance processes might 
not be that personalised or popularised in news reports (cf. Van Santen, 2012 
about politics). We should take into account that specific cases cannot always 
be generalised as a permanent state of affairs. Before turning to the question of 
the influence of mediatisation on governance processes, I therefore first analyse 
to what extent media and media logic have been relevant in the specific gover-
nance processes. Mediatisation is thus not treated as a given in this research. 
This differs from the approach of some scholars who describe mediatisation 
as a meta-process that, alongside other meta-processes such as individualisa-
tion, secularisation and globalisation, is fundamentally shaping our society (see 
Krotz, 2009; Hjarvard, 2013: 137). Approaching mediatisation as a meta-process 
is socially relevant, but it provides less information about how media and their 
logic affect particular governance processes. 
1.4 WHAT THIS RESEARCH IS ABOUT: OVERALL AIM 
AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As indicated above, the overall aim of this research is to study mediatisation in 
the context of governance processes. The overall research question is: “How does 
mediatisation affect governance processes?” To recapitulate, ‘mediatisation’ refers to 
the increasing power of media and their logic over societal institutions.  
Media and mediatisation are relevant for governance processes, as media 
can become entangled in governance processes in many different ways. The 
involvement of media can be categorised roughly in terms of three different 
roles (these roles are explained further in Chapter 3). First, media provide in-
formation packaged in news reports, as democratic platform. Second, media can 
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have effects on the content and process of governance processes, as a political 
agenda setter. Third, media can be used as an instrument of strategic communication 
to ‘sell’ messages to the larger public. This research examines the three roles 
of media in governance processes from the perspective of mediatisation, which 
emphasises the effects of media logic on these roles. This is translated into 
more specific research questions.
1) To what extent can media biases be found in news reports on governance processes and 
how do they relate to the media platform function for different stakeholders’ voices?
Media provide news reports that frame the content and progress of governance 
processes, by which they ideally offer a platform for different stakeholders’ 
voices (Schudson, 2008; McQuail, 2013). News media logic is characterised by 
certain biases in the reporting of news stories that can be efficiently made and 
successfully sold. Often, the news seems to focus on political authorities in 
power, as Gans (1979) and Sigal (1973) claimed, and as is empirically confirmed 
by scholars as Shehata (2010) and Tresch (2009). Further, as described by Ben-
nett (2009): the information in news seem to be increasingly negative (toward 
authorities), as well as dramatised, fragmentised, and personalised. Chapter 4 
examines these media biases and analyses how the media biases relate to the 
range of actors covered by the media. 
2) To what extent can media biases be found in news reports on governance processes and 
how does that affect the governance processes, their results and their legitimacy?
The commercialised news-media logic and the logic of network governance 
may be hard to combine. The media’s focus on conflicts and sensationalism 
(Bennett, 2009) contrasts with the need for network actors to build trust rela-
tions and to collaborate (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Provan et al., 2009; Klijn et al., 
2010a). Another contrast is the concentration of media on political authorities’ 
actions and personal efforts (Hajer, 2009), whereas network actors strive for col-
laborative efforts of public, societal and private actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; 
Mandell, 2001). Chapter 5 analyses how media and information biases affect 
the voice of different stakeholders in the process, the deliberation process, and 
the accountability relations. Chapter 6 tests the assumption whether the more 
media coverage shows biases such as negativity and sensationalism, the more it 
disturbs effective and efficient decision-making processes in networks.
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3) How do actors within governance networks deal with the characteristics of media logic in 
their communication strategies?
Negative media coverage that might form an ‘environmental disruption’ to 
governance processes can be prevented or at least moderated through a proac-
tive approach to the media (cf. Yan & Louis, 1999). Increasingly, communica-
tion professionals are hired by government organisations to help them gain 
positive publicity in news media (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Tenscher, 2004; 
Cook, 2005; Neijens & Smit, 2006; Davis, 2002; Prenger et al., 2011). Chapter 7 
examines how communication professionals can effectively reconcile the logic 
of governance processes with the contrasting news media logic. 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA COLLECTION
In the empirical chapters, the impact of media and media logic is examined 
in decision-making processes around spatial planning, water management and 
infrastructural issues. In urban renewal and water management projects, dif-
ferent spatial claims and functions are at stake, such as housing, recreation, 
agriculture, industry, public infrastructure and social facilities. Consequently, 
public, private and societal stakeholders are involved in the collaborative 
decision-making process with varying interests and different perceptions of 
problems and solutions. These cases thus share the main characteristics of 
governance processes.
Research question 1, about relations between media biases and media coverage 
of different actors in news reporting on complex policy processes, is addressed 
in Chapter 4. The relations are studied in news reports on five complex water 
governance cases in the Netherlands over a ten-year period. A total sample of 
566 news reports from newspapers and television were coded and quantitatively 
analysed with SPSS analysis techniques for non-parametric data. 
Research question 2, about the effects of media and their logic on processes, 
performances and legitimacy of governance processes, was split into two dif-
ferent studies, with two different methodological approaches. In Chapter 5, the 
effects of mediatisation on sources of legitimacy within governance processes is 
scrutinised in three of the five cases, building on the content analysis presented 
in Chapter 4. These three cases were most similar regarding their main policy is-
sue, which was water storage against flooding. The quantitative content analysis 
of media reports is combined with interviews with aldermen and citizen group 
representatives. This mixed method approach enables an analysis of relations 
between media and media logic with voice, deliberation and accountability at 
several moments in the governance processes. Subsequently, as reported in 
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Chapter 6, relations between negative, sensational media coverage and me-
diatised politics on the one hand and trust relations between network actors 
and performance of governance networks on the other hand were tested in a 
cross-sectional large N-study. The data was obtained through survey research 
among 141 network managers in urban spatial planning projects. The survey 
data are used to test statistical relations using structural equation modelling 
(SEM) techniques in AMOS. 
Research question 3 is examined in Chapter 7. Through in-depth interviews with 
ten spokespersons and twelve journalists, it is studied how positive public-
ity is created around governance processes in the implementation phase. The 
interviews are nested in four cases of large infrastructure projects in the Neth-
erlands, in order to scrutinise several publicity moments in the cases and to 
do that from different perspectives (triangulating sources). Through qualitative 
coding analysis in Atlas.ti, the interviews are analysed and conclusions drawn 
about how communication professionals reconcile media logic with the logic of 
governance processes. 
1.6 OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
This first introductory chapter is followed by two theoretical chapters that 
lay down the theoretical foundations of the empirical studies. In Chapter 2, I 
reflect on the underlying principles of mediatisation theory, using pioneering 
work by McLuhan (Understanding Media), Baudrillard (The Gulf War Did Not Take 
Place), Elchardus (The Drama Democracy) and others. I discuss the concepts of me-
dia, media logic and mediatisation; determinism within the concepts of media 
logic and mediatisation; and the role of emotions in claims about mediatisation. 
Chapter 3 offers a theoretical discussion on the roles of media in governance 
processes, which I wrote together with Erik-Hans Klijn and which has been sub-
mitted for a thematic section in Policy and Politics. We discuss the three different 
functions more in-depth (media as democratic fora, media as agenda setters and 
media as instruments for strategic communication). These roles are examined 
through the concept of mediatisation, which suggests that media are gaining 
importance in governance processes. And more fundamentally, as discussed, 
the concept of mediatisation draws attention to the production logic that is 
guiding media reporting and is shaping the three roles of media in governance 
processes. 
The subsequent chapters empirically examine the implications for one or 
more media roles, as shown in Table 1.1 below. 
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Chapters 4 to 7 have already been introduced briefly in Section 1.4. These are 
separate empirical articles and can thus be read on their own. An unavoidable 
consequence is, unfortunately, that parts of these chapters will have some over-
lap, particularly in their theoretical frameworks. Chapter 4 presents the results 
of a content analysis about information biases in news concerning five water 
governance processes, in relation to the news coverage of different actors. It 
thereby focuses mainly on the role of media as democratic fora. The article has 
been published in Public Management Review. Chapter 5, written together with 
Ingmar Van Meerkerk, shows how media and their logic affected legitimacy 
sources within three of the water governance processes. It mainly provides 
insights regarding the agenda setting function of media, but also touches upon 
the other two functions. This article has been published in Local Government 
Studies. Chapter 6, written together with Erik-Hans Klijn, tests the impact of 
Table 1.1: Chapter overview
Chapter 1 – General introduction
Chapter 2 – Discussion of the underlying principles of mediatisation theory
Chapter 3 – Roles of media in governance processes and implications of mediatisation
Empirical chapters Media as 
democratic fora
Media as agenda 
setters
Media as instruments 
of strategic 
communication
Chapter 4 - The relation between 
media biases and news coverage 
of different actors in news 
reports on governance processes
Chapter 5 - The effects of media 
and their logic on legitimacy 
sources within local governance 
networks
Chapter 6 - The impact of 
commercial news media logic 
and mediatised politics on 
governance processes and 
performances 
Chapter 7 - Creating positive 
news coverage on the 
implementation of policies in 
governance context
Chapter 8 -  Conclusions and discussion
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commercialised news and mediatised politics on trust and perceived network 
performance. The study mainly addresses aspects of the role of media as po-
litical agenda setter, but also provides some insights into the democratic fora 
function. The article has been published in Public Administration. Chapter 7 deals 
with media as an instrument for strategic communication, in a study about 
the creation of positive publicity around governance processes. This article has 
been submitted to Administration and Society.  
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis. It provides conclusions about the impact 
of mediatisation on governance processes and the theoretical and practical 
implications. It also acknowledges the limitations of the current research and 
suggests directions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Reflections on the underlying principles of 
mediatisation theory
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After introducing my PhD research in the first chapter, in this chapter I will discuss 
the concepts of media, media logic and mediatisation more extensively. As these 
theoretical notions underpin my empirical studies, it is relevant to examine the 
underlying principles in the light of philosophical and sociological literature.
First, I discuss media as being an important precondition for contemporary soci-
eties. Afterwards, I explain how the initial thoughts of McLuhan (1964) about the 
transformation of information by media have been applied in the conceptualisation 
of media logic. Further, I discuss whether the concept of mediatisation implies a 
deterministic perspective on the impact of media on society. Lastly, I assess underly-
ing normative ideas about the role of emotions in claims about mediatisation. 
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2.1 MEDIA: PART OF OUR HUMAN CONDITION AND 
SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENTS
Media are natural for us, modern human beings. Media are just there, self-
evidently, in our lives. Who does not read newspapers, watch TV or search the 
internet? Human beings use media on a daily basis. Media are also natural in 
the sense of having become part of the human condition (cf. De Mul, 2014). 
Media can therefore be described as extensions of man, as McLuhan (1964) does. 
Media, as mass media or the internet, extend our senses and nerves; through 
media things can be experienced that take place or have been taken place in 
another time or place. 
Media belong to one of the crucial cultural and technological supplements 
that have been shaping and will continue to shape mankind (cf. De Mul, 
2014: 18). Media make human beings evolve, they have a major impact on the 
functioning of human beings in society. Hence, the diverse set of media that 
form the extensions of our nerves and senses is an important precondition for 
contemporary high modern societies. “The contemporary complex condition 
could not be handled without mediated communication. What would politics 
be without media? What would trade, finances, and commerce be without 
information and communication technologies?” (Lundby, 2009a: 2). 
The interference of media in our experiences and in societal processes can 
however never be completely neutral. Media have impact on these experiences; 
media alter sense ratios or patterns of perception (McLuhan, 1964: 19). The 
“medium is the message”, McLuhan famously argued: (…) “it is the medium 
that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action” 
(McLuhan, 1964: 9). The grammar, principles and coercive mechanisms of a 
medium shape the message in its transport. “Each form of transport not only 
carries, but translates and transforms, the sender, the receiver, and the mes-
sage. The use of any kind of medium or extension of man alters the patterns 
of interdependence among people, as it alters the ratios among our senses” 
(McLuhan, 1964: 97-98). Experiencing things that take place or have taken place 
in another time or place through a medium thus means that the experience has 
been translated and transformed by that medium.
Translation and transforming effects are actuated by the technological fea-
tures of the specific medium, McLuhan (1964) argues. Communication through 
a medium means that information is translated and transformed by the format 
criteria of that specific medium. Television generally shapes information into 
moving images and sound; in a newspaper, information is expressed in written 
words and photographs or illustrations. 
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2.2 MEDIATISATION: THE IMPACT OF NEWS MEDIA 
AND THEIR LOGIC
Having discussed the natural use of media in daily life and how this is a basic 
condition for contemporary societies, I now narrow the scope to news media. 
News media are of particular importance for governance processes. News media 
provide information on political issues and decision-making processes, can set 
the agenda of decision-makers, and are an instrument for actors to communi-
cate their message to a larger public. 
News media share some specific translation and transforming effects referred 
to as (news) media logic. In fact, the initial idea of McLuhan (1964) about the 
grammar, principles and coercive mechanisms of media is clearly recognisable 
in the most cited definition of the (news) media logic: “Media logic consists of a 
form of communication; the process through which media present and transmit 
information. Elements of this form include the various media and the formats 
used by these media. Format consists, in part, of how material is organized, the 
style in which it is presented, the focus or emphasis on particular characteris-
tics of behavior, and the grammar of media communication” (Altheide & Snow, 
1979: 10). 
Whereas McLuhan (1964) primarily focused on the technological transfor-
mative factors of media, the social norms and practices by which media are 
used also transform information. Although different news media outlets have 
varying format criteria, they operate according to similar norms and practices 
(Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011; Landerer, 2013). Thus, besides the technological 
medium-specific format criteria that McLuhan initially emphasised – such as 
image, text or sound – the aims and interests of journalists that create news 
and owners of medium outlets that sell news also affect information media 
transport and publish. Media logic therefore consists not only of media-specific 
format criteria, but also includes shared professional standards of newsworthi-
ness and journalistic norms such as independence, as well as the organisational 
pressures on journalists instigated by the commercial interests of media outlets, 
such as deadlines and audience ratings (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Strömbäck 
& Esser, 2014). 
Although media logic is thus a very broad concept that in principle points to 
the overall functioning of news media, in practice it is applied in a narrower 
sense. As Landerer (2013) argues, the dominant conceptualisation of media logic 
actually mainly addresses the commercial interests that guide news production 
processes. “Wherever media logic refers to newsworthiness and to particular 
characteristics of media formats, the idea of competitiveness and hence the 
commercial logic is the dominant underlying rationale” (Landerer, 2013: 244). 
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To sum up, in news media the organisation of material, the presentation style 
and the focus or emphasis in news reports is the outcome of how journalists 
construct news stories for a media outlet that has commercial interests. This 
notion of media logic forms the basis of mediatisation theory. 
In the literature about mediatisation it is claimed that societal institutions 
are increasingly submitted to or becoming dependent on the media and their 
logic (e.g. Hjarvard, 2008). Hence, mediatisation firstly describes the increasing 
importance of media for societal institutions. Secondly, the concept empha-
sises the transformative power of media logic in its increasing interference in 
communication, as opposed to the more neutral term of mediation. In other 
words, mediatisation research examines what it means for society when com-
municating, deciding and acting in ways that are compatible with commercial 
news media logic characteristics becomes the norm in more areas of social and 
cultural life (Marcinkowski, 2014).  Many societal institutions  reach their larger 
public through mass media. The inevitable interference of media and their logic 
shapes communication by and between these societal institutions, which might 
be at the expense of the institutional logic of the institutions concerned. 
Most scholarly attention has been devoted to the mediatisation of political 
processes. For example, the often cited Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 250) discuss 
how commercial news media logic overrules political logic: “mediatized politics 
is politics that has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central func-
tions on mass media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass me-
dia”. They thus claim that politics loses its own autonomous logic to the extent 
to which it adapts to media logic in political practices. Mediatisation has also 
been analysed in other social contexts such as religion (as Hjarvard, 2008; 2013), 
consumption (Jansson, 2002) and public services (Schillemans, 2012). Before 
discussing consequences of mediatisation, I first address how consequences of 
mediatisation are being studied. Particularly, I will discuss whether the concept 
of mediatisation implies a deterministic approach to reality. 
2.3 MEDIATISATION: A DETERMINISTIC CONCEPT? 
De Mul (2002) distinguishes two broad philosophical perspectives on technol-
ogy: the instrumental approach and the substantial approach. According to the 
instrumental approach, technology should be treated as a neutral and value-free 
instrument that can be applied for various purposes. By contrast, the substan-
tial approach claims that technology has certain characteristics that determine 
how people use it. The latter approach is often associated with problematic 
deterministic theorems (De Mul, 2002: 30). Although new techniques, as the 
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printing press or the computer, have had a major societal impact, this impact 
cannot be explained by technological features only. Whereas scholars with 
softer approaches to determinism recognise other factors besides technology as 
causing societal change, they still see technology as the decisive factor. 
As an alternative for hard or soft determinism, but within the substantial 
approach, De Mul (2002: 31) outlines a position of technological interactionism. 
Technological interactionism describes how technological developments are 
caused by an interaction of many heterogeneous factors; moreover, they are 
caused by societal developments as well as the cause of societal developments. 
So technological interactionism describes how technical development is formed 
and becomes consequential through interaction with its local, cultural context, 
by the meaning people give to it and the reasons and motives that guide their use 
of technology (De Mul, 2002: 32). The social factors, on the other hand, should 
also not be seen as absolute, decisive factors, as social constructivists seem to 
do. Technological developments can lead to unforeseen and even undesirable 
consequences due to interactions between heterogeneous factors. Such effects 
are not the result of intentional rational processes, as social constructivist often 
presume. Technological interactionism therefore emphasises the interactions 
between social and technological factors that result in societal and technical 
changes, without giving primacy to either of these factors (De Mul, 2002: 35).
Some scholars claim that the concept of mediatisation is sometimes used as 
a deterministic approach to study media effects (cf. Couldry, 2008; Thorbjørn-
srud, Figenschou & Ihlen, 2014). McLuhan (1964) generally represents such a 
deterministic perspective, and his work has clearly been used in constructing 
theory about media logic (Altheide & Snow, 1979). However, the interpretation 
and application of the concept of mediatisation by the majority of the scholars 
can be seen as a technological interactionism perspective on the relations be-
tween media and society. The majority of scholars see mediatisation processes 
as interaction processes of heterogeneous factors, without clear causal rela-
tions. As Schulz (2004: 90), one of the founders of mediatisation theory, argues: 
“As the concept emphasizes interaction and transaction processes in a dynamic 
perspective, mediatization goes beyond a simple causal logic dividing the world 
into dependent and independent variables”. For Hjarvard (2008: 120), the ways 
in which mediatisation affects society is about media interfering in social 
interactions between individuals within a given institution, within different 
institutions and in society at large. Because of the interactions between media 
and society, the degree of mediatisation can vary in different local contexts. 
In the Netherlands, news media logic clearly interconnects with social pro-
cesses of de-pillarisation, commercialisation and globalisation. In the 1960s, so-
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cial structures became increasingly less reliant on social, cultural and religious 
pillars. The pillarised press has also been transforming gradually into a more 
homogeneous press for the masses since then (Wijfjes, 2002; Hjarvard, 2008). 
Media became cultural institutions themselves, more and more disengaged 
from other social institutions. They came to approach various institutions and 
interest from a more general perspective (Hjarvard, 2008). The rise of mass 
media consumption – pre-eminently television – thereby contributed to the 
commercialisation of society and vice versa; “The advent of television and the 
emergence of consumer society were part of the same historical conjuncture” 
(Kellner, 1990: 41).
Content and formats within news media became largely explicable by the 
commercial interests of the mass media: the maximisation of their audiences, in 
order to boost (advertising) revenues. News needed to appeal to the mass public 
to increase circulation and have greater success on the advertiser market, and 
hence evolved into a form of amusement. Baudrillard, already in 1995, argues 
along this line that the Gulf War was a media spectacle that held citizens glued 
to their television or radio. “Stuck in traffic, one can always amuse oneself by 
listening to the Gulf radio reports: the time of information never stops, the 
slower things are on the roads the more things circulate on the wavelengths” 
(Baudrillard, 1995: 78). Whereas news is often seen as informative for citizens it 
thus needs an entertaining ingredient as well, to keep the public attracted and 
amused, even when it concerns war. 
In conclusion, mediatisation should be understood from a technological 
interactionist perspective. The techniques of mass media, in interaction with 
social factors of de-pillarisation, consumerism and globalisation, have led to the 
commercialisation of news media. Accordingly, the interaction between news 
media and politics have resulted in societal change, which is characterised as 
the mediatisation of politics. I will discuss these developments and their impli-
cations in the next section.
2.4 THE MEDIATISATION OF POLITICS AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS
Since news must be saleable, information in news media has certain biases in 
contrast to other forms of information. News reports often emphasise emo-
tions, conflicts, power positions and personalities, in order to dramatise events. 
Baudrillard (1995) strongly criticises this dramatisation of reality by media, as 
being fraudulent and deceptive toward the mass media public. He claims that 
mass media offer “a masquerade of information” (Baudrillard, 1995: 40); a “dis-
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figuration of the world” (Ibid.); and a “structural unreality of images” (Idem: 46). 
Mass media only deliver simulacra, forming a hyper-reality. Similarly, Elchardus 
(2000: 189, my translation) defines news as “the cultural genre that generates 
an understandable, symbolic self-created version of the world, day by day, hour 
by hour”. According to these critics news thus creates new realities, mediatised 
realities, which deceive the public (see also Bennett, 2009). 
In his essays on the Gulf War, Baudrillard (1995) describes the Gulf War as 
a virtual reality, a simulacrum of the mass media. He in fact refutes the real 
occurrence of the Gulf War altogether. In my opinion this provocative state-
ment goes too far, as people were killed during the Gulf War. Nevertheless, the 
question to what extent the Gulf War was made up of dramatised, virtual events 
is clearly relevant and could also be applied to other contexts. These could be 
similarly tragic contexts such as the disastrous crash of flight MH17 or the pres-
ent war against IS, but the question is also relevant in the context of more or 
less regular political events and processes. Even when simulacra or dramatised 
events do not reflect reality, they can have real effects because of the functions 
media fulfil in political processes. In many cases the public, and even some 
actors involved in the political processes, perceive political reality through the 
media (democratic fora function of media). Mediatised realities consequently 
become their reality, which they use as a basis for their opinions, decisions and 
actions (agenda setting function of media). Mediatised realities thus “become 
enmeshed in the ensuing material and social reality” (Baudrillard, 1995: 11). 
The enmeshing of mediatised reality and societal practice also stems from 
the need of some societal institutions to communicate through media. These 
societal institutions make their communication fit for the news media logic 
in advance, thus incorporating the (commercialised) news biases in their com-
munication. “Real news is bad news”, said McLuhan (1964: 227-8); good news 
can only be sold in combination with a substantial amount of bad news, images, 
conflict and/or human interest. This also includes adapting to different media 
format criteria. A famous example is the debate between Kennedy and Nixon. 
The listeners of the radio chose Nixon as the winner, while the television view-
ers preferred Kennedy. Kennedy appeared to be an “excellent TV image. He has 
used the medium with the same effectiveness that Roosevelt had learned to 
achieve by radio” (McLuhan, 1964: 367). 
If political actors know how they can adapt to media and their logic, media 
can also function as deceptive instruments for them (Baudrillard, 1995). The 
commercial news media logic is about how to attract and retain the attention 
of mass publics, and political actors are motivated to respond to and feed 
masses. Masses are responsive to images, feelings and associations such as fear, 
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discontent, hostility and power. Populist politicians especially – and explicitly 
– respond to and feed these moods of masses and use mass media deceptively. 
Populist politicians in the Netherlands for instance claim to speak on behalf 
of the people, but actually they speak on behalf of “the members of a specific 
ethnic group (white), nationality (Dutch) or social class (‘the ordinary citizen’)” 
(De Mul, 2011: 151, my translation). Moreover, populist politicians working in 
the parliament in The Hague (or aiming to) “flaunt in the media their aversion 
to the intrigues in The Hague or question the principles on which the consti-
tutional state is based – non-discrimination, freedom of speech – with regard 
to certain groups [in society]” (De Mul, 2011: 160, my translation). Despite the 
deceptiveness, their political communication is mediagenic as it alludes to 
impulses and emotions of mass publics. 
This enmeshing of mediatised reality and political practice might have further 
consequences in governance contexts. Actors in governance may feel they need 
to do something with the discomfort, whether this is stirred up by news media 
logic and/or populist politicians or not. Negative public opinions explicated in 
news reports, opinion polls or statements on Twitter (all alluding to impulses 
and emotions of the mass) can affect decision-making processes and even poli-
cies, when authorities “govern by poll” (De Mul, 2011: 159). When mediatised 
reality dominates the political and policy debate over facts and figures it can 
result in real policy effects (Korthagen, 2011; Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud, 2014). 
In general, the mass media with their commercially-oriented news media 
logic are thus seen to give preference to emotions, to images, human interest 
and conflicts over rational, deliberate reflection on issues in our democratic 
society. However, can we justify such a sharp contrast between emotions and 
rationality?
2.5 ON OUR WAY TO A MELODRAMATIC DEMOCRACY?
Elchardus (2002) calls the drama democracy a monstrosity. When media logic 
and its dramatisation dominates political processes, it results in a melodramatic 
democracy which impairs democratic political processes. He argues that “a vast 
number of democratically elected representatives appear to act as if the opinion 
of a few journalists and some crudely expressed emotions are more important 
than the ballot of the voter. In that way, the representative democracy is 
marginalised” (Elchardus, 2002: 25, my translation). His and comparable nega-
tive views of the dominant role of media in democracy (such as Fischer, 2003; 
Meyer & Hinchman, 2002; Cook, 2005; Bennett, 2009) imply an overall negative 
evaluation of emotions. Their underlying rationale is that the focus of media 
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on emotions usually affects political deliberations for the worse. This implicit 
reasoning in the majority of mediatisation research requires further reflection. 
The negative evaluation of emotions suggests that to the extent that humans 
can free themselves of emotions they can be more rational (Evans, 2002: 497). 
This traditional negative conception of emotions – originally rooted in the work 
of Plato – has in recent times been criticised by scholars that argue for a positive 
view of emotions (as Damasio, 1994; Evans, 2002; Goldie, 2004). These scholars 
claim, by contrast, that emotions affect reasoning for the better, and moreover, 
that humans are less rational to the extent that they lack emotions (Evans, 2002: 
498). 
Within this positive view, Evans (2002) presents the search hypothesis of 
emotions: emotions help us delimit the range of consequences and the range 
of outcomes to be considered in rational decision-making processes (see also 
Damasio, 1994). Evans (2002) suggests it might be our gut feelings that prevent 
us from making decisions that would lead to a negative outcome. Gut feelings 
are what enable people to quickly evaluate situations as good or bad, as a threat 
or an opportunity (Kahneman, 2011). Likewise, Goldie (2004: 255) argues that 
“emotions can reveal saliences that we might not otherwise recognize with the 
same speed and reliability; for example, we can immediately see that something 
is frightening or disgusting in a way that we would not be capable of if we were 
not capable of feeling these emotions”. 
Although a positive view emphasises the capacity of emotions to help us gain 
knowledge of the world and to make decisions, the role of emotions is not 
always considered to be positive (see also Kahneman, 2011). At certain times 
emotions hinder our ability to gain knowledge or make decisions, when they 
distort our ability to see things as they are. Emotions distort our perception 
and reason when our epistemic landscape becomes skewed to make it cohere 
with the emotional experience (Goldie, 2004: 259). This happens when one is 
not open to being disproved by new evidence, but ignores the new evidence 
or doubts its reliability for the sake of internal coherence. The preservation of 
emotionally held idées fixes then have the upper hand at the expense of unemo-
tional thoughts (Goldie, 2004: 260). A deep aversion to a certain political party 
might hinder an open-minded evaluation of their latest action, for instance. 
These two-sided reflections on emotions and rationality are also relevant in 
the context of mediated/mediatised realities. As discussed before, many per-
ceptions of (political) realities only come to us indirectly; through media we 
experience issues that take place or have taken place in another time or place. 
Media extend our senses, as McLuhan (1964) explained. So emotions that come 
to us through media can either hinder or help our ability to gain knowledge or 
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to make decisions. Nonetheless, in literature on the drama democracy emotions 
seem to be more or less equated with melodramatics, as a distortion that per 
definition hinders our ability to reason about political issues. This, however, is 
jumping to conclusions. The appeal to our gut feelings in media and politics 
can constructively support our political considerations. For instance, the per-
sonalisation of politics can be positive because personal sympathy or disgust for 
particular politicians or specific decisions can help in voting decisions, and can 
contribute positively to citizenship (Van Zoonen, 2005; Hajer, 2009). Emotions 
can stimulate political processes and public opinion and should not be rejected 
altogether. Moreover, “the idea that there could be a deliberative style of speech 
which is free from emotion is false” (Hoggett & Thompson, 2002: 113).
Political processes inevitably involve emotions, particularly within contem-
porary societies characterised by pluralism and diversity (Hoggett & Thompson, 
2002). A governance approach addresses knowledge and value conflicts and 
mutual dependencies among a diverse range of actors. These political decision-
making processes are rational as well as emotional. Emotions are involved in 
governance processes for at least three reasons: actors must be able to empathise 
with each particular actor; expressive and bodily aspects of communication 
are as important as rational aspects of communication; and the atmosphere 
for relaxed and open communication – by establishing trust and respect – is a 
crucial precondition for political deliberative processes (Hoggett & Thompson, 
2002: 108-110). In sum, emotions can help as well as hinder processes of po-
litical deliberation, but, more fundamentally, they can never be excluded from 
decision-making processes. 
2.6 IN CONCLUSION
This dissertation started with the discussion on the problematic connection 
between news media and politics. This second chapter has further clarified why 
many scholars criticise the pervasive role of media and their logic in political 
processes. Since news media can be seen as extensions of human senses and 
nerves, which are crucial in contemporary societies, the quality of news reports 
is an important concern. The logic by which news media translate and trans-
form information causes scholars to question the quality of the information. 
Mediatised information has important biases, such as the focus on emotions and 
drama. Scholars therefore claim mediatised information to be only an illusion, 
a simulacrum, which does not represent reality (Baudrillard, 1995; Elchardus, 
2002; Bennett, 2009). In their view media logic thereby disables news media 
from being well-functioning democratic fora.
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Furthermore, scholars reproach political actors for letting themselves get 
carried away by mediatised political realities. Hence, news media biases are 
not only troubling because they affect the problems, issues and worldviews of 
citizens and actors, but they also tempt political actors to act in (responsive) 
ways that fit mediatised political realities (Elchardus, 2002; Cook, 2005: 114). 
Scholars thus similarly question the way in which media have effects on politi-
cal decision-making processes, for example how they can set the agenda.
The interconnection between media and politics is moreover criticised be-
cause political actors use media as a deceptive instrument for their strategic 
communication. Media and politics are claimed to deceive their publics by ap-
pealing to gut feelings instead of providing rational facts or reasons that reflect 
reality (as Baudrillard, 1995; Elchardus, 2002; De Mul, 2011). These three lines 
of criticism will be elaborated further in the next chapter about the roles of 
media in governance processes and the implications of mediatisation. 
Two other considerations should be kept in mind when discussing medi-
atisation in general. First, the blame should not be laid at media’s door only. 
Mediatisation is not a deterministic concept, for which explanations should 
principally be sought in technical characteristics of the media. Mediatisation 
should be applied as a ‘technological interactionist’ approach to studying rela-
tions between media and society (De Mul, 2002). The presence of media biases, 
the degree of mediatisation and its impact thus depends on the (local) context. 
Crucial contextual factors are for instance the type of policy issue at stake, the 
actors involved, the democratic tradition and the media system of a country or 
region.  
The last remark concerns the implicit unilateral negative evaluation of emo-
tions in many studies about mediatisation. This seems to disregard the fact 
that concerns, fears, emotions and conflicts are inseparably linked to political 
processes. Mediatised emotions can indeed distort perceptions of reality, but 
they can also contribute to reasoning processes (Evans, 2002; Goldie, 2004). 
Studies on mediatisation so far have neglected the possible positive functions 
of mediatised emotions. 
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Chapter 3
Mediatisation and governance: a theoretical 
overview
Chapter 2 discussed the concept of mediatisation in depth. In Chapter 3, mediatisa-
tion will be discussed in relation to governance processes. This chapter was written 
with Erik-Hans Klijn and has been submitted to the journal Policy and Politics, and 
it can therefore be read as a separate article (this implies that some elements will 
overlap with parts of other chapters). 
The chapter offers a theoretical overview of relations between media and gover-
nance. Media are not often part of the scope of research about governance processes. 
However, media are relevant for governance processes in the different functions this 
article identifies: as democratic fora for the dissemination of and deliberation on 
information; as agenda setters; and as strategic communication instruments. These 
functions are elaborated by streams of literature that have strong historical roots. 
At the same time there is a more recent stream of literature on mediatisation that 
emphasises that other spheres of society are increasingly permeated by the logic of 
the media. 
This article has three main aims. First, to provide an overview of the insights from 
earlier literature on the three functions of media in governance. Second, to connect 
these insights to the recent literature on mediatisation. And last, to identify the im-
pact mediatisation can have on governance processes. The article thereby combines 
two not very often connected branches of literature (literature on governance and 
mediatisation) and offers new conceptualisations and avenues of research.
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3.1 MEDIATISATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GOVERNANCE 
PROCESSES
Until recently literature on governance and literature on mediatisation were 
two separate bodies of literature in scientific debate, although news media and 
governance considerably interact in practice (Hajer, 2009; Marcinkowski, 2014). 
Moreover, the literature on mediatisation could benefit from a more realistic 
conceptualisation of political decision-making processes, while the literature on 
governance could profit from an understanding of what mediatisation implies 
(Hajer, 2009). Although much has been written about the mediatisation of society 
and particularly about the mediatisation of politics (Schulz, 2004; Cook, 2005; 
Hjarvard, 2008; Landerer, 2013; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014), the implications for 
decision-making processes in governance are rarely addressed (Marcinkowski, 
2014). The purpose of this article is threefold. (1.) To discuss the main functions 
of media in governance processes based on existing (classical) literature: media 
function as democratic fora, disseminating and deliberating  on information; 
as agenda setters; and as strategic communication instruments. (2.) To connect 
these functions to the growing more recent literature on mediatisation. (3.) To 
identify mechanisms by which mediatisation influences governance processes.
Governance: complex interaction processes around policies
Governments the world over seem to be looking for or are experimenting with 
new forms of horizontal governance, like public-private partnerships (Osborne, 
2000), interactive decision-making and stakeholder involvement (Edelenbos & 
Klijn, 2006) or various forms of citizens involvement (Torfing & Triantafillou, 
2011). Many conceptualisations of governance exist. Most conceptions share the 
idea of a shift from government – with an emphasis on the organisation and 
the unicentric power of governments –  to governance – with an emphasis on 
the inclusive decision-making process in which outcomes are achieved (Pierre 
& Peeters, 2000; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). 
We use the concept of governance to designate complex interaction, decision-
making and implementation processes around public policies including a 
diverse group of public, private and societal actors (Kickert et al., 1997; Ansell 
& Gash, 2008; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011). These governance processes take 
place in webs of relationships between government, business and civil society 
actors, referred to as governance networks (cf. Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Cru-
cial to the emergence and existence of governance networks are dependency 
relations between actors (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978). The resource dependencies 
around policy problems or policy programmes require actors to interact with 
one another and to create intensive and enduring interactions (Mandell, 2001; 
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Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). At the same time, however, actors have different 
perceptions of the problem and will choose their own specific strategies, which 
makes interactions unpredictable and complex (Kickert et al., 1997;  McGuire 
& Agranoff,  2011). Governance processes are thus time-consuming and require 
the dedication of actors as well as active management (Klijn et al., 2010b; Mc-
Guire & Agranoff, 2011).
Governance and news media 
The role of news media has been studied mainly in relation to political processes 
and less so in relation to decision-making processes around policies (Wolfe, 
Jones & Baumgartner, 2013). Nevertheless, the main mechanisms described in 
literature about media and political processes are also relevant in the context 
of governance. The relation between media and governance processes can be 
studied in terms of three different functions of media:
- media as democratic fora: News media form important fora where actors 
publicly discuss issues and where actors obtain their democratic informa-
tion (Iyengar & Simon, 1993; Schudson, 1998, 2008; Graber, 2004; Aalberg & 
Curran, 2012a); 
- media as agenda setters: News media determine to a certain extent what issues 
are put on the agenda of decision-makers and how the issues are handled 
(Cobb & Elder, 1983; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009); 
- Media as instruments for strategic communication: News media provide impor-
tant platforms for actors to reach a wider audience (Blumler & Kavanagh, 
1999; Davis, 2002; Cook, 2005; Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011). 
Implications of mediatisation
In the literature on mediatisation it has been argued that media do not neutrally 
transmit information but, like all institutions, shape and select information in 
certain ways (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Cook, 2005; 
Parkinson, 2006). The process of news-making led by the media’s rules, aims, 
production routines and constraints is known as media logic (Altheide & Snow, 
1979; Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Hjarvard, 2008; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). 
Media logic includes aspects such as media’s tendency to select negative issues 
over positive ones and to dramatise and sensationalise issues in the news. Many 
scholars describe how the institutional rules of media penetrate into the politi-
cal sphere, as politicians follow an electoral logic, strive for media attention, 
and so adapt their behaviour to characteristics of news media (cf. Landerer, 
2013). Only a few publications have described or empirically explored aspects of 
the mediatisation of governance processes (as Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 
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2010; Voltmer & Koch-Baumgarten, 2010; Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012; Schil-
lemans, 2012; Esser & Matthes, 2013). In this overview, we combine these recent 
studies on mediatisation with previous research on the relations between media 
and governance processes to obtain a full overview of the relevant mechanisms 
of mediatisation in governance processes. 
We continue this article with a systematic discussion of the literature about 
the three roles of media in governance (section 2). Subsequently, implications of 
mediatisation for the roles of media in governance processes are described (sec-
tion 3). Next, we identify important tensions between media logic and the logic 
of governance processes (section 4). We conclude our article with a framework 
in which different mechanisms of mediatisation in the context of governance 
processes are recognised (section 5).
3.2 ROLES OF MEDIA IN GOVERNANCE PROCESSES
Relations between media and governance can be studied through the lens of 
various theoretical approaches and concepts. In the introduction we stated that 
the different branches of literature identify three theoretical functions of the 
media. We first discuss these three functions (section 3.2.1.-3.2.3), examining 
some of the classic literature on media. Subsequently, we contrast the three 
perspectives with each other and show they are related (section 3.2.4.).
3.2.1  News media as democratic fora 
Democracy requires that citizens and (societal) groups interact and discuss 
policy problems and political choices. This has been emphasised in most demo-
cratic theories, but especially in the deliberative democratic theories that have 
dominated democratic theory building for the last two decennia (Dryzek, 2000; 
Held, 2006). News media offer platforms for democratic discussion, making 
media a common carrier of perspectives of various groups in society (Schudson, 
2008: 12).  This democratic fora function also means that they provide a window 
to the vast world beyond our direct experience (McCombs, 2004, 3). 
News media provide information on relevant political and societal processes so 
that citizens (and stakeholders) are able to make informed political choices and 
to ‘check’ authorities on their performance (Hulteng & Nelson, 1983; Schudson, 
1998; Graber, 2004; Aalberg & Curran, 2012a). News media can alert citizens 
and other stakeholders to the corrupt practices or other sorts of misbehaviour 
on the part of public authorities and others, which is often referred to as the 
watchdog function (see Schultz, 1998).
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In order to perform this function, news media select and frame important, 
relevant societal and political issues and give them meaning. Frames are inter-
pretation schemes that reduce the complexity of information. In the words of 
Entman (1993: 52) “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and 
make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation”.
Through their selection and framing, news media affect views of the public on 
specific issues (Gerbner, 1998; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Iyengar & Simon, 1993; 
Entman, 1993; McCombs, 2004; Scheufele & Tewskbury, 2007). The most promi-
nent issues in the news become the most prominent concerns of the public 
(McCombs, 2004). Furthermore, the news guides how people think about gov-
ernance processes; this is referred to as ‘cultivation effect’ in early research by 
Gerbner (1998) or ‘priming effect’ in studies by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) and 
Iyengar and Simon (1993). Scheufele (2000: 300) explains the priming model as 
follows: “Mass media, Iyengar and Kinder (1987) argued, affect ‘the standards 
by which governments, policies and candidates for public office are judged’ (p. 
63). Political issues that are most salient or accessible in a person’s memory 
will most strongly influence perceptions of political actors and figures.” Both 
priming and framing studies – although based on different psychological foun-
dations (Scheufele & Tewsbury, 2007) – argue that news affects public opinion. 
Effects of news reports on the public should not be seen as clear causal 
relations, however. “The public sphere does not begin and end when media 
content reaches an audience; this is but one step in larger communication and 
cultural chains that include how the media output is received, made sense of 
and utilized by citizens” (Dahlgren, 2006: 274). Moreover, citizens do not read all 
available news; they will survey “the political scene carefully enough to detect 
major political threats to themselves or their communities” (Graber, 2004: 562; 
see also Zaller, 2003; Schudson, 1998). Unless unclear causal relations between 
the selection and framing of policy issues and the effects on public opinion, 
media set the stage for the definition of problems and solutions in governance 
processes. 
3.2.2  The agenda setting function
Agenda forming processes are characterised by continuous struggles between vari-
ous actors (and their strategies) to (re)formulate policy issues. As such they are 
typical governance processes affected by media attention. The aim of actors is 
not only to get the issue on the political agenda but also to shape its formulation 
in a certain way (see Dery, 1984; Kingdon, 1984). As different actors emphasise 
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different aspects of an issue, a policy issue is rarely treated systematically in 
the political system (see Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). By increasing news media’s 
attention for certain issues and certain problem formulations the issues can be added 
to the political agenda, thereby influencing the decision-making processes (see 
Cobb & Elder, 1983; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). 
Baumgartner and Jones envisage the process of agenda building as a complex 
system of actors, institutions and issues that can be in a relatively stable posi-
tion, but which can suddenly be disrupted by changes in issue formulation and 
actor participation: “... a change in issue definition can lead to destabilisation 
and rapid change away from the old point of stability. This happens when issues 
are redefined to bring in new participants. Similarly a change of institutional 
rules of standing or of jurisdiction can rupture an old equilibrium” (Baumgart-
ner & Jones, 2009: 16). While Baumgartner and Jones assume media attention to 
lead to positive feedback and change, Wolfe (2012) argues that media coverage also 
contributes to – temporary – negative feedback and stability. She empirically 
shows that news media coverage is related to decelerating effects. Most likely 
due to the input of new information and requests for changes in news reports, 
news coverage slows down the speed of decision-making processes around policies 
(Wolfe, 2012). The complex interactions between issues, actors’ strategies and 
internal and external events make exact outcomes of agenda setting processes 
unpredictable. 
Moreover, researchers disagree on whether media attention has real effects on 
the political and policy agenda, or whether the outcomes are largely symbolic 
politics. In their overview article on agenda-setting research, Walgrave and Van 
Aelst (2006) show that half of the studies find strong effects, whereas the other 
half only finds limited effects. The effects on, for instance, presidential speeches 
or other events where rhetoric is employed might be significant, but less effects 
can be found in the actual political decision-making processes around policies. 
The actual agenda-setting effects might depend on factors such as the type of 
policy issue (obtrusive issues or not, the ownership of the issue etc.) and the 
political context (election time or not, political configuration like the type of 
government-opposition game etc.) (Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). 
Ultimately, it is how actors react to news reports and whether they change 
their strategies in the decision-making process that is decisive. And although 
unpredictable in their exact effects, news reports can significantly influence the 
context in which actors bargain and make decisions (Cook, 2005).
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3.2.3  News media as strategic communication 
instruments
Media also function as instruments for actors: different actors within governance 
processes use media as strategic communication instruments. These actors aim 
to influence the selection and framing processes of media. They need media to 
communicate messages to the larger public; to legitimise decisions, gain a positive 
public image or to increase their power position in governance processes (Hur-
relman et al., 2009). This function is extensively explored in literature about 
public and political communication, public relations and related literature 
about political marketing and branding.
Through the media, actors aim to build relations with stakeholders and the larger 
public. Building a relation with stakeholders can be done in several ways, but 
the media are primarily used to communicate information, images and brands. 
A brand is “a name, term, sign, symbol or design, or a combination of these, 
intended to identify the goods or services of one seller or group of sellers and 
to differentiate them from those of competitors.”(Kotler, Asplund, et al., 1999: 
571). Brands not only communicate images and meaning to a possible audience 
but also simplify choices (voters do not have the read the complete programme 
of political parties, for instance) (see Needham, 2006: 179). Brands are strong 
images that make use of visualisations and emotional associations (see Kotler, 
Asplund et al., 1999; Arvidsson, 2006; Hankinson, 2004; Malony, 2002; Leesh 
Marshment, 2009). A famous example of branding in a policy context is Blair’s 
‘Third way’. This brand enabled Blair to distinguish his policies from old Labour 
policies (state oriented), and conservative policies (market oriented). 
To use media as a strategic instrument, actors provide journalists with information 
subsidies: “Faced with time constraints, and the need to produce stories that will 
win publication, journalists will attend to, and make use of, subsidised informa-
tion that is of a type and form that will achieve that goal. By reducing the costs 
faced by journalists in satisfying their organisational requirements, the subsidy 
giver increases the probability that the subsidized information will be used” 
(Gandy, 1982: 62). Press releases, press conferences, pre-arranged interviews 
and press tours are examples of information subsidies that are nowadays fully 
integrated into the process of news production (Davis, 2002). Besides that, you 
can also think of organised protests, web pages or news leaking. 
Several authors observe that there is an increase in the volume of informa-
tion subsidies aimed at the media, whereas at the same time the number of 
journalists is declining (see Davis, 2007; Prenger et al., 2011; Esser, 2013). It 
is therefore claimed that PR information subsidies increasingly shape the 
news (Davis, 2002; Cook, 2005; Lewis, Williams & Franklin, 2008; Prenger et 
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Table 3.1 Three roles of media in governance processes 
News media as 
democratic fora
News media as agenda 
setters
News media 
as strategic 
communication 
instruments
Main origin Democratic theory 
and political 
communication
Politic science 
literature about agenda 
setting
Political 
communication, public 
relation literature (and 
political marketing, 
and branding)
Focal point Environment (the 
democratic forum)
Issue (and decision-
making process)
Organisation
Focus Information and 
debate for deliberative 
processes
Affecting agendas 
of decision-makers, 
resulting in changes in 
the content and process 
of decision-making
Communicating 
messages using media
Mechanisms  - media select and 
frame governance 
issues in news reports
- media reports affect 
public opinion
 - struggles between 
various actors to 
increase media 
attention for certain 
problem formulations
- media add issues to 
the political agenda 
leading to changes or 
postponement
- media reports affect 
the context in which 
actors negotiate and 
make decisions
- relations with an 
audience are built 
through the media 
- images and brands 
simplify information 
- actors feed media with 
information subsidies 
and brands with the 
aim of shaping the 
news
al., 2011). Other scholars disagree, however, claiming instead that information 
subsidies only have limited impact on the political agenda (Tedesco, 2011; see 
also Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006 for an overview). Also with respect to this role 
of media in governance, causal lines are thus not easy to draw. The effectiveness 
of information subsidies varies across contexts and is dependent on factors like 
the personality of the politician, the approval rating, and relationships with the 
press (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011).
3.2.4  Comparing the three roles
Table 3.1 summarises the main differences between the three broad theoretical 
functions of media. The three roles of media can be distinguished analytically, 
but the roles interact and are mutually reinforcing in practice. The functions 
of media in governance processes are in constant interaction with each other. 
Whereas news media select and frame issues (which affects public opinion), 
news media are at the same time steered and fed by actors that aim to use news 
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media as a strategic communication instrument. This interaction between me-
dia selecting from various information subsidies and framing the information 
ultimately shapes the context in which actors bargain and decide. The process 
of agenda setting might in turn lead to a more strategic handling of the media 
and/or news reports about the process of policy making and the concomitant 
struggles.
In the next sections we will see how the three functions are influenced by 
media logic and processes of mediatisation. 
3.3 THE PERSPECTIVE OF MEDIATISATION
In the expanding literature on mediatisation it is argued that societies are 
increasingly submitted to or becoming dependent on the media and their logic 
(e.g. Hjarvard, 2008: 113; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Reunanen et al., 2010; 
Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). The perspective of mediatisation thus not only fo-
cuses on the importance and impact of media in society – as does the literature 
discussed in the previous section – but also on the guiding logic behind news 
reporting. 
3.3.1  Rules of media logic
Media form a separate institution with their own rules and modus operandi 
(Cook, 2005; Hjarvard, 2008; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). This means that we can 
see media logic as an institutional practice; that is, as a set of rules regulating 
actors’ behaviour (see Scott, 1995; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Cook, 2005;  Asp, 
2014). Media logic provides a set of rules for journalists and others involved in 
media that enables sensible actions and constrains other actions. By constantly 
enacting these rules, media logic as an institutional practice is confirmed but 
also changed over time (Giddens, 1984). Media logic must therefore not be seen 
as static (Cook, 2005).
An extensive set of rules make up the institutional practice of media logic; 
various elements are listed in the literature (see Altheide & Snow, 1979; Bennett, 
2009; Landerer, 2013; Asp, 2014). Strömbäck and Esser (2014: 17-18) identify 
three distinctive dimensions that can be used to categorise the various rules 
and norms of media logic: 
1. Professionalism (see also Bennett, 2009; Asp, 2014): Journalistic norms and 
values require journalists to be independent, to maintain standards of 
newsworthiness in news selection, and to serve the public interest. Scholars 
stress that rules about objectivity and the separation of facts and figures 
gradually emerged in the beginning of the 20th century (see Cook, 2005).
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2. Commercialism: Because of their commercial interests, the media seek to 
maximise their appeal to target groups that are relevant to advertisers. Rules 
inspired by commercialism are about running a business, and they have 
implications for news production, news selection and news presentation. 
News has to be attractive for an audience, which often results in biases of 
dramatisation, negativity, focus on authorities, and human interest in the 
news (see Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009). The news production process is 
also influenced by the need to make efficient use of scarce resources. Most 
journalists are asked to create several news reports a day, which requires 
them to do so efficiently, and that includes using information subsidies. 
3. Media technology; The format criteria of each communication platform set 
the contours of news presentation. Media technology shapes the production 
process, the content and the way messages have to be communicated (in an 
8 o’clock news format for instance; in images, sound and/or text) (Hjarvard, 
2008; Bennett, 2009)
As in all institutions, the rules and norms of the media generally do not form a 
naturally coherent and unambiguous set. Clear tensions exist between the rules 
of professionalism and those of commercialism. Indeed, the main concerns of 
scholars that address the mediatisation of democratic information is this ten-
sion between professional norms of journalism and the commercial interests of 
news organisations. “The degree of mediatization may be measured according 
to how much the respective field’s autonomous pole has weakened; eventually, 
some fields will lose their autonomy entirely. Media, too, have autonomous 
and heteronomous poles, where the autonomous pole is the site of aspects like 
professionalized journalism and codes of ethics, and the heteronomous pole is 
the site of, say, the influence exerted by the advertising market. There is a ten-
sion between the poles in the media; in news media, for example, journalistic 
criteria of news value and the ideals of good journalism often compete with the 
demands of the need to sell copies, the influence exerted by news sources, and 
so forth” (Hjarvard, 2008: 126). Rules of commercialism tend to push journalists 
to a more sensational framing of the news, while journalists’ professionalism 
tends to stimulate giving the facts and to separate news from opinion. Further-
more, growing competition and economic considerations can lead to a decline 
in journalistic products in a certain area, so that journalists are not able to act 
as a watchdog anymore; that is, commercial interests can overrule professional 
standards (McChesney, 1999; Patterson, 2000). Various authors emphasise that 
commercialism has become a stronger element of the media logic in the past 
decades and can have negative consequences for democratic processes (e.g. Pat-
terson, 2000; Fischer, 2003; Bennett, 2009). 
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The concerns about commercialism and its consequences are the most signifi-
cant motives behind studies on mediatisation (Landerer, 2013). Mediatisation 
studies generally focus on the consequences of the commercial news media 
logic’s  interference in the logics of other societal institutions. Such as stud-
ies on the mediatisation of politics which report to what extent and how the 
adaptation to the commercial news media logic is changing politics (e.g. Strömbäck 
& Esser, 2014; Landerer, 2013; Hjarvard, 2008; Kepplinger, 2002; Mazzoleni & 
Schulz, 1999). Recently, there has been a growing interest in the consequences 
of the news media logic with regard to decision-making processes in governance. 
3.3.2  The implications of mediatisation for governance 
processes
Above we discussed three roles of the media in relation to governance processes. 
In this section the implications of the thesis of mediatisation for these roles 
will be described. The media logic, especially due to a dominating commercial 
dimension, has an impact on the described relations between media and gover-
nance. Media logic affects the information provided in the deliberative process 
and thereby the framing and priming effects. Moreover, media logic moderates 
the relations between media and the agenda of decision-makers and the use of 
media as instruments for strategic political communication. As Lundby (2009a: 
9) argues: “The concept of mediatization may help see ‘old’ questions in com-
munication studies and media sociology in new and more striking and relevant 
ways”. The concept of mediatisation builds on the described theoretical tradi-
tions, acknowledging the functions of media in political and policy processes, 
and it adds the observation that media’s functions are shaped by media logic. 
Mediatisation thus both includes and transcends media effects (Schulz, 2004: 
90).
On the basis of the recent literature on mediatisation and its impact, the 
consequences of the commercial news media logic for the roles of media in 
governance processes will be discussed. 
Mediatised democratic fora
Hjarvard (2008) argues that one of the principal consequences of the mediatisa-
tion of society is that we have a shared experiential world that is regulated by 
media logic (see also Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999). Media select and frame gover-
nance issues and processes according to a commercial media logic, resulting in 
a focus on authorities, personalisation, dramatisation and negativity (toward 
authorities) in news reports about public affairs. Many scholars therefore ex-
press severe criticism regarding the mediatisation of information. Commercial 
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interests are claimed to be dumbing down political reporting (Habermas, 1989; 
Bennett, 2009). More entertainment is provided in the content and form of 
news. The increase in such ‘soft’ news and in critical journalism are said to 
shrink the news audience and weaken democracy (Patterson, 2000).  
On the other hand, scholars like Graber (2004: 551) accuse the critics of cling-
ing to a non-realistic ideal of news media that cover all politically important 
issues and present this in the form of high-quality news stories to their news-
hungry public. For many audiences political news is not so interesting (Aalberg 
& Curran, 2012b) or too complicated. Soft news has more potential to reach 
disinterested audiences. Moreover, soft news or infotainment can also provide 
democratically relevant information (Aalberg & Curran, 2012b). 
Mediatised agenda setting
From the perspective of mediatisation, the role of setting the agendas of deci-
sion-makers is restricted by media logic. Only a limited number of issues will be 
selected by media and framed, due to media biases such as personalisation, dra-
matisation and the authority-disorder bias. Baumgartner and Jones have argued 
that the agenda-setting role of the media is biased by the media’s fascination 
with conflict and by the competition between media (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009: 104). At the same time, politicians are even more willing to get involved 
in these issues in the news. Fischer (2003: 58) states in his book Reframing public 
politics: “Politicians and the media (…) have turned contemporary politics into 
a political spectacle that is experienced more like a stage drama rather than 
reality itself.” This echoes Edelman’s (1977) observations, almost forty years 
ago, in his book Words that succeed and policies that fail. Also governance processes 
are claimed to be mediatised (Hajer, 2009). Mediatisation “entices politicians to 
show that they matter, and the temptation is to perform authority in precisely 
the way that fits the preferred media format”, although this clashes with col-
laborative and collective governance processes (Hajer, 2009: 177). The critical 
notes are clear: politicians, the agenda of decision-makers and (symbolic) inter-
ventions are led too strongly by biased media coverage, rather than by thorough 
analyses and deliberations with involved stakeholders. 
Adoption of media logic in strategic communication 
The main driver of mediatisation is the symbiosis of the commercially-oriented 
media landscape and the adoption of the media logic by other institutions and 
organisations and society (Landerer, 2014). While different actors, collectives and 
institutions have become dependent on mass media in their central functions, 
their actions are continuously shaped by the media logic (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 
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1999; Thorbjørnsrud et al., 2014; Marcinkowski, 2014). Hence, over the last de-
cades the number of communication professionals working for governmental 
organisations, private companies and interest groups has risen spectacularly 
(Davis, 2002; Cook, 2005; Neijens & Smit, 2006; Lewis et al., 2008; Prenger et al., 
2011).  This has gone hand-in-hand with the growing use of marketing tools and 
brands in political and public communication and the presentation of policy 
plans (see Leesh-Marsment, 2009; Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2011; Eshuis & Klijn, 
2012). The communication professionals must cope with media logic in their 
pursuit of as much positive publicity as possible, as well as in their attempt to 
protect their organisations against negative or undesirable publicity (McNair, 
2003). Many scholars therefore claim that socially relevant information is al-
ready reduced to mediagenic information by communication professionals, in 
their attempt to make it fit for the (commercial) news media logic (Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1995; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Davis, 2002). It should be noted, 
however, that much of the research on media communication that describes 
Table 3.2 Concerns in mediatisation literature, differentiated according to the three roles of 
media in relation to governance. 
Functions of media News media as democratic 
fora
News media as political 
agenda setters
Media as strategic 
communication instruments
General mechanisms - media select and 
frame (policy) issues in 
news reports
- news reports affect 
views of the public
-  various actors  
struggle to increase 
media attention for 
certain problem 
formulations
- media set the issues 
on the agenda of 
decision-makers, 
leading to changes or 
decelerating effects
- media reports affect 
the context in which 
actors negotiate and 
make decisions
- building relations with 
an audience through the 
media 
- actors feed media with 
information subsidies 
and brands in order to 
shape the news
Concerns within 
mediatisation literature
 - media select and 
frame (policy) issues in 
news reports according 
to their logic
- media biases are 
dumbing down 
democratic information 
- only issues that 
fit media logic are 
selected by media and 
framed accordingly
- because politicians 
need media 
performances, they are 
quick to react to news 
reports
- quick reactions can 
undermine deliberate 
policy decisions
- adoption of media logic 
in functioning of social 
institutions, particularly 
in their communication
- socially relevant 
information is 
reduced to mediagenic 
information
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ssthe adaptation to media logic in political processes is performed in the con-
text of highly visible actors such as PMs, political candidates in elections or 
presidents (as Esbaugh-Soha, 2011). Only a few other actors in policy processes 
have such public visibility. 
Table 3.2 summarises the concerns in mediatisation literature, differentiated 
according to the three different roles of media in governance processes.
3.4 MEDIATISATION: TENSIONS BETWEEN MEDIA 
LOGIC AND LOGIC OF GOVERNANCE 
We conclude this overview with an examination of the tensions that occur 
when media and their logic interfere in governance processes. Results of in-
terferences can be changes in the process – that is, in interactions between the 
actors – or in the content, that is in policy decisions and/or discussions about 
the policy issue. In the introduction we argued that governance processes are 
complex and require the dedication of the various actors, as well as active man-
agement. Leaders in governance networks aim to construct policy solutions that 
are attractive to the various actors involved. Moreover, flexibility in handling 
the goals and content proposals is needed to manoeuvre through the process 
and to create the essential support (see Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Koppenjan 
& Klijn, 2004). Last but not least, governance processes require a commitment 
to the long process and skills to create trust relations between actors. Actors 
must be willing to exchange information and cooperate over a long period of 
time. When media interfere in governance processes, actors need to deal with 
news media that tend to zoom in on drama and conflict, and on the personal 
gains or failures of the authorities involved. This may lead to tensions and to 
actors changing their strategies, and subsequently to changes in the content of 
decisions and the interaction processes.
Some pioneering scholars have examined the effects of mediatisation on 
governance trajectories. On the basis of their work we are able to outline some 
preliminary answers to questions about the impact of mediatisation on gover-
nance as well as to formulate directions for future research. Although effects 
of mediatisation can be both functional and dysfunctional (see also Schrott & 
Spranger, 2007), scholars have focused more on the negative effects.
3.4.1  Content 
Media biases like personalisation and dramatisation are claimed toshape the 
information that media provide about the complex reality of governance pro-
cesses (Brants & Neijens, 1998, Patterson, 2000; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; 
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Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006; Strömbäck & Shehata, 
2007; Bennett, 2009). Media create clear story lines that organise the content, 
which are nice to read or view and easy to understand.  Hence, political decision-
making is often framed as a conflict with winners and losers, while the policy 
issue itself can easily be looked at from a human interest perspective and/or 
criticised as a policy failure.
The reality in day-to-day decision-making processes in governance is much 
more complex, however, with a wide range of policy options deliberately 
considered by the public, private and societal actors involved. Moreover, policy 
plans are constantly changing during the process due to cross-frame reflection 
which is needed to achieve integrative and innovative policy solutions (Kop-
penjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Hence, clashes between news media logic and the logic of governance can be 
expected. Not only do media reports downplay the complexity of policy issues, 
but they also affect the range of policy options that can be considered. After the 
media reports about risks and policy failures, the range of policy solutions which 
can still be publicly legitimised becomes limited for decision-makers (Voltmer 
& Koch-Baumgarten, 2010). In addition, discussions framed in terms of winners 
and losers are difficult to reconcile with a deliberate governance process where 
integrative policy solutions are developed. In such a mediatised context, actors 
will avoid making unpopular decisions, fearing unfavourable media coverage 
(Kepplinger, 2007: 14). Davis (2007) refers to this as the anticipatory news media 
effect. Also Ihlen and Thorbjørnsrud (2014) report that political realities shaped 
by negative, dramatised or human interest news reports can substantively 
change policy decisions. This could also imply positive democratisation effects, 
such as that media attention opens up governance processes for less well-
represented groups (citizens groups etc.) (Korthagen & Van Meerkerk, 2014).  
In public communication, tensions between news media logic and governance 
values exist as well. As Cook (2005: 91) describes: “while officials have an easier 
time entering the public sphere, they cannot get their message across in an 
unfiltered way. The production values of news direct them – and us – toward 
particular political values and politics: not so much pushing politics either con-
sistently left or right as toward officialdom and toward standard of good stories 
that do not make for equally good political outcomes”. Among both politicians 
and public managers, there is a growing awareness that media are or can be 
active actors in governance processes and therefore need to be addressed (see 
Klijn et al., 2014). Actors will thus adapt their strategic communication to the 
needs of the media. This need to profile oneself in the media creates tensions, as 
there is much more ambiguity about the policy issue than fits in a news report. 
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Communication in the media about the content of the governance process 
can therefore be risky, as actor perspectives are diverse and policy options can 
change over time.
3.4.2  Process
The tension between media logic and that of governance processes can also 
impact the process. Sporer-Wagner and Marcinkowski (2010: 9-10) claim that 
“the rationales of media publicity and political negotiation are incompatible: 
The media call for transparency in political processes and show specific inter-
est in individuals, conflicts and negative outcomes. Negotiations, on the other 
hand, require an atmosphere of privacy which allows for compromises, com-
municated to the public as collective decisions without indicating any winner 
or loser.” The privacy required for the collective and complex decision-making 
process clashes with a news media lens that zooms in on individual actions, 
emotions and failures. 
Other effects on the process result from the contradiction between media’s 
fascination with conflicts and the need for trust relations in governance 
processes. Trust building is important in networks because many unexpected 
events can happen; trust is the essential glue that holds the network together 
in difficult times (Provan et al., 2009; Klijn et al., 2010a). News media will tend to 
emphasise and fuel the conflicts and competition between actors, and can thus 
pose a risk to trust relations and put  collaborative relations under pressure 
(Sporer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 2010; Korthagen & Klijn, 2014). 
Furthermore, in news reports the short term is important: there is pressure 
on the individual actors to show quick results. This is problematic because in a 
networked world, actors must deal with complex problems for which it is cru-
cial that actors are committed in the long term and are willing to compromise 
(Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). This is not an interesting and appealing story to tell 
in the news media, however. Negotiating processes under the media spotlight 
are therefore complicated by actors that position themselves and their values 
more decisively (Sporer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 2010; Esser & Matthes, 2013). 
Politicians in particular want to be visible in such mediatised processes. This 
motivates them to perform symbolic interventions, such as asking more official 
questions about a policy issue and by arranging media performances (Landerer, 
2014; Melenhorst, 2013). In general, actors  in decision-making processes want to 
react to the media’s pressure for quick results (Sporer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 
2010), and at the same time they are less willing to compromise and make back-
stage deals (Voltmer & Koch-Baumgarten, 2010). There is thus a clear tension 
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between long-term collaborative negotiations versus the short-term visibility 
and score of separate actors.
The tension stems from the desire to have a good public image and to control 
news reporting to get something done, ‘to govern with the news’ (Cook, 2005). 
This requires actors to communicate strong, often controversial statements 
that will be noticed in the media landscape (Hjarvard, 2008) and to build an 
authoritative image (Hajer, 2009), which stimulates opportunistic behaviour 
and go-it-alone strategies. The audiences, and especially the media, want a 
leader who is responsible for solving the problem and takes ownership of the 
process; this clashes with the need for a connective leader who connects various 
actors and communicates on behalf of a wide coalition. In a mediatised political 
reality, a (political) leader needs to claim success and to criticise the failures of 
others, whereas in network governance processes success has many fathers, 
while everyone has had to compromise as well.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The relevance of news media in relation to governance processes is increasingly 
acknowledged by scholars (e.g. Cook, 2005; Hajer, 2009; Bekkers & Moody, 2015). 
This opens up a new research area, with a wide range of questions. The aim of 
this article has been to provide a theoretical overview of the literature about 
relations between media, mediatisation and governance. It concludes with a 
conceptual framework that identifies key mechanism and interesting (research) 
questions examining the impact of mediatisation on governance processes. 
We first pointed out that media can have different functions in relation to 
governance processes:
- News media can be democratic fora in which information about the policy 
issue is disseminated and deliberated. 
- News media affect decision-making processes by political agenda setting and 
their impact on the context in which actors negotiate and decide. 
- News media can be used as a strategic communication instrument by differ-
ent actors involved in the governance process. 
Secondly, we discussed that media fulfil these functions through an institutional 
logic. Media as an institution are characterised by a set of rules through which 
they function. Within this set of rules, commercial interests seem to dominate: 
at the end of the day, news has to sell. News is therefore efficiently produced 
(for instance with the help of information subsidies and images and brands) 
and has information biases such as dramatisation, negativity and human inter-
est. In governance processes, there is an increasing need and even personnel 
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deployment to address the media and their logic. These developments in media 
and their effects on other societal institutions are referred to as mediatisation. 
Studies on the relationship between news media and governance should take 
account of mediatisation, given the fundamental effect of the news media logic 
and the adoption of news media logic by actors on this relationship. To that end 
we have described a number of potential and actual effects of mediatisation on 
the content and processes of governance, which are summarised in Table 3.3.
We emphasise however that not every governance trajectory will be media-
tised to the same degree. The degree of mediatisation varies among issues and 
among policy rounds. In fact, some governance processes will not be covered in 
the media at all (Sporer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 2010). The degree of mediati-
sation and the sorts of effects may moreover vary among different actors and 
their power position. While the powerful actors will use media as one power 
resource in addition to other resources, actors with less positional resources are 
Table 3.3 Effects of mediatisation on governance in terms of content and process.
Mediatised 
democratic fora
Mediatised agenda 
setting
Adoption of media 
logic in strategic 
communication
Content
(the policy issue at 
stake and substantive 
decisions)
News media biases 
such as dramatisation, 
personalisation and 
the authority-disorder 
bias downplay complex 
policy issues; ignoring 
the real variation in 
actors’ perspectives, 
and not really allowing 
for policy issues and 
goals to change.
Governance processes 
need the possibility 
of collective learning 
and reframing while 
media and their logic 
depict the discussion 
as a debate between 
winners and losers 
and limit the range of 
policy options that can 
be publicly legitimised.
There is much more 
ambiguity about 
policy issues in 
governance than 
fits in news reports. 
Communication 
in media about 
the content of the 
governance process 
can therefore be risky, 
since actor perspectives 
vary and policy options 
change over time.
Process (the 
interactions between 
actors)
Deliberative 
governance processes 
need internal 
transparency, exchange 
of argumentation and 
a ‘safe’ environment to 
compromise and learn 
while media and their 
logic push the process 
toward more external 
transparency and 
emphasise conflict and 
controversies.
The focus on conflict 
and controversies 
and on the actions 
of individual actors 
contrast with the 
need for trust and 
collaboration. Such 
news reports might 
lead to more go-it-alone 
strategies by separate 
actors, which puts the 
collaborative trust-
based relations under 
pressure.
Governance 
processes should 
be communicated 
on behalf of a wide 
coalition of actors, 
while media and their 
logic pushes toward 
communication by 
the individual actors. 
This is an incentive 
for actors to profile 
themselves with their 
own successes in 
contrast to the failures 
of others. 
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more dependent on media (Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012). Finally, mediatisation 
effects are moderated by the complex interaction between media logic and the 
specific logic of institutions involved in the governance process, such as the 
levels of formalisation, transparency, the binding character of decisions, the 
exclusion and inclusion of actors, and the frequency of meeting (see Schrott & 
Spranger, 2007). These interactions could be addressed in future research on 
mediatisation in the context of governance processes. 
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I  Mediatised  
democratic fora
The first research question, about the 
function of media as democratic fora, 
will be addressed most extensively in 
upcoming Chapter 4. This chapter 
examines the extent to which media 
biases can be found in news reports on 
governance processes and how they af-
fect the range of different stakeholder 
voices. 
Content analyses of news reports (N 
= 566) on five water management poli-
cies in the Netherlands showed that in 
a large majority of the news reports, 
one or more information biases can be 
found. About two-thirds of the news 
reports are found to be dramatised, 
by zooming in on conflict. In addition, 
about half of the news reports was 
found to be negative about the policy. 
Further, about half of the reports 
demanded that authorities take action 
(authority-disorder bias). The per-
sonalised, human interest bias only 
appeared in approximately a quarter 
of the news reports.  
When analysing key subjects of the 
news reports, officials are found to 
be the key subject in somewhat more 
than half of the news reports (most 
prominently ministers, aldermen, ‘the 
municipality’, and members of the 
municipal councils). This is less cover-
age for actors in power than expected, 
when looking for ‘official dominance’. 
Even more, the official dominance 
thesis chiefly describes ruling political 
authorities as the prevailing actors in 
news reporting. Distinguishing the 
ruling political authorities (such as 
aldermen) from non-ruling politicians 
(such as municipal council members) 
and administrative governmental ac-
tors (such as actors within the project 
organisation) even diminishes the 
percentage of media reports in which 
ruling political authorities are key 
subject to one-third. By contrast, non-
official actors are found to be the key 
subject in somewhat less than half of 
the news reports (most prominently 
citizens (in associations), environ-
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mental organisations, and farmers). 
These findings to some extent support 
previous research that have described 
political authoritativeness as being 
an important news value (e.g. Ben-
nett, 1996; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; 
Hopmann at al., 2011; Shehata, 2010). 
However, the thesis that officials domi-
nate news reporting over other news 
sources (as Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973; 
Tresch, 2009) is not backed up by the 
findings. The fact that in governance 
contexts authorities collaborate with 
societal and private organization 
could partly explain this result. 
But additional explanation for the 
less than expected coverage  for of-
ficial actors in the news is provided 
by the media logic, particularly by the 
finding that the information biases 
significantly relate to unofficial and 
non-governing actors. Tests for rela-
tions between the information biases 
and groups of actors were performed 
using non-parametric ANOVA analyses 
(Kruskal-Wallis tests). These tests 
demonstrated that most information 
biases are more present when unof-
ficial actors or non-governing officials 
are the key subject. Reports about un-
official actors show significantly more 
dramatisation, more personalisation 
and more negativity in comparison 
to reports about governing officials. 
Similarly, reports about non-ruling 
politicians show significantly more 
dramatisation, more negativity and 
more authority-disorder bias. It thus 
appears that storylines involving unof-
ficial actors and non-ruling politicians 
more easily fit media logic criteria.
To conclude: information biases 
in the news reports about the water 
management policies can be nor-
matively criticised for simplifying 
or sensationalising the information 
around the policy processes, in line 
with the critical examinations by Pat-
terson (2000) and Bennett (2009). On 
the other hand, information biases 
can be argued to be a positive sign of 
journalistic independence (from ac-
tors in power) and a democratisation 
of the media debate, as suggested by 
Schudson (2008) and Sheheta (2010). 
The results of this study at any rate 
show that the information biases 
contribute to checks and balances in 
media debates, as they are about 
the attractiveness of covering non-
authoritative news sources. 
This might contribute to checks and 
balances in the actual policy process 
as well, as mediatised reality can af-
fect actual governance processes. Such 
effects are discussed when addressing 
the second research question, about 
the role of media as political agenda 
setters (see Chapters 5 and 6).

12
3
4
5
6
7
8
Chapter 4
Who gets on the news? The relation between media 
biases and different actors in news reporting on 
complex policy processes
This article has been published as Korthagen, I.A. (2013). Who gets on the news? 
The relation between media biases and different actors in news reporting on 
complex policy processes. Public Management Review, published online: 02 Sep 2013, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14719037.2013.822529?src=recsys#.
VDf8vGd_veA 
Chapter 4
58
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Much decision making takes place in governance networks, with a variety of 
official and unofficial actors involved in the policy-making processes (Kop-
penjan and Klijn, 2004; Klijn, 2008b). In these governance networks, there is 
much uncertainty and no consensus with regard to the formulation of policy 
problems and solutions (Hisschemöller and Hoppe, 1995; Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004; Rittel and Webber, 1973). Actors involved in the policy process have dis-
similar interests; as a result, there are many perspectives on both problems and 
solutions. Because these policy issues are contested, they will often be publicly 
discussed in the media (Voltmer and Koch-Baumgarten, 2010). In public admin-
istration, much attention is paid to complex policy processes, but scarcely any 
to the construction of those processes in news reports. 
News reporting is important for all actors in a governance network. Having 
a voice in the media is an important political strategy to gain power and legiti-
macy in policy processes (Tresch, 2009). Groups of actors without authoritative 
power resources in the decision-making process need media to gain power 
(Cobb & Elder, 1983; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Sireau & Davis, 2007; Voltmer 
& Koch-Baumgarten, 2010; Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012). News coverage of a 
citizen group’s statements, for instance, may change the targets and efforts of 
decision-makers who use the news as a surrogate for public opinion (Entman, 
2007). But officials also attempt to reinforce their own position by publicity, 
especially if they fail to realise their goals by the traditional means of participa-
tion and negotiation in the policy process (Tresch, 2009; Spörer-Wagner and 
Marcinkowski, 2010). Moreover, governing officials need the media to legiti-
mate their policy plans and decisions (Hurrelman et al., 2009). Media coverage 
of policy processes in governance networks is therefore an important study 
object, deserving more attention in public administration research. This is par-
ticularly true in times of increasing mediatisation within present-day Western 
democracies, in which the media and their logic have become more and more 
important (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Hjarvard, 2008; Hajer, 2009; Strömbäck & 
Esser, 2009; Reunanen et al., 2010). 
Media logic refers to ‘the process through which the media present and 
transmit information’ (Altheide & Snow, 1979: 10). The media are not neutral 
transmitters of information. The process of news-making depends to a great 
extent on the news value that journalists ascribe to an event or viewpoint, and 
organisational pressures on journalists such as deadlines and economic goals. 
This leads to certain patterns in news reporting. Research in the field of (politi-
cal) communication has identified two media bias trends: firstly, the trend of 
official dominance, indicating that journalists rely heavily on official sources in 
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their news reporting; secondly, information biases, whereby news is increasingly 
negative (toward authorities), as well as dramatised, fragmentised and person-
alised. 
These aspects of media logic have an important influence on who will get 
access to the public and how those actors’ public images are formed (Altheide 
& Snow, 1979; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999). To date, studies conducted on official 
dominance or on information biases mostly concern general trends in (politi-
cal) news reports (Sigal, 1973; Gans, 1979; Shehata, 2010; Patterson, 2000) or 
election coverage (Tresch, 20094; Hopmann et al., 2011; Brants & Neijens, 1998; 
Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006).5  In a more multifaceted 
setting of a complex policy process – where it is not all about the politicians, 
as in election periods, but various public, semi-public and private actors are 
involved – the results might be different. 
In this article, we analyse ten years of news reporting on five comparable 
water management projects, representing cases of complex policy processes 
(Van Buuren et al., 2010). We are interested in how much media attention dif-
ferent groups of actors receive and how the identified media biases relate to this 
media attention.
We distinguish four groups of actors in our analysis. Firstly, there are govern-
ing officials: executive politicians such as ministers, provincial governors and 
aldermen. Secondly, there are non-governing officials, who are members of the 
lower house and from provincial and municipal councils. The third category, 
administrative officials, mostly represents the project organisation. Lastly, the 
unofficial actors’ category mainly encompasses various citizen groups. These 
four groups of actors have different interests in gaining media attention, and 
they generally represent different perspectives on policies. Governing officials 
mainly strive to ensure that their policies attract positive attention, whereas 
unofficial actors and non-governing officials rather try to open up the policy 
process by publicly questioning these policies. 
We start this article with a theoretical elaboration, mainly by zooming in on 
official dominance and information biases in news reports. In the second sec-
tion, we discuss our data and  methods. Thirdly, we present the results. Lastly, 
we discuss our conclusions.
4. More precisely Tresch (2009) studies news reports in the context of two referenda: on a set 
of bilateral agreements with the EU and on a popular initiative “Yes to Europe.” 
5. An important exception is Baumgartner and Jones (2009). They discuss the biases of nega-
tivity and conflict in their book on policy processes. 
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4.2 COMPLEX POLICY PROCESSES IN THE CONTEXT OF 
MEDIATISATION 
Many policy problems can be characterised as ‘wicked’ (Rittel & Webber, 1973; 
Mason & Mitroff, 1981; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Wicked problems are ill-
defined, and solutions to such problems rely on extensive negotiations between 
different actors. Planning problems are a good example of wicked problems, 
with implications for policy making. There is a broader participation of affected 
parties, directly and indirectly, in the policy process (Mason & Mitroff, 1981). All 
kinds of actors are part of the decision-making process, such as representatives 
of municipalities, provinces, private enterprises and interest groups. Horizontal 
relations between these actors replace hierarchical relations, resulting in gov-
ernance networks (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Interde-
pendencies between actors are predominant in these governance networks. No 
single actor has the final coercive power to fulfil his/her policy plans, because 
of these interdependencies (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005a). 
In policy games, the actors with divergent interests, goals and perceptions 
pull and push to bring about problem formulations and policy measures (Kop-
penjan, 2007). Because little agreement exists between them with regard to 
the problem or the solution, negotiations among the actors will seldom lead to 
unanimous consensus. As Sørensen and Torfing (2005a: 203) argue: ‘delibera-
tion takes place in a context of intense power struggles and the presence of 
disagreements, conflicts and social antagonism that means that political deci-
sions will often be made on the basis of a “rough consensus” where grievances 
are unavoidable, but tolerable.’ 
Although no actor has the final coercive power in policy games, power dif-
ferences do exists, due to differences in power resources such as knowledge, 
money or political position (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; 
Koppenjan, 2007). The ability to anticipate and mobilize media attention is 
another power resource in policy games (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009; Hajer, 2009; Tresch, 2009; Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 2010; 
Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012). As discussed in the introduction, with publicity for 
their viewpoint, actors can strengthen their position in negotiations in policy 
processes. This power resource has become increasingly important in the age of 
mediatisation (Hajer, 2009). 
Competition over media access is, however, guided and restricted by media 
logic: the process of news-making led by the media’s aims, production routines 
and selection criteria (Tresch, 2009). This has led to certain trends in news re-
porting: official dominance and information biases in news reports. We further 
discuss these trends in the next two sections.
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4.2.1  Official dominance: News is about the powerful
The more powerful position an actor holds, the more media attention he/she 
automatically receives. This is referred to as the incumbency bonus (Hopmann et 
al., 2011) or as official dominance (Shehata, 2010). Studies dating back as far as the 
1970s – still frequently cited – had already concluded that the majority of the 
news reports are written about officials (Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973). More recent 
studies also confirm that officials dominate the news (Tresch, 2009; Shehata, 
2010). 
Explanations for official dominance in the news mainly include professional 
journalistic norms and efficiency aims within media businesses (Bennett, 1996; 
Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Cook, 2005; Bennett, 2009). Reliance on officials is 
partly due to the news value of officials’ behaviours and viewpoints. The news-
worthiness of actors’ perspectives or actions is at least partially determined 
by the power and influence of those actors (Bennett, 1996; Shoemaker & Re-
ese, 1996; Shehata, 2010; Hopmann et al., 2011). Actions of the powerful are 
newsworthy because what the powerful do affects the general public. Tresch 
(2009: 71) therefore argues that “formal power in the policy-making process 
therefore easily translates into discursive power in the media, which can 
further strengthen the political power of an actor and ultimately lead to a self-
perpetuating cycle of political influence and media coverage”. 
Moreover, reliance on governing officials is rooted in journalistic norms of 
objectivity and in the political obligation to provide some degree of democratic 
accountability (Bennett, 1996). Officials are seen as providing ‘factual,’ authori-
tative and legitimate information. 
In addition, governing officials are mostly very efficient news sources. Au-
thorities increasingly invest in ‘selling’ their policies and managing their public 
relations (Cook, 2005; Eshuis & Klijn, 2012). Public relations practitioners make 
governmental information easily accessible to journalists (Gandy, 1982; Lieber 
& Golan 2011). In times of intensifying pressures on journalists due to the heavy 
competition in the news market, journalist are increasingly dependent on these 
‘information subsidies’ supplied by official sources (Gandy, 1982). Consequently, 
many news reports arise in close collaboration between reporters and govern-
ing officials, and their media advisers.
Whereas officials are newsworthy because of their influential position, oth-
ers, who lack habitual access to the media, have to rely on disruptive events 
(Shehata, 2010) or other news values (Parkinson, 2006) in order to become news-
worthy. Hence, one way for other actors to get publicity for their viewpoint is 
to organise events such as protests (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Terkildsen et 
al., 1998). This fulfils their need to get media coverage, but it also fulfils the 
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media’s need for news (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Besides this organisation 
of (pseudo) events and drama, using sound bites and personalising a story are 
other ways to attract media attention (Parkinson, 2006). The information biases 
in the news (Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009) can therefore be seen as a trend in 
news reporting that facilitates the relations between journalists and unofficial 
actors or non-governing officials.
4.2.2  The other side: Information biases
Wicked policy processes are either avoided by journalists or drastically reshaped 
to fit journalistic norms (Davis, 2007). Bennett (2009) describes four trends in 
current news reporting that, in his opinion, simplify complex governmental 
issues. He sees trends of personalisation, dramatisation, fragmentisation and an 
authority-disorder bias, which he calls information biases. In addition, Patterson 
(2000) sees a bias toward negativity in the news. These five trends in the fram-
ing of news can also be found in other studies on media content. 
The personalisation bias refers to the framing of stories in terms of human 
interest. It brings a human face or emotional angle to the presentation of an 
issue (Bennett, 2009; Patterson, 2000; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).
The dramatisation bias concerns an emphasis on crisis and conflict in stories 
rather than on continuity and harmony (Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009). Jour-
nalists tend to describe the situation at hand in terms of conflicts, with winners 
and losers (Brants & Neijens, 1998; Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Hopmann et al., 
2011; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2007).
The isolation of stories from one another and from their larger context is 
called the fragmentisation bias (Bennett, 2009; Iyengar & McGrady, 2007; Pat-
terson, 2000; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2007; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). In this 
‘episodic’ framing, journalists describe issues in terms of specific events; they 
do not place them in their more general context (Iyengar & McGrady, 2007).
The news is furthermore preoccupied with order, as journalists question 
whether authorities are capable of establishing or restoring the order (Bennett, 
2009; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). At the same time, the media’s attitude 
toward authorities is shifting from a more favourable stance toward an attitude 
where the media are more suspicious of authorities (Bennett, 2009; Kleinnijen-
huis et al., 2006). This bias is known as the authority-disorder bias.
Lastly, the tendency of the news to be more negative in general (Patterson, 
2000) reflects a negativity bias.  
These five information biases can be seen in two different ways. While factors 
of personification, negativity and a focus on drama and conflict are part of the 
classical news factor theory of Galtung and Ruge (1965), nowadays these news 
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factors give rise to much criticism regarding the quality of news; they are seen 
as information biases. Bennett (2009: 40) introduces the information biases in 
his book as follows: “In particular, four characteristics of news stand out that 
public information in the United States does not always advance the cause of 
democracy.” Many other prominent scholars also accuse journalists of making 
political news more spectacular and entertaining, while providing less substan-
tive information (e.g. Patterson, 2000; Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001; Davis, 
2007; Bennett, 2009). This is explained in the literature by competition for the 
attention of the news consumer and – again – efficiency aims (Bennett, 2009; 
Davis, 2007; Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001). 
However, the information biases can be approached more positively as well. 
Shehata (2010: 127) claims that “framing politics as a game rather than focusing 
on issues, policy positions and ideologies is (…) a way for journalists to distance 
themselves from politicians and to impose their own ‘professional’ lens on poli-
tics.” Reporting on aspects of politics other than those promoted by politicians 
thus demonstrates journalistic independence. Schudson (2008) even argues that 
an unlovable press is essential for the functioning of democracy. The very char-
acteristics of media logics that other scholars criticise – the pre-occupation with 
events, with conflicts, the cynism – give journalists the opportunity to subvert 
established power in the deliberative process, Schudson (2008) claims. Conflicts 
and news dramas therefore do not only “downplay information on complex 
policy information and the workings of government institutions,” as Bennett 
(2009: 41) states. Zooming in on citizens potentially affected by the policies 
shows a different side of the policy story. In contrast to the official dominance 
thesis, information biases might indicate that a news story is more independent 
of governing officials. More conflict, negativity and human interest in a news 
story can thus also be a form of checks and balances.  
4.2.3  Hypotheses
On the basis of the literature discussed, we can develop some – although merely 
explorative – hypotheses on the media coverage of the complex policy processes 
under study.
The official dominance thesis leads to the following two hypotheses:
H1: Officials will be more often the key subjects in a news report than unof-
ficial actors.
H2: Governing officials will be more often the key subjects in a news report 
than non-governing officials.
The information biases thesis leads to another three hypotheses:
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H3: The mean ranks on the information biases in news about governing of-
ficials and administrative officials differ significantly from the mean ranks of 
non-governing officials and unofficial actors.
H4: The personalisation bias, dramatisation bias, fragmentisation bias, au-
thority-disorder bias and negativity bias are more often present in news about 
unofficial actors than in news about governing officials.
H5: The personalisation bias, dramatisation bias, fragmentisation bias, au-
thority-disorder bias and negativity bias are more often present in news about 
non-governing officials than in news about governing officials.
The data and methods we used to test these hypotheses are described in the 
following section on methodology. 
4.3 METHODOLOGY
We studied news reports on five complex water management cases in the 
Netherlands over a ten-year period. Initiative for these projects is taken by the 
national government or by provinces. The cases can be seen as representative 
regional water projects conducted in the Netherlands (Van Buuren et al., 2010; 
Edelenbos et al., 2013). Information about the main issues, the policy initiator 
and the current state of the different cases can be found in Table 4.1.
Water management is in all cases combined with other planning activities 
such as housing, the development of recreational areas or infrastructure. 
This combination of tasks increases the number of public and private actors 
involved in the decision-making process. Van Buuren et al. (2010) also note a 
more general trend of an increasing involvement of citizen groups, not only in 
water projects, but also in other public decision-making processes. 
Regarding the water policy measures executive and non-executive politicians 
from local, regional and national government; water boards, bureaucrats from 
ministries, provinces and municipalities; and representatives from citizen 
groups, private investors and research institutes are involved. Most actors 
have different interests and different perspectives on the project. Besides this, 
knowledge on the issues is limited and contested. For instance, conflicting opin-
ions exist on the necessity for extra water storage in the areas and the amount 
of water that will have to be managed in the future. Van Buuren et al. (2010) 
therefore characterise these water management issues as wicked. 
News media facilitate the public debate on these projects. Moreover, media 
attention for your stance can be seen as a power resource in decision-making 
processes. It is thus important to see which actors are covered in news reports 
on these wicked issues. 
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Data collection
We obtained our data from newspapers and the television. We included the 
regional media newspaper(s) of that region and five national newspapers with 
different political orientations6. The search in the Lexis Nexis Academic NL 
database7 concentrated on the period between 1 January 2000 and 1 January 
2010. We used the name of the case8 as the search term. 
Reports were deemed to belong to the universe only when more than one 
paragraph9 was written on the relevant water management project. If the uni-
verse of regional news reports for one specific case comprised more than 150 
items, we took a random sample per project.10 The number of national news 
6. Algemeen Dagblad, De Telegraaf, de Volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad and Trouw
7. Although Lexis Nexis is the most comprehensive newspaper database in the Netherlands 
– containing all national, regional and local newspapers in the country – the coverage of 
some newspapers with a merely regional character did not start until after 2000. This may 
have led to some biases in the sample.
8. IJsseldelta-Zuid, dijkteruglegging Lent, Noordwaard, Wieringerrandmeer and Zuidplaspolder.
9. Or when the report itself was just one paragraph and it concerned the water management 
project. 
10. Between 150 and 300 reports: the sample consists of the first of every two reports (for 
Noordwaard and Wieringerrandmeer); between 300 and 450 reports: the sample consists 
of the first of every three reports (for Zuidplaspolder). 
Table 4.1 Information about the five water management cases 
IJsseldelta-Zuid Lent Noordwaard Wieringerrand-
meer
Zuidplaspolder
Time period 2000–to date 1993–to date 2000–to date 1998–2009 2001–to date
Initiator Province National gov-
ernment
National gov-
ernment
Province Province
Main issues Creating a by-
pass for water 
storage, with 
implications for 
a railway and 
a motorway 
in that area, 
combined with 
the building of 
new dwellings 
and recreational 
area.
Shifting the 
dikes for water 
storage, com-
bined with the 
building of new 
dwellings and a 
new bridge.
Shifting the 
dikes for water 
storage and 
stimulating 
recreational 
activities in the 
area.
Creating a large 
lake and build-
ing new dwell-
ings (enhancing 
tourism and cre-
ating economic 
incentives for 
the area).
Redeveloping 
a polder (land 
reclaimed from 
the sea) and cre-
ating space for 
new dwellings, 
water storage 
and space for 
glass houses.
Current 
stage
Delayed imple-
mentation
Implementation Implementation Cancelled Delayed and 
downsized 
implementation
Note: Based on the case studies of Van Buuren et al. (2010) and Edelenbos et al. (2013)
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reports exceeded that threshold for sampling in none of the cases. We analysed 
television items about the water management projects using the Netherlands 
Institute for Sound and Vision website (http://portal.beeldengeluid.nl/) and re-
gional broadcasters’ websites. We included all television items in our analysis, 
since they were few in number.
The total universe consisted of 1,011 news reports; after sampling the re-
gional newspaper reports, we had a total sample of 566 news reports. More 
than 10 percent (13.6 per cent) of the reports come from national news media, 
and the rest come from regional media (86.4 per cent). Newspapers reported 
significantly more often about the projects than television, with, respectively, 
536 (94.7 per cent) and 30 items11 (5.3 per cent).  
Method: Quantitative content analysis
The unit of analysis was a news report. We used Patterson’s (2000) established 
coding scheme to typify each report regarding the information biases. We also 
used his instructions with regard to conceptualisation as can be seen in the appen-
dix. This scheme is more elaborate than those used in other studies, which have 
tended to focus on just a selection of information biases (see for instance Brants 
& Neijens, 1998; Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006; Semetko & 
Valkenburg, 2000; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2007). Moreover, Patterson’s (2000) codes 
can be easily translated into the information biases described by Bennett (2009) 
(because Bennett builds on Patterson’s research). In addition, we created a coding 
variable for the actor who was the key subject of the news report. The categories of 
this variable (23 actors in total) were based on earlier case study research on these 
projects (Van Buuren et al., 2010). We recoded this item into four categories for the 
purpose of this study, into governing officials, non-governing officials, administra-
tive officials and unofficial actors (see Table 4.2).
Five teams of trained coders executed the coding of the news reports, with 
the help of an extensive coding instruction. We executed two tests of reliability, 
using conformity tests. Conformity of 0.90 or higher leads to a reliability score 
above 0.80 on all types of reliability measures (Wester & Van Selm, 2006). First, 
intra-observer reliability (Krippendorf, 2004) was tested; the stability of the cod-
ers was on average 0.94. Secondly, inter-coder reliability (Krippendorf, 2004) 
was tested, resulting in an average of 0.90. Hence, we conclude that the data set 
11. However, we must remark that it is only quite recently that regional television programmes 
can be found on the Internet. The earliest item from regional television is from March 
2006, and the date regional broadcasters started their broadcasting on the Internet may 
even differ per outlet. This may lead to small biases in the analysis. 
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can be seen as reliable: there is not much ‘noise’ hampering accurate statistical 
analysis of these data.  
To analyse the data, we used SPSS version 20.0. Both the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic and the Shapiro-Wilk statistic were highly significant for the data 
among the four different groups of actors; this means that the different dis-
tributions are all non-normal. We therefore used non-parametric statistical 
methods. Instead of assuming normal distributions, these methods calculate 
the test statistics with ranked data (Conover & Iman, 1981). The lowest score 
in the data - including all groups - is given a rank of 1; the next lowest score is 
given a rank of 2, and so on . In case of similar scores, this is referred to as ties, 
average ranks are assigned. The tests are carried out on the ranks rather than 
the actual data (Conover & Iman, 1981; Field, 2009). 
We have examined significant differences between the four groups in our 
analysis with the Kruskal-Wallis test, which can be seen as a non-parametric 
ANOVA. The Kruskal-Wallis test calculates whether the mean ranks for the 
groups differ significantly. With post-hoc tests provided by SPSS 20.0 we cal-
culate pairwise comparisons; we test for significant differences between the 
mean ranks of two groups. These post-hoc tests correct for type I errors by the 
Dunn-Bonferroni test; they calculate an adjusted significance value.
4.4 FINDINGS: MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE WATER 
MANAGEMENT PROJECTS 
The official dominance thesis 
We firstly examine whether officials indeed dominated the news reporting on 
the water management projects. Table 4.2 reports the percentages of how rela-
tively often the different actors were the most important actor in a news report. 
Per news report, only one of the actors could be chosen as key actor.
In Table 4.2, we see that officials are the main subject of the story in 56.5 per 
cent of the news reports, against 43.5 per cent of the news reports on unofficial 
actors. So, officials, including governing officials, non-governing officials and 
administrative officials, are somewhat more often the key subject of a news 
report than unofficial actors. It seems that the officials indeed to some extent 
benefit from the newsworthiness value they automatically possess and the 
information subsidies that they provide.
However, the contrast between the groups of officials and unofficial actors 
is not as strong as we expected, following the theoretical notions on official 
dominance. Particularly, in comparing attention on governing officials (key ac-
Chapter 4
68
tors in 31.6 per cent of the news reports) with attention on unofficial actors (key 
actors in 43.5 per cent of the news reports), the conclusion must be nuanced. 
Governing officials do not really dominate the news among the complex water 
management projects under study. Nevertheless, the majority of the news 
reports do have an official as their key subject. Although with reservations, we 
can confirm the expectation stated in H1.
Within the category of officials, we make a distinction between governing 
officials, non-governing officials and administrative officials. We see that gov-
erning officials are the main subject of the story in 31.6 per cent of the news 
reports, against 13.8 per cent of the news reports mainly concerning non-gov-
erning actors. Governing officials’ actions have generally more consequences 
for citizens and have therefore more news value than actions of non-governing 
officials. Moreover, governing officials generally have more resources to invest 
in their communication strategies than non-governing officials. We indeed see 
that governing officials are more often the most important actors in a news 
report than non-governing officials, thereby confirming hypothesis H2. 
Table 4.2 Media coverage of actors: percentages of actors as key subjects in a news report
Officials (56.5%)
Governing officials
(31.6%)
(Prime) minister 6.9%
The state 0.4%
Provincial governor 7.2%
The province 1.9%
Mayor 1.8%
Aldermen 5.1%
The municipality 6.4%
Water board 1.9%
Non-governing officials (13.8%)
Member of the lower house 4.4%
Member of the provincial council 2.7%
Member of the municipal council 6.7%
Administrative officials (11.1%)
Administrative officials 3.0%
Metropolitan region 0.4%
Project organisation 7.8%
Unofficial actors
(43.5%)
Unofficial actors
(43.5%)
Inhabitants (association) 17.1%
Farmers 6.7%
Environmental organisations 7.1%
Private investors 3.2%
Research institute 3.9%
Other 5.5%
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The information biases thesis
The relatively large share of news reports in which unofficial actors are the 
key subject might be related to the other trend in news reports: information 
biases. As discussed in the theoretical section, we expect unofficial actors and 
non-governing officials to get more publicity by adapting to the media’s needs. 
By providing dramatic events, conflict, critical accounts and human interest, 
these actors acquire more news value as well. 
In Table 4.3, we report the frequencies of information biases. Frequencies in 
bold show the percentages of the news reports in which the relevant informa-
tion bias is clearly present.12 
From the table it is clear that reports are often fragmentised, dramatised, 
include an authority-disorder bias and bring negative news on the project. The 
personalisation bias appears less often than the other information biases. About 
one-third of the news reports are heavily dramatised (32.7 per cent), and another 
third are dramatised to some extent (31.3 per cent). The authority-disorder bias 
can be found in almost half of the reports (49.6 per cent). More than three-
quarters of the news reports are coded as episodic13 (77.2 per cent). Almost half 
of the news reports are negative toward the water management projects (47.5 
per cent). ‘Only’ about a quarter of the news reports are highly or moderately 
personalised (23.8 per cent). It might be less likely to report on these merely 
technical water management projects with a more personal or emotional ap-
proach than on other policy issues. 
Examining the number of information biases per news report, we see that 95.6 
per cent include one or more information biases (see Table 4.4). Even excluding 
the fragmentisation bias, we note that, in a large majority (71.9 per cent) of 
the news reports, one or more information biases can be found. Information 
biases thus definitely seem to shape the news reporting on these complex water 
management projects.
How do these information biases relate to the different groups of actors stud-
ied in the previous section? 
12. These emboldened categories were also used to calculate the variable the number of informa-
tion biases.
13. The fragmentization bias frequencies are quite different for the five cases; this may result 
from different interpretations of Patterson’s (2000) instruction on this item, which is quite 
broad. We have to be careful with conclusions about the fragmentization item because it 
may not be as reliable and valid in this study as we would like it to be. Nevertheless, in all 
cases, the bias is found in more than 50 per cent of the reports.
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The relations between different key subjects in news reports and information biases
Firstly, we show the complete picture, comparing all four groups in Kruskal-Wallis 
tests. The presence of four of the five information biases in news reports varies 
significantly when different groups of actors are the key actor in the report. The 
personalisation bias (H(3) = 56,13, p<0,001); the dramatisation bias (H(3) = 47,79, 
p<0,001), the authority-disorder bias (H(3) = 19,09, p<0,001) and the negativity 
bias (H(3) = 49,37, p<0,001) show significantly different mean ranks among the 
different groups of key subjects in the news reports. The fragmentisation bias, 
Table 4.4 The frequencies with regard to the number of information biases
Number of information biases Percentage Number of information biases, excl. fragmentation 
bias
Percentage
0 4.4 0 28.1
1 28.4 1 23.3
2 25.3 2 23.0
3 20.1 3 18.0
4 17.1 4 7.6
5 4.6 --
Table 4.3 The frequencies of the biases categories
Categories Percentage
Fragmentisation Thematic 22.8
Episodic 77.2
Personalisation No (or merely incidental) human interest 54.6
Slight human interest content 21.6
Moderate human interest content 12.7
High human interest content 11.1
Dramatisation No conflict framing 36.0
Some conflict framing 31.3
Substantial level of conflict framing 32.7
Authority-disorder bias No authority-disorder bias 50.4
Authority-disorder bias 49.6
Negativity bias Clearly positive/favourable/good news   7.1
More positive or favourable than negative or unfavourable 12.9
Balanced mix between negative and positive/Neutral story, no 
positive or negative
32.5
More negative or unfavourable than positive or favourable 22.6
Clearly negative/unfavourable/bad news 24.9
71
Who gets on the news?
4
however, did not show significant differences (H(3) = 2.20, p=0.532); we therefore 
did not perform pairwise comparisons concerning this bias. 
In the post-hoc test provided by SPSS 20.0, the mean ranks regarding the other 
four biases are compared in pairs. Fig. 4.1 presents the results. We adjusted the 
figures presented by SPSS to increase the clarity and readability of the figures. 
The numbers represent the mean ranks of the four groups of key subjects on 
the information biases in the Kruskal-Wallis test. For instance, with regard to the 
dramatisation bias, ‘governing officials 246.02’ indicates that the average of the ranks 
assigned to scores within the group ‘governing officials as key subject’ is 246.02. 
The differences between these mean ranks are tested for significance. Solid 
lines between groups of key actors indicate significant differences between the 
groups regarding their mean rank on one of the information biases; conversely, 
the dashed lines indicate non-significant differences between the groups of actors. 
The mean rank of governing officials regarding the dramatisation bias (246.02) is 
thus significantly different from the mean rank of unofficial actors (316.05). 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governing officials 
246.02 
Unofficial actors 
316.05 
Administrative officials 
            201.08 
Governing officials 
249.63 
Governing officials 
239.43 Governing officials 272.64 
Unofficial actors 
291.40 
Unofficial actors 
323.26 
Unofficial actors 
335.73 
Non-governing officials 
   328.04 
Non-governing officials 
   322.18 
Non-governing officials 
      249.29 
Administrative officials 
             228.35 
Administrative officials 
       205.56 
Administrative officials 
                 218.16 
Dramatization bias 
Authority-disorder bias  Negativity bias 
Personalization bias 
Non-governing officials 
     333.43 
            Mean ranks are significantly different    
            Mean ranks are NOT significantly different   
Figure 4.1 Graphic representation of pairwise comparisons: four information biases across four 
groups of key subjects
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The governing officials and administrative officials score the lowest mean 
ranks on all information biases (except for the personalisation bias, where the 
non-governing officials score a few decimals lower than the governing officials). 
In most of the graphics, these lower mean ranks can be contrasted with the 
higher mean ranks of unofficial actors and non-governing officials. Thus, most 
information biases are more present when news reports have an unofficial ac-
tor or a non-governing official as their key subject. 
The solid and dashed lines clearly show this contrast between the governing 
and administrative officials versus the non-governing officials and unofficial 
actors regarding the dramatisation bias and the negativity bias. Non-governing 
officials or unofficial actors as key subjects lead to more conflict and more 
negativity in the news report.
Given the line pattern of the personalisation bias, we note that this bias mostly 
relates to the unofficial actors as key actors in the news report. The unofficial 
actors can in this regard clearly be contrasted with the other groups of key 
actors, who all score significantly lower mean ranks on the personalisation bias. 
The authority-disorder bias shows a more complex pattern of pairwise compar-
isons. The non-governing officials have the highest mean rank on this variable; 
this differs significantly from that of the governing officials and administrative 
officials, but not from that of the unofficial actors. So far, this is comparable to 
what we found regarding the dramatisation bias and the negativity bias. How-
ever, the mean rank of the authority-disorder bias in news reports on unofficial 
actors is in itself comparable to the mean rank of news reports on governing of-
ficials. In summary, the different results of the Kruskal-Wallis tests confirm that 
the presence of four of the five information biases vary to the extent that key 
subjects vary. We can therefore reject these null hypotheses for H3. The mean 
ranks regarding the dramatisation bias, the negativity bias, the personalisation 
bias and the authority-disorder bias of the different groups of key actors differ 
significantly. However, the mean rank concerning the fragmentisation bias of 
the different groups of key actors does not differ significantly; we thus retain 
this null hypothesis.
In the next sections, we discuss more extensively the comparative analysis 
of the information biases among reports in which governing officials are key 
actors versus reports in which unofficial actors and non-governing officials are 
key actors. We provide the results of the pairwise comparisons with post-hoc 
tests, correcting for the type I error by the Dunn-Bonferroni test, and the effect 
sizes, to test H4 and H5 exhaustively.  
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Governing officials versus unofficial actors as key actors in a news report
As revealed in the previous section, news reports with unofficial actors as key 
subject are more personalised (p < 0.001, r = 0.29), more dramatised (p < 0.001, 
r = 0.22) and more negative (p < 0.001, r = 0.26) than news reports on governing 
officials. Stories about unofficial actors, mostly citizen groups, seem to have 
provided more conflict, more negativity and more human interest to the jour-
nalists. The reported effect sizes (r) represent all small to medium effects; they 
are just under the 0.3 threshold for a medium effect. 
In contrast, the pairwise comparison of unofficial actors and officials as key 
subject in news reports was not significant with regard to the authority-disorder 
bias (U = 18,760, n.s.). In the news reports, we found governing officials also 
frequently demanding (urgent) action by their own or other governmental 
institutions. We presume that therefore no significant difference exists in the 
occurrence of the authority-disorder bias in news reports where officials or 
unofficial actors are key subject.
We can thus reject most null hypotheses belonging to H4; the personalisation 
bias, dramatisation bias and the negativity bias are significantly more often pres-
ent in news on unofficial actors than in news on governing officials. However, 
we need to retain the null hypotheses that the presence of fragmentisation bias 
and the authority-disorder bias is more or less similar, whether unofficial actors 
or governing officials are the key actors in the news reports. 
Governing officials versus non-governing officials as key actors in a news report
The news reports on non-governing officials are more dramatised (p < 0.001, r 
= 0.26) and more negative (p < 0.001, r = 0.24) than news reports on governing 
officials. Furthermore, they more often show the authority-disorder bias (p < 
0.05, r = 0.18). Non-governing officials seem to provide more conflict and more 
negativity to journalists. Furthermore, they seem to make more demands that 
authorities should take action. The effect sizes all indicate small to medium 
effects.
In contrast, the pairwise comparison did not show a significant difference 
concerning personalisation bias (U = 0,337, n.s.). We did not find many news 
reports in which officials, governing or non-governing, personalise their mes-
sage, or in which these officials are part of a human interest story. 
In sum, we can reject most null hypotheses belonging to H5; dramatisation 
bias, negativity bias and authority-disorder bias are significantly more often 
present in news on non-governing officials than in news on governing officials. 
However, we need to retain the null hypothesis that the fragmentisation bias 
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and the personalisation bias are similarly present when non-governing officials 
and governing officials are key actors in news reports. 
Combining the results on the official dominance thesis with the results on the 
information thesis leads to the conclusion that governing officials are newswor-
thy because of their authoritative position as such; to other actors, newsworthi-
ness is added by information biases. These information biases can be a result 
of the framing of the message or the organisation of an event on the part of 
unofficial actors or non-governing officials. Conversely, information biases can 
also be the product of a more attractive or independent framing on the part of 
journalists using the perspectives of unofficial actors or non-governing officials. 
Probably, it will often be a combination of these. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF 
INFORMATION BIASES IN THE FIGHT FOR MEDIA 
ATTENTION 
Media attention is an important source of power within governance networks, 
especially in times of mediatisation. Actors thus fight to attract media atten-
tion. Hence, we have studied how much media attention different groups of 
actors attract in complex policy processes and how media biases relate to this 
media attention. We have analysed official dominance and information biases in 
news reports on five water management projects in the Netherlands.
We observed that official actors do receive somewhat more media attention 
than unofficial actors in the news reports; and governing officials more than 
non-governing officials. Authoritativeness thus indeed seems to be an impor-
tant news value; this is in line with earlier research on this topic (Bennett, 1996; 
Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Shehata, 2010; Hopmann et al., 2011). Governing of-
ficials might at the same time benefit from the information subsidies provided 
by their communication professionals. However, the contrast between official 
and unofficial actors is not as strong as we expected following the literature on 
official dominance (Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973; Tresch, 2009). From the comparison 
of relevant smaller subgroups, it even appeared that unofficial actors are more 
frequently subject of a news story than governing officials. This result might 
be partly explicable by the governance networks in which actors are organised, 
where political hierarchy is less important. In these networks, inclusion of un-
official actors is an important principle. Still, governing officials often function 
as the public face of decisions or policies (Eshuis & Klijn, 2012).
Another explanation is that unofficial actors benefit from information biases 
in news reports, which were clearly present. Many reports were fragmentised, 
75
Who gets on the news?
4
dramatised, negative toward the project and demanded action by a governmen-
tal authority (authority-disorder bias); some were personalised. As discussed in 
the theoretical section, these information biases in the news can be judged 
differently. In line with Patterson (2000), Bennett (2009) and many others, we 
could argue that the complex policy process within the five water management 
cases are simplified and enlivened by information biases. Although news con-
sumers are to some extent entertained by reading or viewing the news reports, 
we can at the same time question the extent to which they get really informed 
on the actual policy process. In contrast, we can also argue that the information 
biases are a sign of journalistic independence and even of democratisation of 
the media debate, as Schudson (2008) and Shehata (2010) suggest.
Media attention for unofficial actors and non-governing officials, with gener-
ally fewer power resources in governance networks, shows significantly more 
information biases than news on governing officials. Information biases thus 
seem to make it easier for these non-authoritative groups to attract media at-
tention to their side. We do not wish to make a definitive moral judgement on 
information biases, but these empirical results show that information biases 
function as a form of checks and balances. At least they provide checks and 
balances in media debates; but because media attention is a power resource 
in decision-making processes (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; 
Sireau & Davis, 2007; Voltmer & Koch-Baumgarten, 2010; Kunelius & Reunanen, 
2012), information biases might similarly affect the policy process.
In our water management cases, publicity indeed seems to have helped citi-
zens to influence the decision-making process (Van Buuren et al., 2010; Kortha-
gen & Van Meerkerk, 2014). In IJsseldelta-Zuid, for instance, a citizen group 
received much media attention for their protests against the building of new 
dwellings near their village. Consequently, the municipal council changed their 
decision in favour of the citizen group. The group clearly incorporated media 
logic in their strategies, organising protests and dramatising and personalising 
their communication (Korthagen & Van Meerkerk, 2014). Although agenda set-
ting theory is often studied and applied in public administration, the role of 
media biases is often neglected in this literature on policy dynamics. It would 
be interesting to see more research on the role of information biases. 
With regard to information biases, we found in this study that these partly 
differ in the patterns of relationships with the actors. News reports are fre-
quently fragmented, and this bias does not vary across the different groups 
of key subjects, as the other biases do. The dramatisation bias and negativity 
bias significantly relate to the media attention on unofficial actors and non-
governing officials. Conflicts and negativity seem to make these actors – who 
Chapter 4
76
lack the habitual access to the media enjoyed by officials – more newsworthy. 
Moreover, by organising protests, contra-expertise and press releases (Kortha-
gen & van Meerkerk, 2014), citizen groups provide journalists with information 
subsidies, which feed these two biases. Unofficial actors gain news value as well 
by incorporating the human angle in their story. 
Furthermore, claiming that there is need for authorities to act increases the 
attractiveness of their standpoint. However, it is not only non-governing of-
ficials that use this in their communication, governing officials also do this 
to some extent. This is actually the only bias for which the governors do not 
score significantly lower than unofficial actors. Possibly governing officials to 
some extent become influenced by the media debate, which is full of drama and 
negativity, and consequently also feel the need to plead for policy plans to be 
amended by their own departments or other governmental authorities. 
Our mainly optimistic conclusion should be tempered by the fact that we 
did not study exact qualitative content in this research. It should be borne in 
mind that, when an actor is coded as key subject of a news report, this does not 
necessarily mean that his/her perspective is correctly described in the story. 
According to the more pessimistic accounts of Bennett (2009) and Patterson 
(2000), his/her vision will often be simplified. Moreover, following this line 
of reasoning, we cannot and do not claim, on the basis of our results, that 
viewpoints of groups of actors are equally represented in the media debate. 
Probably, it is mainly unofficial and non-governing actors that are covered in 
news reports because of their greater newsworthiness in terms of drama and 
conflict, and thus obviously information biases are more likely to feature. 
Nevertheless, we do not want to downplay the positive side of these informa-
tion biases. The debate on policy plans can be enriched by issues raised by unof-
ficial actors or non-governing officials in news reports and this can be partly 
attributed to information biases in news reporting. 
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Appendix 1 Conceptualization of the variables
(This conceptualization can be found in Patterson, 2000: 24–6)
Variable Definition Categories
Personalization 
bias
The use of the human interest frame. Hu-
man interest stories use a human example 
or put a ‘human face’ on an issue or prob-
lem, or go into the private or personal life 
of an actor and/or journalist, employing ad-
jectives or personal vignettes that generate 
feelings of sympathy, empathy or outrage.
-High human interest content
-Moderate human interest content
-Slight human interest content
-No (or merely incidental) human
interest content
Dramatization 
bias
Based on story, and the way story is pre-
sented, not on the topic of the story.
-Substantial level of conflict
-Some conflict (not merely incidental)
-No conflict (or so slight as to be
inconsequential)
Fragmentization 
bias
Episodic (story, not topic) mainly in the 
context of a particular event, incident; 
the story does not go much beyond that 
specific event; the story takes the form of a 
case-study). Thematic (story itself, not topic) 
mainly in a broader context that deals with 
its meaning or implications for society, a 
trend that goes beyond this single event/in-
cident; story places public issues in a broad 
or abstract context
-Episodic story
-Thematic story
Authority-disor-
der bias
When the story implies a need for action 
or suggests action should be taken, the 
action frame is present. We combined this 
item with another code: the attribution of 
responsibility. When the story implies a 
need for action and the government is given 
the responsibility for that, the authority-
disorder bias is present.
Action/non action frame
-Story implies/says there is an urgent 
need for action/describes a problem 
(and by direct statement or implica-
tion indicates the problem needs to 
be fixed); suggests action should be 
taken, would be desirable, etc. (can 
be public or personal action).
-Story implies/says there is a non-
urgent need for action/describes a 
problem (and by direct statement or 
implication indicates the problem 
needs to be fixed); suggests action 
should be taken, would be desirable, 
etc. (can be public or personal action).
-Story describes action already taken 
or being taken to resolve the problem
-No action component of note
Attribution responsibility
-Not applicable – coded 4 in previous 
code
-Government/some level of 
government/a governmental institu-
tion or an individual public official 
(e.g. the president, mayor )
-A group, or collective, or community 
in society or a private institution
-Private individual
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Negativity This code is designed to pick up whether 
the story is thought on the whole to be in 
the good news or bad news category. In 
some instances, it might be helpful to ask 
the following questions: If about a news-
maker and you were his/her press secretary, 
would you consider this a favourable or an 
unfavourable story? If about an institution 
(e.g. Congress), does this reflect favourably 
or unfavourably on the institution? If about 
a development (e.g. a social trend, event 
or incident) is this a good or bad thing for 
society?)
For this research, we coded whether the 
report was favourable or unfavourable 
towards the water management project. 
-Clearly negative/unfavourable/bad 
news
-More negative or unfavourable than 
positive or favourable
-Balanced mix between negative and 
positive
-More positive or favourable than 
negative or unfavourable
-Clearly positive/favourable/good 
news
-Neutral story, no positive or negative
Most important 
actor in the 
report
Prime minister 
Minister
Member of the lower house 
National government official
The state
Provincial governor
Delegate from the provincial execu-
tive/councillor
The province
Metropolitan region
Water authority 
Mayor
Aldermen
Municipal councillor
The municipality 
Inhabitants
Farmers
Environmental organizations 
Project organization
Private investor
Research institute 
Other
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II  Mediatised  
agenda setters
The second question ‘To what extent 
can media biases be found in news reports 
around governance processes and how does 
that affect the governance processes, their 
results and their legitimacy?’ will be ad-
dressed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In Chapter 5, three of the water 
management policy processes are 
chosen for a further analysis of the 
influence of media and their logic 
on democratic legitimacy sources. 
These three cases are selected because 
the main policy issues in each case 
concerned water storage (preventing 
flooding), for which in two cases dikes 
had to be relocated and in one case a 
bypass needed to be created. In the 
other two cases the main policy issues 
were less similar. The findings are 
based on a qualitative case analysis 
of the policy process, quantitative 
content analysis of 290 news reports 
and 6 interviews with citizen group 
representatives and aldermen. Media 
attention for the policy processes was 
found to be highly inconstant in the 
different rounds of decision-making. 
The attention of news media clearly 
increased at times of conflict between 
citizen groups and political authori-
ties. This points to the role and pres-
ence of news media logic; news media 
were found to focus on conflicts, nega-
tivity and authority-disorder in their 
coverage of the governance processes. 
Particularly news reports featuring 
drama, negativity and human interest 
give greater voice to unauthoritative 
news sources such as citizen groups 
in a policy context (see also Schudson, 
2008). This input widens the delib-
erative process, and in that sense the 
characteristics of media logic help 
boost a legitimate decision-making 
process. At the same time, only 
unauthoritative citizen groups that 
have the willingness and capacity to 
translate their stances into fierce or 
emotional statements or dramatised 
protests get such news media cover-
age. Some citizen groups quickly learn 
how to do that and thereby increase 
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their impact. A concrete risk and bal-
ancing act for governing authorities in 
this respect is to not have the overall 
governance processes be overruled by 
dramatised and negative images of 
one group and its mediatised state-
ments. Although governing authori-
ties want to be responsive to news 
reporting, other actors involved in the 
governance process are trying to reach 
compromises backstage collaborative-
ly. In all three cases, the balancing act 
in the mediatised stages of the policy 
process led to relatively small changes 
in the policy process and the content, 
in favour of citizen groups who were 
able to attract media attention.
The quantitative study in Chapter 
6, based on a survey of 141 project 
managers of urban spatial projects 
organised in governance networks, 
shows that the degree to which these 
projects are covered in a negative, 
sensational way varies considerably 
among the projects. Some project 
managers clearly saw the news about 
their project as negative and sensa-
tional, but certainly not all of them. 
Moreover, in general the project man-
agers do not see involved politicians 
as prioritising news media coverage 
over policy goals. Although the politi-
cians do not completely disregard 
the media, most of their behaviour 
cannot be characterised as mediatised 
politics, as the political logic is not 
perceived to be replaced or dominated 
by the media logic (cf. Strömbäck, 
2008, Cook, 2005; Elchardus, 2002; 
Edelman, 1988).
At the same time, the analysis of the 
survey data with the structural equa-
tion modelling technique in AMOS 
indicates that when news is negative 
and sensational this has a negative im-
pact on trust and perceived network 
performance. And when politicians do 
prioritise media coverage over policy 
goals, this negatively affects trust rela-
tions. Mediatised news realities are 
relevant for governance networks as 
they influence the scenery in which 
negotiations take place (Cook, 2005; 
Voltmer & Koch-Baumgarten, 2010). 
The mediatised scenery might make 
some of the negotiating actors change 
their strategy (Kepplinger & Glaab, 
2007; Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 
2010; Schillemans, 2012; Esser & Mat-
thes, 2013). 
In sum, media and media logic cer-
tainly do not always shape the context 
of governance processes in urban 
spatial projects. But the more they do, 
the more they negatively affect trust 
relations and network performance.
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5.1 MEDIATISED LEGITIMACY WITHIN LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE NETWORKS
In contemporary democracies, political authorities often experience tremen-
dous difficulty in legitimating their position and actions, especially in response 
to complex societal issues that cross different institutional boundaries (e.g. Beck 
et al., 2003; Hajer, 2003; Peters, 2010). Media play an important role in legitimis-
ing processes (Habermas, 2006; Hajer, 2009). In this article, we are interested 
in the influence of the media, and particularly media logic, on the democratic 
legitimacy of political decision making in governance networks. Although the 
democratic legitimacy of governance networks is a highly debated issue in the 
literature (e.g. Pierre, 2000; Papadopoulos, 2003; Sørensen & Torfing, 2005b), 
little attention is paid to the impact of the media and media logic in this respect 
(e.g. Hajer, 2009). Important sources of democratic legitimacy, such as voice, 
due deliberation and accountability, are influenced by the media. The media 
could be used as a vehicle for stakeholders to put their issues on the political 
agenda. They could provide a platform for debate and also act as a forum for 
political authorities to brand their policies and to create legitimacy for their 
actions. 
However, the media are not neutral information transmitters, but, like all 
institutions, shape and select information in certain ways (Altheide & Snow, 
1979; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Cook, 2005; Parkinson, 2006). The process of 
news-making led by the media’s rules, aims, production routines and constraints 
is known as media logic (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Hjar-
vard, 2008; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). News-making depends to a great extent 
on the news values that journalists ascribe to events or viewpoints, but also on 
organisational pressures on journalists such as deadlines and economic goals 
(Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Research by Patterson (2000) and Bennett (2009) 
has identified general trends in this media logic: news is increasingly negative, 
particularly toward authorities, as well as dramatised and personalised. 
An important question then is how these characteristics of media logic affect 
sources of democratic legitimacy within governance networks, which we exam-
ine in this article. In the literature on mediatisation, it is argued that, within 
present-day democracies, media and their logic are very influential, even to the 
extent that media logic overrules other institutional logics, such as political 
logic (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Cook, 2005; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). 
We conducted a comparative case study of three local water management 
projects, using a mixed method design. Although we are aware that a variety of 
actors are involved in governance networks, we concentrate on two important 
groups of actors relevant to the democratic legitimacy of political decision mak-
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ing: political authorities and citizens (organised in citizen groups). To measure 
the presence of media logic and media attention on both citizen groups and 
political authorities, we conducted a quantitative content analysis on media 
reports about the projects (N=290). Case study analyses, and specifically inter-
views with key representatives of both groups, were used to further examine 
the way in which citizen groups and political authorities interacted with the 
media and how this affected legitimacy sources. 
In the first part of the article, we elaborate how media logic could theoretically 
influence different sources of democratic legitimacy in governance networks. 
In the second part, we discuss our mixed method design. This is followed by 
an analysis of the results of our study. Lastly, we discuss our findings in the 
concluding section. 
5.2 DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AS A COMMUNICATIVE 
PROCESS BETWEEN POLITICAL AUTHORITIES AND 
CITIZENS 
In this study we focus on governance networks around complex water projects. 
Complex water projects could be typified as boundary-crossing public issues, 
as they cross different geographical, societal, administrative and institutional 
borders (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2011; Van Meerkerk et al., 2014). The network 
around such projects consists of a variety of interdependent governmental, 
private, and societal actors (including citizen groups), who interact with each 
other to influence the policy and decision-making process by means of negotia-
tion, persuasion, and collaboration (Van Buuren et al., 2010; Edelenbos et al., 
2013).
The democratic legitimacy of political decisions in such governance networks 
is not straightforward as there are no clear constitutional rules and norms that 
determine what constitutes a legitimate decision. As Hajer (2009: 30) rightly 
points out: “the primacy of the politics presupposes that the council of elected 
representatives confers legitimacy on the decisions it takes. Yet when policy 
problems do not respect the territorial scales, this system breaks down.” This 
means that, in the words of Warren (2009: 7), “the legitimacy generated by elec-
toral democracy does not carry over to [these] issue-segmented constituencies.” 
Many authors therefore stress the importance of communicative relationships 
between political authorities and affected stakeholders in the construction 
of legitimacy for political decisions in governance networks (e.g. Bang, 2003; 
Dryzek, 2010). Traditional policy-making is characterised by a domination of ex-
pert-based knowledge and rather unilateral modes of communication between 
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experts and decision-makers (Crozier, 2008; Wagenaar, 2007). Information flows 
in governance networks are rather multilateral, and communicative capacity is 
more egalitarian. Furthermore, ‘messages undergo transformations as receivers 
interpret and process information in creative and self-referential ways that can 
easily escape the original intentions of the sender’ (Crozier, 2008: 9). Media, as 
an important communication channel, also select and transform information. 
Generating legitimacy is for an important part dependent on managing in-
formation flows, as relevant information loops concerning policy and decision 
making are more integrative and dynamic. Different stakeholders part of the 
governance network contribute to the generation and spreading of information 
in the policy and decision-making process, not seldom using media.
By legitimacy we mean a generalised preparedness to accept, within a cer-
tain margin, a decision or policy by those to whom it is supposed to apply (see 
Luhmann, 1975). As decisions and policy-making around complex governance 
issues often take a considerable amount of time (e.g. Teisman, 2000), in which 
preferences and perceptions of actors can change, we could therefore also 
speak of a process of acceptance (cf. Dryzek, 2010). This is also emphasised 
by deliberative models of democracy, which locate the source of legitimacy in 
the process of deliberation between actors (Manin, 1987). In this process of ac-
ceptance, different sources of legitimacy are important.
5.2.1 Different sources of legitimacy in governance 
networks
Various models of democracy stress varying sources of democratic legitimacy. 
We focus on three different sources of democratic legitimacy that are especially 
relevant for analysing decision-making processes in governance networks (see 
Klijn, 2011). These three sources derive mainly from the deliberative model 
of democracy. This model goes relatively well with the nature of governance 
networks, as compared to more traditional models of democracy (Sørensen, 
2002; Dryzek, 2010; Van Meerkerk et al., 2014).14 
As a first source of democratic legitimacy in governance networks, voice is an 
important consideration. Voice is about the way in which affected stakeholders 
can provide input in the decision-making process (Manin, 1987; Dryzek, 2007). 
To what extent are citizens enabled to express their wishes and interests in po-
14. As Sørensen (2002: 715) rightly points out: a governance network ‘exhibits and aggravates 
inherent problems in some of the basic concepts of liberal democracy.’ However, an exten-
sive elaboration of the relationship between governance networks and traditional models 
of democracy is beyond the scope of this article. Interesting elaborations in this matter are, 
for example, provided by Sørensen (2002) and Dryzek (2007, 2010).
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litical decision making and how easy is it to get issues on to the political agenda 
(Bekkers & Edwards, 2007)? Secondly, democratic legitimacy in governance net-
works is dependent on the quality of the deliberation process: due deliberation. To 
what extent are different perspectives included in the decision-making process? 
In this sense, legitimacy is derived from the extent a decision receives reflective 
assent through participation in authentic deliberation by those subjected to the 
decision in question (Cohen, 1989). Mutual exchange of information, percep-
tions and preferences could induce a learning process by which well-informed 
and reasoned decision making could take place. This is grounded on the as-
sumption that individuals’ preferences are not fixed, but can change in debate 
and political dialogue (Held, 2006). The transparency of the decision-making 
process and open information access are also often mentioned parameters of 
due deliberation (Dryzek, 2000). Accountability of decision-makers to the public is 
a third source of democratic legitimacy. In governance networks, accountability 
is often diffuse and spread among different actors and governmental layers (Van 
Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004, Hajer, 2009). However, particular officehold-
ers often function as the public face around decisions or a specific policy (Eshuis 
& Klijn, 2012). Providing information and explaining certain decisions in the 
media is important for politically responsible actors to generate legitimacy and 
to convince their electorate that their actions are right and necessary.
5.2.2 Mediatised legitimacy
Role of media in democracies
Graber (2003: 143) summarises four different functions of news media within 
democracies:
· Providing a forum for discussion of diverse, often conflicting ideas;
· Giving voice to public opinion;
· Collecting information about political events, serving as citizens’ eyes and 
ears to survey the political scene and the performance of politicians;
· Acting as a public watchdog that ‘barks loudly’ when it encounters misbe-
haviour (e.g. corruption, abuse of power) in the halls of government.
Although these are potential functions of news media, rather than an accurate 
description of their routine performance (Graber, 2003, 2004), these functions 
are strongly connected to the legitimacy sources discussed above. The media 
can open up the political and policy agenda, giving voice to citizen groups. Fur-
thermore, as they provide a forum for discussion, they impact on the quality of 
the deliberation process. Thirdly, as they inform citizens about the performance 
of politicians, they affect the accountability relationship of political authorities 
toward citizens. The media facilitate or mediate these legitimacy sources, at 
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least to some extent. In this matter, it is important to consider how the media 
operate, as they are not neutral information transmitters, but have their own 
logic (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Parkinson, 2006). In the 
next section, we describe how this media logic potentially affects the role of the 
media regarding the three sources of legitimacy. 
Mediatisation
As discussed in the introduction, media logic refers to “the process by which 
media present and transmit information” (Altheide & Snow, 1979: 10), led by 
the media’s rules, aims, production routines and constraints. Complex policy 
processes are often tremendously reshaped to fit the journalistic norms of 
newsworthiness and media formats (Davis, 2007, Bennett, 2009). Bennett (2009) 
describes several trends in news reporting that, in his opinion, simplify com-
plex governmental issues. He sees information biases of personalisation (a focus 
on human interest), dramatisation (an emphasis on crisis and conflict) and an 
authority–disorder bias (a claim that authorities are not able to establish or 
restore order in society) (Bennett, 2009). In addition, Patterson (2000) observes 
a bias toward negativity in the news. These trends in the news can also be 
found in other studies on media content (e.g. Brants & Neijens, 1998; Semetko 
& Valkenburg, 2000; Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006; 
Strömbäck & Sheheta, 2007). 
Many scholars argue that societies and societal institutions are submitted to, 
or become dependent on, the media and their logic to an increasing degree; 
they are increasingly mediatised (Hjarvard, 2008; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; 
Reunanen et al., 2010; Strömbäck & Esser, 2009). In the context of politics, 
Mazzoleni and Schulz (1999: 250) argue: “mediatised politics is politics that 
has lost its autonomy, has become dependent in its central functions on mass 
media, and is continuously shaped by interactions with mass media.” Meyer 
and Hinchmann (2002) even speak of a ‘colonisation’ of politics by media logic. 
As political actors adapt their communication strategies and even tailor their 
policy decisions to fit the media’s needs of timing, staging and framing, me-
dia logic dominates over political logic. Others expect that some institutions, 
policy stages and activities in the political process will be more mediatised than 
others, depending on how compatible they are with media logic (cf. Esser & 
Matthes, 2013). 
In this study, we empirically examine the extent to which and how legitimacy 
sources are mediatised in different stages of the policy process. 
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Mediatised voice
Voice refers to the opportunities for citizens to participate and influence deci-
sions. To what extent can they influence the decision-making agenda and can 
they exercise voice during the governance process with the help of media at-
tention?
 Citizens often organise themselves in citizen groups. Although these groups 
are often to some extent involved in processes of network governance, they 
have less power resources than other actors in the decision-making process. 
Citizen groups can increase their influence by gaining media attention (Kune-
lius & Reunanen, 2012; Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 2010). They then strive 
to shape the news in order to set their issue and their frame on the agenda of 
decision-makers; this is also known as agenda setting (Baumgartner & Jones, 
2009; Cobb & Elder, 1983; Cook et al., 1983; McCombs, 2004) and framing power 
(Fischer, 2003; Terkildsen et al., 1998). As Entman (2007) argues, decision-makers 
use the news as a surrogate for public opinion. In this respect, news coverage 
of a citizen group’s statements may change the targets and efforts of decision-
makers in the decision-making processes. News reports influence the context in 
which officials bargain and decide (Cook, 2005). 
Since media logic influences the selection and framing of societal actors’ 
messages (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999), we argue that it plays an intermediating 
part in the source of voice. Success in shaping the news is often more related 
to journalistic norms than to actual pressure group strength as Terkildsen et 
al. (1998) note. They mention the following criteria as influencing this success: 
spokespersons’ accessibility, rules of issue simplicity, drama and event-oriented 
coverage. Journalists need spokespersons to fill news holes, to meet deadlines 
and to provide drama (Terkildsen et al., 1998). In other words, citizen groups are 
submitted to, and become to a certain extent dependent on, media logic if they 
want to influence the decision-makers’ agenda via media attention. Therefore, 
we could presume that the degree to which they are able to adapt to media logic 
affects their success. 
Due deliberation and mediatisation
Habermas (2006) argues that the media play an important role in deliberative 
processes by facilitating flows of political communication throughout the 
political system in a public sphere. The media collect, select, assemble and 
interpret relevant issues and require information from the flows of political 
communication. They ideally could, if only circumstances were favourable, 
generate considered public opinions (Habermas, 2006). 
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However, these functions of the media in the deliberative process can become 
problematic if the media focus excessively on the negative, dramatic or emo-
tional aspects of governance processes (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Habermas, 
2006; Bennett, 2009). Rohlinger (2007: 145), in addition, reproaches the media 
for presenting only the most extreme elements, thereby undermining the 
deliberative process. In this respect, information biases seem to problematise 
the function of the media as a public platform for diverse deliberations. Many 
authors suggest that the legitimacy of political authorities is under pressure in 
the media debate, merely because of critical reporting about them (Patterson, 
2000; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2006; Bennett, 2009; Hurrelmann et al., 2009). 
At the same time, many political actors are assisted by public relations prac-
titioners and spokespersons who bridge the differences between governmental 
or political logic and media logic (Davis, 2002). They provide information sub-
sidies to journalists to ‘sell’ policy plans; official sources are therefore not only 
authoritative but also efficient news sources (Davis, 2002; Cook, 2005; Louw, 
2007; Eshuis & Klijn, 2012). In times of increasing time pressure on journalists, 
these information subsidies have quite an impact on news reporting (Davis, 
2002). 
An unlovable press can therefore be seen as essential for the functioning of 
democracy. In particular, the often-criticised characteristics of media logic – the 
pre-occupation with events, with conflict and the cynicism of the media – may 
contribute to the subversion of established power (Schudson, 2008). This could 
prevent interests of minority groups being easily pushed aside by powerful 
public and private stakeholders in the deliberative process.
Mediatised accountability relations
According to Hurrelmann et al. (2009: 487), the media serve as “the primary 
interface […] between citizens and the representatives of political systems; 
media debates on political issues juxtapose the self-legitimating claims of these 
elites and the legitimacy assessments of important stakeholders or professional 
observers.” When political actors and governmental institutions want to pub-
licly legitimate their decisions, the media are a highly important resource. As 
discussed earlier, the degree to which political authorities are able to adapt 
to media logic influences whether they manage to present their policy deci-
sion as successes. Through information subsidies such as press releases, press 
conferences, pre-arranged interviews and press tours – which are nowadays 
fully integrated into the process of news production – they proactively commu-
nicate their policy decisions and suppress potentially damaging stories (Davis, 
2002). Adaptation to media logic may decrease the quality of information that 
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voters can obtain from media reports on public affairs (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 
1999; Davis, 2002; Hjarvard, 2008; Bennett, 2009). The authorities have thus 
professionalised their communication strategies, but Jacobs (2009) points out 
that the logic in news reporting can lead to coercive, reactive legitimation of 
decisions made. When the media increasingly focus on drama and conflict and 
hold authorities responsible for failures in governance processes, authorities 
have to react to these accusations and increase their efforts to legitimate their 
decisions.  
5.3 MIXED METHODS
To examine the influence of media logic on democratic legitimacy sources, we 
have developed a mixed method design, combining quantitative and qualitative 
methods to generate more knowledge on the phenomenon (Currall & Towler, 
2003). 
Data: three governance networks around complex water projects
We studied three water management cases in the Netherlands: a bypass in 
IJsseldelta-Zuid (near Kampen), a dike relocation in Lent (in Nijmegen) and a 
dike relocation in the area called the Noordwaard (near Werkendam). These 
cases are part of a national governmental programme, called Space for the River 
(Ruimte voor de rivier), which started officially in 2000. This programme strives 
for a collaborative, interactive governance approach aiming to increase the 
involvement of local citizens and investors in the planning process (website 
Ruimte voor de Rivier, Van Buuren et al. 2010). As the national government leaves 
project development to the regional and local governments, executive local 
politicians often function as the face of these projects or the first political point 
of contact for citizens.
The complex water projects are about new ways to improve water safety 
(reducing flood risks) in combination with spatial quality. As these water safety 
measures make a big claim on space in and near cities, they are confronted, 
and often combined, with other planning activities and ambitions of local and 
regional governments, such as housing, the development of recreational areas 
and infrastructure. 
We approached the projects as governance networks, following previous 
research on these same projects (see Van Buuren et al., 2010; Klijn et al., 2010a; 
Edelenbos et al., 2013). These projects (a) involve many actors (public actors such 
as local government, water boards, province; private actors such as building 
companies; and societal groups, such as environmental organisations and in-
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habitants), (b) have a relatively stable character, i.e. they have been in existence 
for a long period and are characterised by regular interactions between the 
actors, and (c) are dominated by wicked problems, i.e. the solutions proposed 
for problems and challenges are contested because the different actors have 
divergent perceptions of the problems and solutions (Edelenbos et al., 2013). 
In short, the water projects are developed and implemented in networks of 
interdependent actors, who employ dynamic interaction processes with one an-
other and who lack clear relations of domination and subordination (although 
power inequalities exist). In all three cases, citizen groups are involved, using 
different strategies to influence the policy and decision-making process. The 
interactions between the actors are typified by a mix of negotiation, collabora-
tion, persuasion and mutual adjustment. Besides direct interaction with one 
another, these actors could also use ‘go-alone’ strategies to strengthen their 
position (see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
The three cases have been studied extensively with regard to the governance 
process (Van Buuren et al., 2010) on the basis of Teisman’s (2000) rounds mod-
el.15 We use these decision-making rounds to organise our analysis. 
Quantitative content analysis 
The media reports about the three projects stem from newspapers and televi-
sion. The selection of newspaper reports started at the Lexis Nexis Academic 
NL database. We used the name of each case16 as the search term, in the period 
from 1 January 2000 to 1 January 2011 as the Space for the River programme 
started in 2000. Besides these newspaper reports, we searched for television 
items on the website of the Dutch institute for television and radio (http://
portal.beeldengeluid.nl/) and on regional broadcasters’ websites. This resulted 
in a universe of 290 media reports. 
In the quantitative content analysis, we used Patterson’s (2000) coding 
scheme, items and coding instructions, which fit the information biases that 
Bennett (2009) describes (see also Korthagen, 2014). We focused on: 
•	 dramatisation (news report has a substantial level of conflict framing);
15. In Teisman’s (2000) decision-making model, which relates especially to decision making 
and interactions between actors in governance networks, decision making is defined as 
an intertwined clew of a series of decisions taken by a variety of parties. The interactions 
between actors and the interdependence of actors are stressed. Rounds are distinguished 
by a crucial decision or event (e.g. the involvement of a new actor), defined by the research-
ers in retrospect, but based on the reconstruction of the process by the involved actors. The 
crucial decision or event is the beginning of a next round and generally serves as a focal 
point of reference for the actors involved.
16. IJsseldelta-Zuid, dijkteruglegging Lent and Noordwaard.
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•	 personalisation (news report has high or moderate human interest framing)
•	 negativity (news report is clearly negative/more negative than positive);
•	 authority–disorder bias (news report implies a need for action and attributes 
this to a governmental institution). 
Furthermore, we developed an item by which one key subject in the report 
was identified. The categories of this item were based on case study research 
(Van Buuren et al., 2010).17 Three teams of trained coders coded the news reports, 
with the help of an extensive coding instruction. We executed two reliability 
tests: intra-coder (0.94) and inter-coder (0.91). These scores indicate that the 
dataset can be seen as reliable.  
Interviews
Besides the interviews used to elaborate the case descriptions and analysis on 
the basis of the rounds model (see Van Buuren et al., 2010), we additionally 
interviewed both the politically responsible aldermen and the spokesmen for 
the citizen groups. These aldermen are the public face of the water projects. 
We picked the citizen groups most often present in the media reports: Citizen 
group Zwartendijk in the IJsseldelta-Zuid case, Citizen group Federation of Lent 
in the Lent case and citizen group Bandijk in the Noordwaard case.18 In relation 
to the sources of legitimacy, we asked the respondents about the involvement 
of the citizen group in the decision-making process, about the quality of the 
deliberation process and the outcomes. We additionally asked them about their 
contacts with journalists, whether they made their message more attractive for 
journalists and, if so, how they did this, and the effects of media attention. All 
the interviews were face-to-face and took about 100 minutes.19 The interviews 
were fully transcribed. 
5.4 RESULTS
We first report the findings of our quantitative content analysis. Afterwards, we 
connect these findings to our interviewees’ responses, discussing the impact of 
media logic on the three sources of legitimacy in governance networks.
17. These categories can be found in Table 1. They are recoded as dummy variables. We used 
the dummy variables of ‘citizens group as key subject in news report’ and ‘executive politi-
cians as key subject in news report’ in our further analysis. 
18. In Dutch: werkgroep Zwartendijk (IJsseldelta-Zuid); Lentse Federatie (Lent); bewonersvereniging 
Bandijk (Noordwaard)
19. The interview with the Werkendam alderman (Noordwaard case) is an exception in this 
matter. This interview was by telephone and took about 45 minutes.
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Media attention in the different rounds of decision making
From the universe of 290 media reports 20 reports come from national news 
media (6.9%), and 270 reports stem from local media (93.1%). In addition 280 
reports stem from daily papers (96.5%) against 10 items from television pro-
grammes20 (3.5%).  
Who gets on the news?
Table 5.1 shows the different groups of key subjects grouped in four categories. 
For the purposes of this study, the executive politician and citizen groups are 
particularly important. In all three cases, citizen groups are key subject in 
about a third of the media reports. In IJsseldelta-Zuid and Lent, executives are 
somewhat more often key subject than citizen groups. In Noordwaard by con-
trast, executive politicians are key subject in only one in seven media reports, 
whereas citizen groups feature in almost one in two. 
Adding these two groups, we see that in all three cases in a majority of the 
media reports citizen groups or executive politicians are the key subject. They 
are thus very important in the media debate.
Media attention in the different rounds of decision making
In all three cases, citizen groups were part of the governance network, interact-
ing with the initiating governmental actors and other stakeholders to negotiate 
and deliberate project plans. However, the juncture at which the citizen groups 
became involved, the way in which participation was organised and the extent 
to which they choose for a go-alone strategy varies. These aspects form an ex-
planation for the uneven distribution of media attention among the different 
rounds of decision making in all three cases, shown in figure 5.1.
In the Noordwaard case, the citizen group was strongly involved from the 
beginning, when interactive planning sessions were organised with a variety of 
stakeholders to develop the project plan, creating much room for voice and de-
liberation. However, in the last round, when the planning process was finishing 
and the implementation process started, the communication and interaction 
between stakeholders sharply decreased. At that time, citizen group members 
became increasingly dissatisfied about the execution of the governmental plans 
and they publicly started some fierce discussions about the consequences of the 
plans for citizens and compensation. 
20. However, we must remark that regional television programmes are quite recent phenom-
ena on the Internet. The earliest regional television item is from March 2006, and the date 
regional broadcasters started their broadcasting on the Internet may even differ per outlet. 
This may lead to small biases in the analysis. 
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In the Lent case, the citizen group was part of the advisory committee of 
the project organisation. However, because they were not satisfied with the 
proposed project plan and opportunities for meaningful deliberation, they were 
also developing their own alternative. The number of media reports peaked 
when the local council supported the citizen group’s alternative. This led to 
a difficult position for the responsible alderman (the political executive), who 
was negotiating with the national government. 
In the IJsseldelta case, the concerned citizen group became involved relatively 
late. Although interactive sessions were organised here, this citizen group be-
came involved in the sessions when the project plans became more concrete. 
The peak in news reports is in 2007–2008 when this citizen group strongly 
protested against the proposed development of the bypass, particularly with 
regard to the housing plans (see Van Buuren et al., 2010). They were able to put 
their concerns on the agenda of the local council. Subsequently, housing in the 
Zwartendijk area was postponed by the local council.
Table 5.1 Media coverage of actors: percentages of actors as key subject in a news report
IJsseldelta-Zuid 
(N=100) 
(%)
Lent 
(N=97) 
(%)
Noordwaard  
(N=93)
(%)
(Prime)Minister/The state 11.0 14.4 5.4
Provincial governor/ The province 13.0 4.1 2.2
Municipal governor /The municipality 10.0 16.5 8.6
Executive politicians total 34.0 35.0 16.2
Inhabitants (association) 21.0 29.9 28.0
Farmers 2.0 1.0 9.7
Environmental organisations 1.0 1.0 8.6
Citizens (group) total 24.0 31.9 46.3
Administrative officials - 3.1 8.6
Water board 1.0 1.0 1.1
Project organisation 16.0 2.1 6.5
Member of the Lower House 2.0 12.4 3.2
Member of the Provincial Council 1.0 1.0 2.2
Member of the Municipal Council 9.0 4.1 5.4
Other governmental actors total 29.0 23.7 27.0
Private investors - 2.1 -
Research institute 4.0 4.1 3.2
Other 9.0 3.1 7.5
Other societal actors total 13.0 9.3 10.7
Chapter 5
96
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
04-05 05-07 07-08 08-09 09
rounds of decision making
Executive politicians as
key subject
Citizens (group) as key
subject
Total media reports
Media reports IJsseldelta-Zuid
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
00 00-03 03-05 05-07 07-09
rounds of decision making
Executive politicians as
key subject
Citizens (group) as key
subject
Total media reports
Media reports Lent
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
02-03 03-05 05 05-07 07-09
rounds of decision making
Executive politicians as
key subject
Citizens (group) as key
subject
Total media reports
Media reports Noordwaard
Figure 5.1. Media attention in the different rounds of decision making in IJsseldelta-Zuid, Lent 
and Noordwaard
Note: X-axis = time period. Each time period is a decision-making round. Y-axis = number of 
media reports.
97
Mediatised legitimacy within local governance networks.
5
We can conclude that media attention was not constant during the three 
decision-making processes. Media attention increased at times of conflict 
between citizens and political authorities around the plans. This is when the 
legitimacy of important aspects of the policy plans were most contested by the 
citizen groups.
The presence of media logic in the news reports
Table 5.2 shows that all information biases appear in the news reporting on 
the water management projects. In most of the reports (more than 60% of all 
reports in each project) at least one of the information biases is present. The 
authority–disorder bias and the negativity bias are most often present, whereas 
the personalisation bias appears less often. The media logic presence seems 
to be the strongest in the Lent case (78% versus 64 and 62%). An explanation 
could be that in this case the citizen group proposed an extensive alternative 
plan, not only challenging and discussing the governmental plan, but really 
competing with it.21 
Presence of media logic in reports on citizen groups versus reports on executive politicians
In Table 5.3, we report how the information biases relate to citizen groups as 
key subject and to executive politicians as key subject. Clear positive relations 
exist between information biases and citizen groups as key subject, especially 
with regard to dramatisation, personalisation and negativity. Stories about 
them contain more conflict, more human interest, more negativity toward the 
water project. The citizen groups do not seem to demand significantly more 
21. Furthermore, the particular history of the small village Lent, ‘annexed’ by the city of 
Nijmegen (‘David versus Goliath’ as the interviewees called it) in 1998, provided an inter-
esting narrative for the media to mention. 
Table 5.2 Information biases in the news
Biases Media reports
IJsseldelta-Zuid (%) Lent (%) Noordwaard (%)
Dramatisation bias 23.0 46.4 26.9
Personalisation bias 16.0 13.4 19.3
Authority–disorder bias 42.0 68.0 36.6
Negativity bias 45.0 54.6 40.8
1 or more biases present in media 
report
64.0 78.4 62.4
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often than other groups of key actors that governmental authorities should 
take actions (authority–disorder bias).
In all three cases, reports about citizen groups score high on the personalisa-
tion bias. Reports on the citizen group in the IJsseldelta-Zuid case score highest 
in relation to dramatisation and the Lent citizen group in relation to negativity. 
In contrast, we see in Table 5.3 no or only small negative relations between 
executive politicians and information biases. Significant negative correlations 
would show that, when executive politicians are key subject in a media report, 
the report has significantly fewer information biases. This would mean that 
reports are more positive, less dramatised, less personalised and have fewer 
demands for action by a governmental authority. This is probably what execu-
tive politicians strive for in media attention on their projects. Some politicians, 
especially concerning IJsseldelta-Zuid, seem to indeed succeed in telling their 
side of the story: reports are significantly less dramatised and more positive to-
ward the project. However, in Lent and Noordwaard, these negative correlations 
are much smaller and not significant. Apparently, the executive politicians in 
these projects have more difficulty getting a more positive and less dramatised 
image of the project into the news.
Mediatised legitimacy
In summary, the quantitative analysis of the media reports reveals that the 
media attention is quite erratic. Media attention increases in the rounds in 
which the legitimacy concerning the policy plans from the citizen groups’ 
perspective is under most pressure. Furthermore, the findings show that execu-
Table 5.3 Relations between the information biases and the citizen groups/executive politicians
Citizen groups in Executive politicians in
IJsseldelta-
Zuid 
N= 24(100)
Lent 
N= 31(97)
Noord-
waard 
N= 43(93)
IJsseldelta-
Zuid 
N= 34(100)
Lent 
N= 34(97)
Noord-
waard
N= 15(93)
Dramatisation bias .446*** .216* .257*  -.294**  -.176  -.201
Personalisation 
bias
.416*** .430** .388**  -.117  -.193  -.234*
Authority–disorder 
bias
.091 .138 .081  -.012  -.145  .092
Negativity bias .207* .371** .226*  -.255*  -.182  -.142
*** Spearman’s rho correlation is significant at a .001 level (2-tailed). 
** Spearman’s rho correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
* Spearman’s rho correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
Note: We measured media attention on the citizen groups/executive politicians by the variable in which they 
were coded as the most important actor in the news report.
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tive politicians do receive media attention, but this attention does not always 
show a more positive side of the water projects. Media logic seems to make it 
harder for executive politicians to publicly legitimate their decisions and obtain 
broad social support for the water project via media reports, especially because 
citizen groups attract a lot of media attention as well; but this attention reflects 
many information biases. At several junctures, the citizen groups criticised the 
legitimacy of the policy plans and fought for their interests, deploying different 
strategies, such as arranging protest actions, designing alternative measures 
and/or participating in discussion fora. Media attention thereby potentially 
increased their power position. They seem to use the media and media logic 
quite well. 
We conducted interviews with both citizen groups and executive politicians 
to further examine how they make use of the media in their political com-
munication and how media logic consequently affects the three democratic 
legitimacy sources.
Voice: media attention to influence the decision-making process
In all three cases, we observed citizen groups succeeding in attracting much 
media attention; in about a quarter to half of the media reports they were 
the key subjects in media reports (Table 5.1). The media reports were crucial 
in making them and their viewpoints known to the wider public and to the 
authorities. This strategy can get a much faster reply from the formal decision-
making authorities, as the spokesman for the Noordwaard citizen group argues: 
‘I was amazed by how soon the Minister of State reacted to such a report in the newspaper.’ 
This media attention can contribute to changing decisions within the process. 
Although in the three cases the water storage plans and the other activities 
were not that much altered, some smaller decisions were made in favour of 
the citizen groups. In the IJsseldelta-Zuid case, the municipal council changed 
its decision about housing in the area in response to the actions of the citizen 
group and the consequent extensive media attention. In the Lent case, the 
citizens’ alternative plan has been incorporated in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), funded by the national government. Furthermore, the citi-
zens pleaded for measures against seepage water. The publicity around these 
problems bolstered their viewpoint, as the alderman noted. Consequently, the 
municipality invested more money in instruments to prevent the area from 
seepage water and to monitor this. Regarding Noordwaard, the alderman noted 
that he created fewer recreational facilities to make concessions to the citizens, 
publicising his stance through the press. 
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How did these citizens obtain media attention for their story? As stated in the 
previous section, media attention on the citizen groups related strongly to the 
information biases of dramatisation, personalisation and negativity. Therefore, 
citizen groups’ representatives used protest actions to attract journalists. ‘You 
need something visual, something which they [the journalists] can see and you must provide 
some drama,’ as the spokesman for the IJsseldelta-Zuid citizen group argued. One 
of their actions entailed driving a car with a homemade ‘dike’ on it through the 
city, with water leaking out of this dike. Children could stick their finger in the 
little holes in the dike; that led to speaking pictures in the local press. In the 
Lent case, the citizen group marked the route of the new dike with black flags. 
These kinds of actions play to media logic. 
Besides these protest actions, citizen groups provided journalists with in-
formation about their viewpoints directly by emails, telephone calls or even a 
press conference. Letters written to governmental institutions were often also 
sent to the media. Furthermore, we found that they often showed awareness of 
journalistic needs. As the Lent citizen group representative noted: ‘Some journal-
ists were interested in the emotions of citizens who had to leave because of the relocation 
of the dike. I assessed what kind of story they wanted. Did they want a really emotional 
story? then I sent them to inhabitant A, did they want a more sober story? I sent them to 
inhabitant B.’ 
The citizens also found that less dramatic or negative stories were less at-
tractive to the media. The Noordwaard citizen group representative stated that 
the press did not report on their collaborative experience with the political 
authorities in the first rounds of the decision-making process. Although this 
collaboration did not pass off easily, the citizen group was committed to col-
laborate. ‘The concerned journalist judged “this is not controversial enough, we won’t 
come to report on your story”.’ 
Overall, the citizen groups’ representatives were satisfied with the media 
reporting on their case. Media logic seems to help citizens, especially when 
they explicitly protest against the measures proposed by the political authori-
ties. The easy accessibility of the spokesmen and their feeling for media logic, 
communicating simple and dramatised messages certainly seemed to help in 
this matter. But what does this mean for the quality of the debate?
Due deliberation: media attention broadens the scope of the deliberative process
In all cases, we observed a widening of the scope of the deliberative process con-
sequent to the activities of the citizen groups and the attention they received 
from the media. By following the media, the aldermen received more informa-
tion on citizens’ viewpoints. By keeping in contact with the local journalist, the 
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aldermen received more information about citizens’ concerns. ‘Just by keeping in 
touch with the local journalist, I got much information about the concerns of citizens in the 
area. You receive signals. They [the citizens] don’t tell me everything, but they do tell [the lo-
cal journalist] this,’ as the Nijmegen alderman stated. In the IJsseldelta-Zuid case, 
the alderman noted on this matter: ‘I don’t experience this [the media attention on the 
citizen group] all in a negative manner. It has created more attention for certain aspects, 
such as the safety level, and provided more accurate information and transparency.’ The 
Noordwaard alderman argued: ‘The media performed quite well for the inhabitants, 
enabling them to express their criticism, as well as for us, making the signals stronger, so 
that we addressed those criticisms in our conversations with the ministry, on behalf of the 
inhabitants.’ By providing more information on the citizens’ concerns, the media 
reporting has thus broadened the scope of the deliberation process in the three 
cases.  
However, media logic also caused a certain shift in focus, namely, a focus 
on negativity, drama, disorder and some human interest. As we saw in the 
quantitative content analysis, a majority of the media reports show at least 
one of the information biases. In this matter, the alderman responsible for 
IJsseldelta-Zuid argued that the media debate ‘alluded to emotion, not to facts 
or the content of the plan.’ Moreover, the media often seemed to side with the 
opposing citizen groups. ‘Generally, the media mainly choose the critical side,’ the 
Noordwaard alderman noted. The alderman in the Lent case aptly remarked: 
‘the citizen group receives rather much attention and they realise rather much participa-
tion space, although the governmental experts are convinced that the other plan is surely 
much better.’ The alderman in the IJsseldelta-Zuid case questioned the extent to 
which the viewpoints in the media really represented the viewpoints included 
in the decision-making process: ‘people who said that they were not involved in the 
process received maximum attention, whereas people who said they were involved, received 
minimum media attention.’ 
The quality of the deliberation process is thus to some extent increased by 
more information. However, at the same time, the quality might be decreased, 
since we can question the diversity of the perspectives covered in the media 
reporting. Media logic seems to restrict this diversity.
Accountability: more reactive position than proactive communication due to dramatisation
The authorities needed media attention to obtain social support for the water 
project plans. When the national governmental decision about Space for the 
River had to be made, the ministry also used the press. The Lent citizen group 
representative argued: ‘By short movies with an image of chairs in water, and images 
of floods in the future in the Netherlands, they argued that the Netherlands should take 
Chapter 5
102
measures. They prepared us for the fact that much money is going to be spent on water 
management.’ 
However, it is not that easy to explain decisions in the media. As the cor-
relations in Table 5.3 show, executive politicians cannot always ‘escape’ the 
presence of information biases in the media representation of their stories. Ex-
ecutive politicians’ stories may be presented in a more negative and dramatised 
way than they want. In the Lent case, this was indeed so. The local authorities 
presented the project plans enthusiastically by showing how the area would 
look after the dike shift. The alderman stated: ‘we wanted to communicate that 
this water project is also an opportunity for the area. But this came back as a boomerang. 
(…) The press thought it was pitiful for the inhabitants.’ The media focused on the 50 
dwellings that had to be removed from Lent village, and thus on stories of grief 
and the citizen group’s alternative plan. A success story for the local authority 
in the media is ‘like rubbing salt in a wound,’ the alderman stated. 
However, he kept close contact with the journalist from the local newspaper, 
the most important news medium with regard to this project. ‘I informed him 
upfront, told him about the considerations. Sometimes I gave him things, sometimes a 
scoop. I called him a lot, and was always available to him. He could even call me at eleven 
o’clock in the evening, if he wanted to. And I never ran away from him.’ Nevertheless, 
this journalist always combined the alderman’s story with that of the inhabit-
ants, he argued. This was not always positive for the legitimising of the alder-
man’s actions and decisions. The alderman in the IJsseldelta-Zuid case had a 
similar experience. He described media reports after press conferences as ‘only 
one quarter of the page which covers our part of the story and three quarters of the page 
was filled with the citizen group’s story.’ 
The political authorities had trouble proactively ‘selling’ their project to 
the public. According to the Kampen alderman, the political authorities ‘were 
frequently pushed into a reactive position, instead of proactively communicating about the 
project. This almost killed our project, because it strongly influenced the public image.’ The 
IJsseldelta-Zuid citizen group played an important role in this matter. According 
to them, the bypass would create more possible victims in the event of flooding 
than the scenario without a bypass. This made it very hard for the political 
authorities to communicate their plans. ‘You find yourself in a reactive position, 
although it [citizen group’s statement] was bullshit, because we can prove that it is incor-
rect. However, you have to react to their story, while the tone is already set. And if the media 
do not hear you at the same time, but the next day or something, your story comes second. 
Then, things become complicated.’ This example shows how political authorities 
sometimes have to fight against a public image which, according to them, is 
highly incorrect. This public image can delegitimise their proposed decisions 
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or plans. Recently, the authorities involved in the project consciously decided 
not to react anymore to all negative stories in the media. ‘When we, the steering 
committee, gave less attention to these stories, we noticed that journalistic attention for 
them disappeared as well,’ the alderman argued. Hence, ignoring negative stories 
in the media can also be a communication strategy. 
In contrast, the alderman involved in the Noordwaard project noted that 
listening to and dealing with the emotions of citizens and showing that he 
understands them is a major part of his message to the press: ‘always show the 
press that you can handle empathy and emotions well as a governor,’ he declared. In 
that regard, he thought it was important to openly make concessions on his 
plans for recreational facilities and mediate for the relevant inhabitants in the 
compensation negotiations. This is comparable to the strategies of the alder-
man in Lent. 
Nevertheless, what all aldermen have in common is a more reactive com-
munication strategy, to which they sometimes feel condemned by the role of 
the media and media logic in the projects. 
The findings are summarised in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4 Influence of media logic on the sources of legitimacy
Role of media Media logic
Voice The media are a vehicle 
to generate attention 
for certain issues and to 
gain influence
Increases 
possibilities 
The citizen groups succeed in attracting 
media attention by adapting to media 
logic and are able to put their issues on 
the political agenda.
Due 
deliberation
The media as watchdog, 
as a check and balance 
in the process, platform 
for diverse deliberations
Increases 
possibilities
The deliberation process is broadened by 
the perspectives of the citizen groups, 
partly because of media attention.
Decreases 
possibilities
Since media are more interested in 
entertaining stories, with a focus on 
conflicts and drama, this partly reduces 
the quality of the deliberation process. 
Images seem more important than well 
elaborated deliberations. The media are a 
platform more for the citizen groups than 
for the authorities.
Accountability The media are a 
communication 
channel for generating 
transparency and 
accountability
Decreases 
possibilities 
The media sometimes force political 
authorities into a reactive communication 
style: they have to fight against a negative 
image. Proactive communication, such as 
branding, is difficult in the context of the 
citizens’ dramatic stories.
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5.5 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Although theoretical and empirical work on the democratic legitimacy of gov-
ernance networks is growing (e.g. Pierre, 2000; Papadopoulos, 2003; Sørensen & 
Torfing, 2005b; Van Meerkerk et al., 2014), the role of the media and particularly 
media logic in this respect has so far been neglected. In this research, we aimed 
to start to fill this lacuna. Before we present our conclusions however, we want 
to mention several important research choices and limitations of our study. 
A first important choice was the local level focus. Media communications by 
politicians may be characterised by a lower level of professionalisation than is 
described by the national-level focused literature on PR and news management 
(cf. Davis, 2002; Cook, 2005). Local-level politicians often have fewer resources 
regarding communication, but this may differ between organisations and 
projects. Furthermore, as we studied cases in the field of water management, 
our results cannot automatically be assumed to hold for other types of public 
projects or policy domains. The role of the media in less technical and more 
controversial public issues is likely to be stronger, especially because of media 
logic. 
We can conclude that the media attention in the three cases was highly in-
constant. This is in line with other research (Cobb & Elder, 1983; Baumgartner 
& Jones, 2009). Most media attention occurred in the decision rounds in which 
citizen groups strongly contested the policy plans. This points to the role and 
presence of media logic, with its focus on conflict and negativity, as was con-
firmed by the results of the content analysis.
Although in a lot of the literature the role of the media in legitimacy rela-
tions is stressed (e.g. Bang, 2003; Habermas, 2006; Louw, 2007), the role of media 
logic in these relationships is not yet well examined. In this study, media logic 
extended the possibilities for citizen groups to voice their views. The citizen 
groups in our cases seem to know how the media work and are capable of 
adapting their stories to media logic. They often strategically strove for media 
attention, and they benefitted from media logic to challenge political authori-
ties and influence the decision-making process. This is in line with Schudson’s 
(2008) claim that the characteristics of media logic give journalists and citizens 
the possibility to subvert established power in a deliberative process. However, 
these mediatised voice possibilities for citizens are dependent on the capacity 
and will of citizens to adapt to media logic. This means that citizen groups 
need to provide some drama and conflicts, otherwise journalists will not be that 
interested (see also Cook, 2005; Hajer 2009).
In the case studies, we observed that citizen groups deployed media strate-
gies at times when they were losing faith in the interactive governance process 
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(Noordwaard, Lent) or when they were fighting for their last chance to influence 
the decision-making process (IJsseldelta-South). Although these media strate-
gies extend their influence possibilities, they are not without risks. They could 
influence trust relationships between the citizen groups and the other actors or 
even isolate them from the interactive governance process. There are also other 
challenges. To what extent is it legitimate to listen to these actors, barking 
loudly in the media, while other stakeholders are trying to reach compromises 
in an interactive setting? The aldermen in both the Lent and the IJsseldelta-Zuid 
case experienced this dilemma. Further research could be done to examine 
what kind of dilemmas actors within governance networks face in this respect 
and how they deal with them.
Furthermore, through the workings of media logic, the deliberation process 
broadened, but this did not improve the quality of this process per se, as nega-
tive and dramatised images seem to dominate over substantial argumentation. 
This connects with the literature that doubts the quality of media reporting, 
providing more drama and less information about the complexity of societal 
issues from different viewpoints (e.g. Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009). Extensive 
qualitative content analysis of media reports could lead to firmer claims in this 
regard. 
A next conclusion is that local political authorities had great difficulty legiti-
mising their actions. The literature suggests that authorities could proactively 
use the media to ‘sell’ their policies (Davis, 2002; Cook, 2005; Bennett, 2009; 
Eshuis & Klijn, 2012), but the political authorities did not really feel capable of 
doing this as they were pushed into a rather reactive position (cf. Hajer, 2009). 
In this study, we thus see a mediatisation of legitimacy sources at certain 
stages of the policy process, namely, those that contain conflict and drama, 
leading to some changes in the policy process and outcomes in favour of citizen 
groups who are able to attract media attention. At these stages, media logic 
might overrule the logic of deliberative governance processes to some extent. 
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The mediatisation of network governance: The 
impact of commercialised news and mediatised 
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6.1 MEDIATISATION AND NETWORK GOVERNANCE: 
TWO WORLDS APART? 
The options for building trust relations within governance networks and reach-
ing satisfactory network performance can vary depending on the social context 
in which the network operates. An important transformation within this 
context is the mediatisation of society in general and politics in particular (Maz-
zoleni & Schulz, 1999; Cook, 2005; Hjarvard, 2008; Bennett, 2009; Reunanen 
et al., 2010).  Many scholars describe that news media and their logic have a 
significant impact on society, even to the extent that media logic overrules 
other institutional logics, such as political logic (Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999; 
Fischer, 2003; Cook, 2005; Hjarvard, 2008; Strömbäck, 2008). Politicians seem 
to adapt their behaviour in such a way that it fits the requirements of media in 
form and substance.
The role of political actors in governance networks has received quite some 
scholarly attention in public administration (Stevenson & Greenberg, 2000; 
Hirst, 2000; Agranoff, 2006; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). Less attention has been 
paid so far to the impact of the news media, media logic and mediatised politics 
on governance networks, although that could be seen as another dimension of 
mediatisation. The literature on governance and the literature on mediatisation 
and mediatised politics are almost two worlds apart, although these phenom-
ena considerably interact in practice (Hajer, 2009). 
Media coverage could disturb effective and efficient decision-making pro-
cesses in networks, because the commercialised news-media logic and the 
logic of network governance are hard to combine (see Esser & Matthes, 2013). 
Whereas the media often focus on conflicts and sensationalism (Patterson, 
2000; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Bennett, 2009; Korthagen, 2013), network 
actors need to build trust relations and need to collaborate because of their 
interdependencies in relation to problem solving or service delivery (Ansell & 
Gash, 2008; Provan et al., 2009; Klijn et al., 2010a). The media may highlight 
a specific policy solution (Voltmer & Koch-Baumgarten, 2010), but network 
performance requires addressing the various perceptions of involved actors and 
thus requires deliberation of a rich set of policy options (Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004; Klijn et al., 2010b). Moreover, whereas the media tend to concentrate on 
political authorities’ actions and personal efforts (Edelman, 1977, 1988; Hajer, 
2009), network actors necessarily strive for collective decisions and efforts of 
public, societal and private actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Mandell, 2001). At 
last, politicians who primarily aim to increase their media impact may subvert 
the privacy needed to reach negotiated compromises that lead to substantial 
network performance (Landerer, 2013) 
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Given these conflicting interests of news media and governance networks, “a 
considerable decline in the quantity and quality of negotiating outcomes seems 
likely in a mediatised environment” (Esser & Matthes, 2013: 191). We expect 
strong mediatisation to limit the opportunities for building trust relations and 
reaching desirable network performance. In this article, we empirically test the 
possible effects of two aspects of mediatisation that can complicate collective 
decision making in networks (Esser & Matthes, 2013):
1. Commercialised news reporting22: Critical, dramatic, and sensational news re-
porting (Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009; Esser & Matthes, 2013; Landerer, 
2013).
2. Mediatised politics: Politicians involved in the project focusing their strate-
gies first and foremost on the media, to reach their electorate, marketing 
themselves (Edelman, 1988; Landerer, 2013). 
We use data from an internet survey among project managers in the Nether-
lands who each report for one spatial planning project (N=141).
In the following section we discuss the theoretical framework and the hy-
potheses. Section three contains the methodology and the operationalisation 
of the key variables, as well as their descriptive statistics. Section four presents 
the main findings, and the last section presents the conclusion and discussion.
6.2 GOVERNANCE NETWORKS AND MEDIATISATION: A 
FRAMEWORK 
Much decision making on both policy problems and service delivery takes place 
in networks of actors (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978; Kickert et al., 1997; Rhodes, 1997). 
Our research fits in a tradition of studies on the political environment of and 
political support in governance networks (e.g. Hirst, 2000; Stevenson & Green-
berg, 2000; Agranoff, 2006; Klijn & Skelcher, 2007; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). 
Politicians often function as the ‘public face’ of policies and the decisions 
around it. Politicians also affect the network performance by their authoritative 
decisions. “In virtually every public management network, it is government 
22. With commercialized news we do not mean news from a commercial broadcast, but news 
produced via a commercial logic. As Landerer (2013) convincingly argues, in many stud-
ies the concept of media logic actually refers to this commercial production logic behind 
news. “As an economically inspired theoretical model, commercial logic has the conceptual 
precision and linear rationale that media logic lacks. In this account, both issue selection 
and presentation formats are subordinated to a single overarching goal: the maximization 
of audience—readers, viewers, listeners—in order to generate profit” Landerer, 2013, : 
244). Public as well as commercial media often have commercial interests: maximizing 
consumers, to gain advertising revenues. 
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administrators at federal, state, and local levels who are the core or among the 
core actors in the network” (Agranoff, 2006: 62). Politicians are politically re-
sponsible for the work of the government administrators and are able to make 
final legislative decisions. Due to this formal authority political actors can set 
agenda’s and decide on the scope and content of decisions. and subsequently 
influence the network performance.
In practice, the agenda setting and decision-making power of politicians is 
limited as politicians are dependent upon other actors in the network that pos-
sess resources needed to deal with the policy issue, as knowledge, financial 
or production resources (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Crucial to the emergence 
and existence of governance networks are those dependency relations between 
actors (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978). Governance networks are therefore characterised 
by more or less horizontal coordination and interaction between governmental, 
private, and semi-private actors around policy problems or policy programmes.
6.2.1 Network performance: the need for trust
Interaction in the governance networks show complexity because actors are 
relatively autonomous: they are not legally bound in authority relationships but 
operate from their various institutional and organisational backgrounds; they 
have their own perceptions about problems and solutions; and they employ 
their own strategies (Hanf & Scharpf, 1978; Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Man-
dell, 2001; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). Due to the variety in institutional and 
organisational foundations, network actors differ in their value preferences and 
they can fundamentally disagree on policy problems and solutions. As a result, 
decision-making processes are usually characterised by conflicts. 
In networks therefore a constant tension exists between the need for coop-
eration because of the resource dependencies and conflicts about the goals 
and interests of actors (see Rhodes, 1997; Mandell, 2001; McGuire & Agranoff, 
2011; Ansell & Gash, 2008). This makes it hard to achieve good network perfor-
mances. Good performance means that actors have employed their resources 
and succeeded in achieving innovative solutions to wicked policy problems (see 
McGuire & Agranoff, 2011).
Trust is often mentioned as an important characteristic that enables the 
achievement of good network performance. Trust refers to the actors’ more or 
less stable, positive perception of the intentions of other actors, that is, the per-
ception that other actors will refrain from opportunistic behavior (Klijn et al., 
2010a).  As the definition highlights, trust is a perception about the intentions 
of other actors. The literature on trust both in business administration and 
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network literature emphasises that trust enhances cooperation and collabora-
tive performance through various mechanisms which are related to each other.
Trust reduces transaction costs and enhances durable investment. Trust reduces the 
risk inherent in transactions and cooperative relations because it creates greater 
predictability (Ring & van der Ven, 1992; Provan et al., 2009).
Trust enhances stability in relations. Trust increases the probability that actors 
will invest their resources, such as money, knowledge, and so on, in coop-
eration, thus creating stability in the relationship and providing them with a 
stronger basis for cooperation (Parker & Vaidya, 2001; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; 
Nooteboom, 2002).
Trust stimulates exchange of information and learning. Relevant knowledge is partly 
tacit and only available, for instance, in the form of human capital and human 
interaction (Sako, 1998; Nooteboom, 2002).
Trust stimulates innovation. The outcome of innovation processes is usually 
uncertain since innovations are novelties rather than proven developments. 
Actors are not certain whether their efforts and investment in the innovation 
process will lead to any returns. Trust is therefore crucial for entering in innova-
tion processes (Lane & Bachman, 1998; Huxham & Vangen, 2005).
The core of our explanatory model consists of the relation between trust and 
network performance. 
Hypothesis 1: Higher levels of trust between the actors in the network around the project 
lead to better network performance.
6.2.2 Conflicts in networks
Trust is not automatically present; it has to be developed, as virtually all schol-
ars describe (see Sako, 1998; Rousseau et al., 1999; Nooteboom, 2002; Provan et 
al., 2009). Trust can enhance but also diminish in time as a result of internal and 
external network characteristics. 
We hypothesise that conflict may lead to a decrease in the trust level.
Conflicts lead to less trustworthy behaviour and less small joint actions. Trust is gradu-
ally built and enhanced in a ‘trust cycle’ (Huxham & Vangen, 2005) in which 
trustworthy behaviour, modest small joint actions, small wins, and building of 
trust expectations reinforce one another. Severe conflicts will harm this trust 
cycle since it is more difficult to realise small wins and build trust expectations 
for actors in conflict. More conflicts make it thus more difficult to achieve trust 
between actors (Lane & Bachman, 1998; Nooteboom, 2002).
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Moreover, conflicts can negatively affect network performance.
More conflicting strategies require more coordination costs to achieve consensus. As 
previously discussed, conflicts in networks result logically from actors’ differ-
ent interests, perceptions and strategies; but, if there are severe conflicts in 
networks, it hinders (all other factors remaining equal) ‘easy’ consensus about 
(packages of ) goals (Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). To achieve collective decision-
making on integrative solutions in situations of conflicts more transaction 
costs of coordination have to be made (Nooteboom, 2000, Huxham & Vangen, 
2005; Parker & Vaidia, 2001). This reduces the possibility to reach satisfactory 
outcomes. Some actors are not willing or able to make these transaction costs.
This leads to two hypotheses on the relation between conflicts and trust and 
conflicts and performance: 
Hypothesis 2a: Conflicts have a negative effect on the trust level between actors in the 
governance network. 
Hypothesis 2b: Conflicts have a negative effect on perceived network performance. 
Opportunities to build trust relations within governance networks and to 
reach satisfactory network performance can furthermore vary depending on 
societal characteristics. We focus on the influence of media and their logic: the 
mediatisation of network governance. 
6.2.3 Four dimensions of mediatisation
The role of media and media logic in society can be studied among four dimen-
sions of mediatisation, sketched by Esser and Matthes (2013) – building on the 
work of Strömbäck (2008) –. These dimensions can be seen as four subsequent 
phases of mediatisation (see Strömbäck, 2008). The third dimension of mediati-
sation is the main object of our study, but this presupposes a mediatisation in 
the first and second dimension (at least to some extent). 
“The first dimension examines whether media coverage of political affairs is 
predominantly shaped by media logic or political logic” (Esser & Matthes 2013: 
178). Media logic concerns the process of news-making led by the media’s rules, 
aims, production routines, and constraints (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Brants & Van 
Praag 2006; Hjarvard, 2008). The media logic is mainly guided by commercial 
interests: competitive, economic considerations guide the processes of news se-
lection, organisation and production (Landerer, 2013). A dominance of this com-
mercial logic results in a simplified, dramatised, and negative representation of 
decision-making processes (Esser & Matthes, 2013). Moreover, journalists often 
do not have the time to check the facts in a 24/7 news market and consequently 
report inaccurately (Witschge & Nygren, 2009; Schillemans, 2012).  
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The second dimension considers how politicians are guided by elements 
of media  and their logic (Esser & Matthes, 2013). Politicians are dependent 
on media to reach the public, their electorate. The more they follow a self-
interested, electoral logic, the more their actions aim at gaining media atten-
tion. The marketing of political symbols and images through media will then 
overshadow the goal of implementing policies (Edelman, 1988; Elchardus, 2002; 
Cook, 2005; Needham, 2006). “For political actors this means to increase their 
electoral strength by subordinating substantial political problems to symbolic 
issues that are more likely to result in increased public attention and hence 
electoral gains” (Landerer, 2013: 250). To gain media attention politicians adapt 
to the requirements of media forms and formats (Edelman, 1977; Mazzoleni & 
Schulz, 1999; Fischer, 2003; Hjarvard, 2008). 
“The third dimension investigates how political organisations and decision-
making institutions (parties, governments, interest groups, negotiation com-
mittees, and bargaining processes) are affected by media logic” (Esser and 
Matthes, 2013: 178). Media not only highlight certain aspects of the policy 
problem and thus influence the way actors within and outside the network view 
problems – as shown in the research on agenda forming (Cobb & Elder, 1983; 
Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Media and their commercialised logic also cause 
changes in autonomous strategies of actors – as Kepplinger and Glaab (2007), 
Spörer-Wagner and Marcinkowski (2010), and Schillemans (2012) describe in 
their research. 
The fourth dimension concerns “the effects of mediatisation on people’s 
knowledge, perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors” (Esser & Matthes, 2013: 
179). This dimension is not part of our research, as it asks for another research 
strategy.
6.2.4 The commercial news media logic and the 
functioning of governance networks
The third dimension of mediatisation thus addresses that trust relations and 
network performance can be affected by (commercialised) media reporting 
and by mediatised politicians. We start with explaining how trust relations in 
negotiating processes in networks can be influenced by commercialised news.
The commercialised news logic encourages opportunistic behaviour, as competition 
over media access is guided and restricted by the commercial media logic (Maz-
zoleni & Schulz, 1999). Actors using the media to gain power need to fit their 
message to media logic, for instance by making their message more controver-
sial (Hajer, 2009; Korthagen & Van Meerkerk, 2014). The commercialised media 
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logic thus stimulates opportunistic behaviour and go-it-alone strategies which 
undermines the network’s collaborative needs. 
News reports affect the behaviour of subjects of news reports. Subjects of news reports 
usually overestimate the effect of the content of the articles upon others; this 
is known as the third-person effect (Kepplinger & Glaab, 2007). This makes that 
particularly negative news reports have strong emotional and social effects on 
their subjects (Kepplinger & Glaab, 2007; Schillemans, 2012; Dixon et al., 2013). 
This causes these actors’ behaviour and intentions to become less predictable 
and less reliable.
News reports affect the behaviour of other actors in the network. Other actors’ be-
haviour can also change, when news reports bring new information on issues 
beyond an actor’s own experience or when the reports ‘scream’ for action. 
News media help “disjoined actors [to] keep tabs on each other and on what 
they consider the ‘public mood’” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009: 107). Particularly 
when news media focus on negativity and drama, trust relations come under 
pressure as such news reports even seem to require that actors change their 
behaviour. In these cases the ‘meditated reality’ might become more decisive 
than the ‘actual reality’ (cf. Strömbäck, 2008). 
In addition, commercialised news reports can negatively interfere the process 
of achieving desirable network performance. 
Collaborating and compromising under the media spotlight can be more difficult. In 
negotiating processes under the media spotlight, actors will generally have 
a tendency to position themselves and their own values more strongly (see 
Spörer-Wagner & Marcinkowski, 2010; Esser & Matthes, 2013). As the media 
often highlight outsider and extreme positions, and overemphasise differences 
of opinions, they make it more difficult to achieve compromises and make 
political decision with due consideration (Voltmer & Koch-Baumgarten, 2010). 
In negotiating processes in networks actors need opportunities to act on and 
respond to newly gained insights. Under media pressure, however, negotiating 
partners are less willing to compromise and to give in, complicating the search 
for a collaborative solution. 
Media can be used to obstruct the decision-making process. The very characteristics 
of media logic that many scholars criticise – the pre-occupation with events, 
with conflicts, the cynicism – give journalists and opponents opportunities to 
subvert established power in deliberative processes, Schudson (2008) claims. 
“As the tone of stories in mass media changes, say, from positive to negative, 
opponents of a policy have an opportunity to attack the existing policy arrange-
ment” (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009: 26). While this might open the process for 
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new policy options, it can also lead to a deadlock in the collaborative search for 
solutions.
The commercialised news reports limit the range of policy options. The media’s fasci-
nation with drama and conflict restricts the variety of solutions which can be 
chosen by the network actors. “By emphasising risks and policy failures the 
media systematically limit the range of policy choices that can be publicly le-
gitimated”, as Voltmer and Koch-Baumgarten (2010: 8) claim. Consequently, it is 
harder to reach innovative, effective solutions for policy issues in negotiations.
Although we do not expect the media to report on every urban project in a 
mainly negative, sensational, and inaccurate way, when they do so we expect 
such news reporting to have negative consequences for the level of trust be-
tween the actors in the network and for perceived network performance.
Hypothesis 3a: More commercialised news reports on the project have a negative effect on 
the trust level between actors in the governance network.
Hypothesis 3b: More commercialised news reports on the project have a negative effect 
on  network performance.
6.2.5 Mediatised politics in governance networks
Another element within the third dimension of mediatisation is the impact 
of mediatised politicians on governance networks. Mediatised politicians fol-
low an electoral logic, are primarily focused on their impact in news and their 
personal image, which can damage trust relations. 
Media presume more authoritative, hierarchical politics. Despite the fact that much 
decision making takes place in governance networks without a clear authorita-
tive centre, the media generally reproduce a more classical–modernist view on 
politics (Hajer, 2009). This encourages politicians to show their authority and 
power in decision-making processes, although these may be limited within a 
governance network. This go-it-alone strategy can damage the personal con-
nections between the politicians and other actors in the network and may lead 
other parties to doubt the intentions of these politicians. 
Sound bites only draw attention to the politician and his interests. “Mediatised politics 
entices politicians to show that they matter, and the temptation is to try to per-
form authority in precisely the way that fits the preferred media format” (Hajer, 
2009: 177). One form this adaptation takes is that politicians tend to speak in 
spicy sound bites to increase the likelihood of attracting media attention for 
their political point of views (Elchardus, 2002; Fischer, 2003; Hjarvard, 2008). 
Sound bites cannot be nuanced or consider all the pros and cons, and therefore 
are at odds with the deliberate decision-making process in the governance 
network involving all the different actors, perspectives, and interests. Such 
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adaptation to media logic can be seen as opportunistic, entailing, for instance, 
a decrease in other actors’ goodwill. 
Mediatised politics might also negatively interfere on achieving desirable 
network performance.  
News reports bring politicians to take ad hoc policy measures. The way in which a 
political or governmental reality is presented in the media influences politi-
cal responses (Dixon et al., 2013). As a result of the pressure of news reports, 
particularly negative, dramatised news reports, politicians may feel forced to 
publicly announce hasty, ad hoc, and strict policy measures without consider-
ing the deliberations and relations in the governance network (Fischer, 2003). 
These interventions, in turn, may cause other actors in the network to react 
strategically, resulting in damaging or threatening previously achieved agree-
ments. Moreover, as a result of ad hoc policy measures the range of future, 
integrative policy solutions is diminished.
Adaptation to commercialised news values can clash with finding collaborative solu-
tions. When politicians interfere in the policy process because of news reports 
and not because of relevant developments in a project, news values overrule 
political values (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Fischer, 2003; Cook, 2005). This in 
a sense echoes Edelman’s analyses in the 1970s. Edelman (1977, 1988) talked 
about ‘words that succeed and policies that fail’, by which he wanted to indicate 
that politics can be mainly a verbal game, whose actual policy outcomes might 
not be equally successful. This might be particularly true in a situation where 
politicians feel forced to dramatise stories or to emphasise the wrong facets of 
the story, or even create events to gain publicity (Edelman, 1977; Cook, 2005). 
This dramatisation rather leads to controversy and polarisation than to substan-
tial negotiations and an integration of different perspectives (Landerer, 2013). 
Moreover, as it is important for politicians to sell a consistent message in media, 
they have limited opportunities to twist and turn in the negotiating process 
while this twisting and turning is crucial in achieving integrative, innovative 
and effective solutions (Hajer, 2009). 
The previous mechanisms found in the literature leads us to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a: Mediatised politicians in the network around the project negatively affect 
the trust level between actors in the governance network.
Hypothesis 4b: Mediatised politicians in the network around the project negatively affects 
network performance.
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6.2.6 Mediatisation and governance networks: the full 
model 
To test the hypotheses, we used a survey of managers involved in spatial plan-
ning projects in the Netherlands. Since we use a survey which measures the 
managers’ perceptions about the different factors, our study builds on self-
reported measures.
Our assumption is that the incidences of media attention on various policy 
processes in networks will differ in number and tone. As Voltmer and Koch-
Baumgarten (2010) argue, large areas of policy-making are entirely unaffected 
by the media. We expect the level of commercialised news to vary among the 
projects, enabling us to see whether there is any relation with the reported 
outcomes of these projects. 
Variation in media attention is on the one hand caused by coincidental fac-
tors, but on the other hand by certain characteristics of the project. Scholars 
describe a mutually reinforcing relation between conflicts in policy processes 
and commercialised news (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Reunanen et al., 2010; 
Esser & Matthes, 2013). Conflicts between the involved actors can be a trigger 
for more commercialised news and negative, sensational and/or inaccurate 
news can trigger conflicts.  
We also expect commercialised news and mediatised politics to be positively 
correlated. As politicians follow an electoral logic, they focus their strategies 
first and foremost on the media. The assumption is that more negative and 
sensational news attracts politicians who orient their behaviour toward news 
media, trying to market themselves in the news by for instance demanding 
improvements or change. These politicians fit their communication to the com-
mercialised news logic, which asks for sound bites, drama and conflict. The 
combination of the various hypotheses and correlations results in the concep-
tual framework visualised in Figure 6.1. 
6.3 RESEARCH METHODS
Data collection
We used data from a web-based survey conducted in 2011 (April–July) among 
project managers in the four largest cities of the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rot-
terdam, The Hague, and Utrecht) and managers within two private firms (P2 and 
DHV) which manage urban spatial planning projects. No significant statistical 
differences exist between respondents from the four different municipalities or 
consultancy firms in ANOVA-tests, comparing the five groups (the respondents 
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of the two private firms cannot be split in our data file, they form one group 
that is in size comparable to the number of respondents in one municipality).   
We held three preparation sessions with eight project managers from the 
four participating cities and two firms to discuss the clarity and relevance of 
the questions, to validate our survey. The organisations undertook the e-mailing 
to the managers. We sent one follow-up e-mail. In addition, we phoned respon-
dents to remind them of the survey. We asked the organisations to send emails 
to each leading project manager of a specific project. So we had one possible 
respondent for each project, as the respondents were asked to fill in the survey 
bearing in mind the specific urban project in which they are most intensively 
involved. This means that we collected data for 141 projects, since we had 141 
managers. Table 6.1 describes the population and the response rate, which is 
40.9%. 
The project managers operate in governance networks to realise urban proj-
ects. They therefore have the experience and extensive knowledge of operating 
in governance networks needed to answer our research question. The managers 
are involved in a wide variety of projects, but most of the projects concern 
restructuring parts of the city. Projects deal with restructuring/building dwell-
ings, business functions and/or commercial functions (shopping malls etc.) 
in neighbourhoods. We consider the group of interdependent governmental, 
private and societal actors around the urban projects as the network; this is 1  
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also how it was presented to the survey respondents. We now discuss some of 
the characteristics of the networks (number of actors, involved actors, policy 
problems, etc.).
Characteristics of the networks around urban projects included in this study 
Networks are characterised, as most authors argue, by 1) a significant number of 
interdependent actors, 2) that are involved in policy-making or service delivery, 
and 3) policy issues characterised by task complexity (see Agranoff & McGuire, 
2001; Ansel & Gash, 2008; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).
In 66% of the projects, more than ten different organisations were involved in 
the surrounding networks, as reported by the managers. A significant number 
of the managers (27.0%) worked in networks consisting of at least 20 organi-
sations. We can therefore conclude that we are dealing with policy problems 
that are solved by collective actions of a set of interdependent actors: one of 
the main characteristics of networks. Most of the networks included societal 
interest groups (94.3%), private developers (78.6%), architectural firms (79.4%), 
and various governmental organisations (national government 60.3%; province 
58.9%; other municipalities 47.5%).
These network actors work on projects encompassing multiple activities. On 
average, more than three policy tasks (M=3.76) play a medium to large part in 
the project. These activities include environmental development (public parks), 
houses, business/shopping areas, water storage, infrastructure (rail and public 
highways), and social issues (schools, sport facilities, other social facilities). 
These broad activities all include smaller subtasks in practice. 
Conceptualisation 
Trust between network actors: To measure trust within the network, we used Klijn 
et al.’s (2010a) existing scale based on business management literature. In this 
research, we have added one item, feeling a good connection. The project man-
agers in the preparation phase emphasised that trust in a person is partly based 
Table 6.1 Response to the survey
Population Response
(absolute)
Response 
(percentage)
Municipalities (4) 288 117 40.6%
Private organisations 
of project managers (2)
57 24 42.1%
Total 345 141 40.9%
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on whether they sense mutual understanding. This more intuitive, emotional 
connection between persons is also described by Lane and Bachman (1998). 
In our survey, the project managers rated the level of trust between the differ-
ent parties among six dimension of trust, listed in Table 6.2. 
Cronbach’s Alpha of the six items is 0.80. The mean score on the trust level 
assigned by the project managers is 3.31 (SD=0.60) on a five-point Likert scale. 
This indicates a moderate degree of trust between the actors in the networks, 
perceived by the project managers.
Network performance: Measuring network performance is difficult. Actors have 
different goals and it is thus difficult to pick a single goal by which to measure 
outcomes. Measuring network performance is also problematic because policy 
processes in governance networks are lengthy and actors’ goals are likely to 
change over time (see Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Moreover, it is not possible 
to assess the ‘objective’ outcomes (realised dwellings, infrastructure, time of 
decision-making, and so on) because of the variety of projects and the variety 
in policy goals. This problem is addressed in this article by using network per-
formance as perceived by the project managers as a proxy for the outcomes, 
taking into account that goals change and that actors have different views about 
the outcomes. The applied measurement scale, of Klijn et al. (2010a; 2010b), 
builds on five different dimensions of network performance described in the 
literature, that focus on the character of the collective policy solution. 
Table 6.2 Measurement of trust
Dimension Item Literature
1. Agreement trust AGR The parties in this project generally live up 
to the agreements made with one another
Sako, 1998
2. Benefit of the doubt BEN The parties in this project give one another 
the benefit of the doubt
Lane & Bachman, 1998
3. Reliability REL The parties in this project keep in mind the 
intentions of the other parties
McEvily & Zaheer, 
2006
4. Absence of 
opportunistic 
behaviour
ABS Parties do not use the contributions of 
other actors for their own advantage
Sako, 1998; 
Nooteboom. 2002
5. Goodwill trust GDW Parties in this project can assume that the 
intentions of the other parties are good in 
principle
Sako, 1998; 
Nooteboom, 2002
6. Good connection CON Parties in this project feel a good personal 
connection with one another 
Lane & Bachman, 
1998; Practical 
relevance (input 
project managers)
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Since policy problems in network are complex and need innovative and inte-
grative solutions these are two indicators of network performance (Nooteboom, 
2000; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). Other indicators of network performance ad-
dress whether the outcome solves relevant policy problems: the problem solv-
ing capacity and robustness of the solution (cf. De Jong & Edelenbos, 2007; cf. 
Innes & Booher, 2003) Lastly the relation between costs and benefits is a feature 
of performance that is often applied (cf. Mantel, 2005). Table 6.3 presents the 
items. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for these items is 0.76. The mean score for network perfor-
mance, as rated by the project managers, is 3.71 (SD=0.61) on a five-point Likert 
scale, indicating a quite high satisfaction with the results.
Commercialised news: News production is claimed to be guided by a merely com-
mercial logic, an economically inspired theoretical model (Landerer, 2013). The 
mediatisation literature sketches that the commercial logic suppresses media’s 
ideal of social responsibility, when media exaggerate sensational and negative 
aspects in the news at the cost of more positive, substantive and accurate news 
(Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009; Esser & Matthes, 2013). This suppression or 
domination of the commercial logic can be measured more precisely in the, 
horizontal rating scales. These scales provide two opposite attitude positions 
and ask them to show where on the ten-point scale – in between two opposites 
–  their own view falls (de Vaus, 2002). 
Table 6.3 Measurement of perceived network performance
Dimension Items Literature
1. Innovative character INN Do you think that innovative ideas have 
been developed during the project?
Nooteboom, 2002
2. Integral nature of 
solution
INT Do you think that different environmental 
functions have been connected 
sufficiently?
Klijn et al., 2010
3. Effectiveness 
solutions
EFF Do you think that the solutions that 
have been developed really deal with the 
problems at hand?
Fischer, 2003; McGuire 
& Agranoff, 2011
4. Effectiveness in the 
future
FUT Do you think that the developed solutions 
are durable solutions for the future?
Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004
5. Relation costs and 
benefits
RCB Do you think that – in general – the 
benefits exceed the costs of the 
cooperation process?
Mantel, 2005
Note: One item has been deleted from Klijn et al.’s (2010a,b) scale because of its low loading on 
‘performance’: ‘Do you think that in general the involved actors have delivered a recognisable 
contribution to the development of the results?’ Table 7 shows the results of the factor analysis.
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No measurement scale exists on the degree to which media reports can be 
qualified as commercialised news in a survey. Therefore, we developed our own 
scale. Respondents rated media reports for their project on the items presented 
in Table 6.4. 
Cronbach’s Alpha for these items is 0.84. The mean score is 5.03 on the 
ten-point scale, indicating a moderate degree of commercialised news on the 
project. It seems that the news is mixed: containing sensational content as well 
as informative content, about as much positive as negative reports and accurate 
as well as inaccurate reports according to the project managers. The standard 
deviation of 1.85 shows that quite some variance exists in this degree. 
So, the degree of commercialised news varies considerably across projects. 
Not all projects are mainly negatively, sensationally, and inaccurately described 
in news reports; this to some extent tones down the term media logic. The mean 
and the standard deviation show that some project managers have clearly per-
ceived commercialised news characteristics in news around their project, but 
certainly not all of them. 
Mediatised politics: Politicians involved in the project that focus their strategies 
first and foremost on the media, to reach their electorate, marketing themselves 
(Edelman, 1988; Landerer, 2013), we refer to as mediatised politics. We assess 
whether their orientation on media (logic) replaced their orientation on, the 
governance network (the political logic) (cf. Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Fischer, 
2003; Cook, 2005; Strömbäck, 2008), political image marketing prevailed (cf. 
Edelman, 1988; Elchardus, 2002; Fischer, 2003), and therefore the extent to 
which the politicians were (consequently) ill-informed on the project (Elchar-
dus, 2002). We again used horizontal rating scales, to measure more accurately 
what prevails in the behaviour of politicians: an orientation on the media or on 
the project, see Table 6.5. 
Table 6.4  Measurement of commercialised news
Dimension Rating scale Literature
1. Sensationalism in news 
reports
SEN From informing to sensational Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 
2009; Esser & Matthes, 2013
2. Negativity in news reports NEG From positive to negative Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 
2009
3. Mistakes in news reports MIS From accurate to full of 
mistakes
Witschge & Nygren, 2009; 
Schillemans, 2012 
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The items have a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.76. The politicians are not perceived 
to be that mediatised, as indicated by the mean score of 4.03 (SD=1.64) on the 
ten-point scale.
Thus interestingly, our data suggests that the degree of the mediatisation of 
politics in governance networks is not that high. Although most politicians in 
governance networks around the urban projects are not totally ignorant of the 
media, they seem to be more focused on the project than on the media. 
Conflict: Respondents were asked to rate the amount of conflict on a ten-point 
scale from many conflicts between organisations to no conflicts. The mean 
score of 4.85 and the standard deviation of 2.0 show that respondents gener-
ally characterise the networks by quite some conflicts, but that the amount of 
conflict differs considerably across projects.
Control variables: We selected control variables on two analytical levels. Firstly, 
we controlled for project-level variables: phase of the project, task complexity 
and network size. We, secondly, control for the respondent’s experience with 
urban spatial projects, measured by their reported years of involvement. 
Data analysis
We use structural equation modelling (SEM) (in AMOS 18.0) to test the relation-
ships in the conceptual model with our survey data. This has two advantages 
compared to regression analysis. Most importantly, we hypothesise a research 
model in which commercialised news and mediatised politics have a negative 
effect on trust relations and on network performance. To study these indirect 
(effects via trust) and direct effects on network performance in our model we 
use structural equation modelling, performing path analysis. The second advan-
Table 6.5 Measurement of mediatised politics
 Dimension Rating scale Literature
1. Focus on media reporting 
on the project
BME Based on development in the 
project versus based on media 
reports
Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; 
Fischer, 2003; Cook, 2005; 
Strömbäck, 2008
2. Focus on ‘marketing’ 
personal image
MAR From fairly involved in 
the project to working on 
‘marketing’ personal image  
Elchardus, 2002; Fischer, 
2003; Needham, 2006
3. Ill-informed on the project ILL From well-informed to ill-
informed
Elchardus, 2002
Chapter 6
124
Table 6.6 Descriptive statistics and correlations between variables in analysis
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.Commercialised 
news (1–10)
5.03 1.85 1
2. Mediatised politics 
(1–10)
4.03 1.64 .253** 1
3.Conflict (1–10) 4.85 2.00 .180* .155 1
4.Trust (1–5) 3.31 .60 -.362** -.295** .347** 1
5. Perceived network 
performance (1–5)
3.71 .61 -.409** -.233** -.160 .404** 1
6.Project 
phase (1–6)
3.21 1.33 -.136 -.124 -.007 .208* .164 1
7.Task complexity 
(1–6)
3.76 1.58 -.093 -.299** .021 .204* .114 .131 1
8.Size of network 
(1–5)
3.28 1.29 -.051 -.150 .080 .063 .220** -.026 .292** 1
9.Years of involvement 13.01 7.23 -.200* -.080 .132 .092 .026 .035 .052 .128 1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
N is in between 133–141 (pairwise deletion of missing values)
tage of SEM is the exact calculation of the latent factors, using separate factor 
loadings for the different items.
6.4  FINDINGS
In this section, we discuss the correlations between the variables, the factor 
analyses, and the results of our structural equation modelling. 
Relations between the variables
Table 6.6 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables discussed in the concep-
tualisation section and the correlations between these variables.
,Between the independent variables commercialised news, mediatised poli-
tics, and conflict, the correlations drawn in the research model are significant 
in our statistical analysis. Commercialised news and mediatised politics have a 
small positive correlation (r=0.253, p<0.01). In addition, commercialised news 
is positively related to conflict (r=0.180, p<0.05). However, the correlation is 
smaller than we expected; commercialised news thus seems to be largely ex-
plainable by factors other than conflict between network actors. 
A positive correlation exists between trust and perceived network perfor-
mance (r=0.404, p<0.01). Negative correlations exist between conflict and trust 
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(r=-0.347, p<0.01); between commercialised news and trust (r=-0.362, p<0.01); 
and between mediatised politics and trust (r=-0.295, p<0.01). Negative cor-
relations can also be reported between commercialised news and perceived 
network performance (r=-0.409, p<0.01) and between mediatised politics and 
perceived network performance (r=-0.233, p<0.01). However, we do not see a 
significant relation between conflicts and perceived network performance (r=-
0.160, p=0.095).
These correlations give us a first indication of the mediatisation on the trust 
relations and perceived performance in the governance networks. As a first step 
in our analysis, the correlations broadly support our conceptual model. 
SEM results
Before testing the hypothesised model, we conducted a factor analysis to as-
certain that we were working with a valid and reliable measurement model. 
Although exploratory factor analysis is generally strictly distinguished from 
confirmatory factor analysis, in practice this distinction is not that clear-cut 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988: 411). The concepts of trust and performance used 
in this study have been successfully used in earlier studies (Klijn et al., 2010a,b), 
whereas the other measures (commercialised news and mediatised politics) are 
newly developed on the basis of scientific literature. We therefore firstly use 
exploratory factor analysis and secondly confirmatory factor analysis. 
For the exploratory factor analysis we used a principle components approach 
with oblique rotation (see Table 6.7).
In the confirmatory factor analysis, we test the fit of the measurement model 
of latent factors with our data. The convergent validity and the discriminant 
validity of the latent factors (commercialised news, mediatised politics, trust, 
and performance) are examined. Convergent validity is obtained, since the stan-
dardised loadings are all significant and above the threshold of 0.4 (Anderson & 
Gerbing, 1988). These indicate how well they measure the latent factors of trust 
and performance, and range from 0.454 to 0.888. With regard to discriminant 
validity, we look at the difference between the constrained (covariance set on 
1) and the unconstrained model, checking whether we are dealing with differ-
ent factors or whether it is actually one factor. The unconstrained model must 
therefore have a significantly lower chi-square than the constrained model 
(Bagozzi & Phillips, 1982). This can also be seen as a test for common method 
bias. The chi-square value for the unconstrained model is 138.663 with (df:113); 
for the unconstrained model, 338.789 (df:119). The difference is significant at 
the p<0.001 level. The overall fit of the measurement model was also good.
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Results
Bentler and Chou (1987) have shown that as a rule of thumb SEM is acceptable 
when the sample size to parameter ratio is 5:1 to 10:1, although fit indices 
may be biased to some extent with smaller samples. Our ratio is within that 
range. The ratio is calculated by dividing the sample size (N) by the number of 
parameters in the model.
Figure 6.2 depicts the results of the SEM analysis. The presented model had 
the best fit. The statistically significant relations (p<0.05) are presented by 
the arrows in the figure, at which the standardized regression coefficients are 
reported. Furthermore, the explained variance is noted in the boxes: the inde-
pendent variables explain 32.8% of trust and 35.1% of the perceived network 
performance.
Most hypotheses are confirmed in this structural model with latent factors, 
but not all of them. In this study, we again confirmed the positive relation 
between trust and perceived network performance (β=0.368, p<0.01); this sup-
ports hypothesis 1. Trust seems to be crucial in achieving results in the gov-
ernance networks around urban projects. Conflicts between organisations are 
Table 6.7 Exploratory factor analysis
Trust Perceived network 
performance
Mediatised politicians Commercialised news
INN -.048 .635 -.090 -.113
INT .002 .761 -.031 -.014
EFF -.001 .832 -.088 .113
FUT .002 .680 .011 -.100
RCB .206 .582 .151 -.103
MAR -.151 -.039 .809 -.076
BME .027 -.109 .755 .153
ILL .017 .044 .831 -.032
NEG .045 -.145 .041 .843
MIS -.037 -.043 .038 .803
SEN .065 -.016 .039 -.854
AGR .620 .185 .113 .144
BEN .749 .011 -.046 .041
REL .741 .115 -.060 -.070
ABS .530 -.094 .020 -.192
GDW .787 -.203 -.115 -.051
CON .650 .170 -.090 -.020
Note: The abbreviations for the items can be found in the tables in the conceptualisation
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also negatively associated with trust (β=-0.276, p<0.01), as stated in hypothesis 
2a. However, contrary to our expectations, conflicts do not have this negative 
relation with perceived network performance. We found evidence for hypoth-
eses 3a and 3b: commercialised news on the project is negatively related to 
trust between the actors (β=-0.288, p<0.05) and perceived network performance 
(β=-0.333, p<0.05). Hypothesis 4a is also confirmed; mediatised politics is sig-
nificantly negatively related to trust (β=-0.251, p<0.05). In contrast, we did not 
find a significant relation with perceived network performance as predicted 
in hypothesis 3b. Politicians aiming at media attention for their own interests 
negatively associate with the crucial trust relations in the network, and only 
indirectly (through trust) on perceived network performance. 
Model fit: Several indices are used to evaluate the fit of the model. A good fit 
would be indicated by CMIN/DF between 1 and 3; TLI and CFI above 0.95; and 
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Figure 6.2 Results of SEM analysis
Note: Function estimate means and intercepts used to deal with some missing values. N=141
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RMSEA under 0.5 by which PCLOSE is above 0.5 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & 
Bentler, 1995; Byrne, 2010). The indices of our model are reported in Table 6.8 
and demonstrate that the model has a good fit. 
Bootstrapping analysis: Although skewness of data is ignored by many scholars 
for different reasons, we wanted to incorporate an analysis for non-normal data 
since Mardia’s estimate of multivariate kurtosis in our analysis is above 5.00 
(see Byrne, 2010) Bootstrapping is the principal approach in AMOS to analyse 
continuous non-normal data (Hox, 2003; Byrne, 2010). However, we should take 
into account that our sample size without any missing values (N=135) is just 
below the advised N=150 (Hox, 2003).
In the bootstrap analysis with 500 samples the non-standardized regressions 
are all significant. Regarding the standardized regression coefficients, which 
are reported in table 6.9, it appears that the relation from mediatised politics 
to trust is not significant at the threshold of p<0.05 (p=0.65). The standardized 
regression coefficients calculated in the bootstrapping analysis only slightly 
differ from the results presented earlier.
Control variables: We examined one small significant effect of one of our control 
variables. The more organisations the network contains, the higher the perceived 
network performance (β=0.183, p<0.05). However, we must remark here that 
the effect of size is smaller than any other effect in the model. Chin (1998: xiii) 
argues that effects smaller than 0.2 should not even be included in AMOS models, 
because these effect calculations explain at best about 1% of the variance. 
Cross validation of the model: Besides the evaluation of the model by the good-
ness-of-fit indices, model validity must be achieved by cross validation of the 
Table 6.9 Standardized regression coefficients in bootstrapping 
Trust Perceived network performance
Commercialised news -.275** -.353**
Mediatised politics -.269
Conflict -.268**
Trust .339*
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Bootstrapping with 500 samples.
Table 6.8 Fit indices for the model 
Model N df CMIN/DF TLI CFI RMSEA PCLOSE
Full sample 141 128 1.23 0.95 0.96 0.04 0.77
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model. The fit measures show how well the parameter estimates are able to 
match the sample covariances, but they do not tell how well the latent variables 
are predicted (Chin, 1998: xiii). Cross validation tests whether the explained 
variance in the sample can also be found in other samples. Because there is 
no independent sample available, we split the sample into two subsamples 
(Jöreskog, 1993). The cross validation resulted in generally small differences in 
the explained variance, and we therefore evaluate the validation of our model 
positively (see Table 6.10).
6.5 CONCLUSION
We have highlighted a disregarded topic in the academic discussion on gov-
ernance networks: mediatisation. We studied the influence of media logic, 
through commercialised news and mediatised politics, on network governance.
The study does have some limitations. Our study is based on perceptional 
measures and is cross-sectional: our concepts are based on the perceptions of 
the leading public manager within the networks at one point in time. We there-
fore should be careful making generalisations. Especially self-reported data on 
performance has some drawbacks, particularly when only reported on one level 
(see Provan & Milward, 2001), we therefore explicitly use the term ‘perceived 
network performance’. Longitudinal case studies on networks could provide 
data on the development of performance, measured at different levels. Such an 
approach could also contribute in studying the feedback mechanisms between 
the variables in our model. Although we draw unidirectional causal paths in our 
model, the relations are probably more dynamic in practice. Another limitation 
of our study is the relatively small number of respondents (N=141) for the AMOS 
analysis we performed, particularly for the bootstrapping analysis. However, we 
believe that, within the constraints of this research, we can draw meaningful 
conclusions.
Our findings show that there is variation in the degree to which commer-
cialised news reporting and mediatised politics exist in the networks around 
the urban spatial projects researched. Commercialised news reporting is some-
Table 6.10 Results of model cross validation: explained variance in the three samples
Predicted Variable Full sample 20% sample 80% sample Difference in R²
for 20-80% sample
Trust .328 .223 .272 .051
Perceived network 
performance
.351 .395 .317 .078
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what more common than mediatised politics. Claims about the mediatisation 
of politics are often done in the context of elections or national policy issues, 
politics in the context of urban governance networks seems to be less media-
tised, our study shows. This might be explained by the character of governance 
networks in which politicians are dependent on other actors in the network. 
To be involved in the project, building on collaboration and trust are more 
rewarding and needed in negotiating processes, than being covered in media. 
Another explanation might be that politicians on a more local level have not 
made such a shift in their adaptation to the media and their logic, practising PR 
and news management strategies, as is described for national politicians (Davis, 
2002; Cook, 2005). 
This study at least shows that mediatisation is a relevant aspect to include in 
network research. When news reports are more commercialised and politicians 
are mainly focused on their self-image in media, this is significantly negatively 
related to trust and perceived network performance. 
Interestingly, we find a direct effect of commercialised news on performance 
but not of mediatised politics. Mediatised politics has an impact only on the level 
of trust, but, the effect is not significant in the bootstrapping analysis. Although 
we should be a bit careful explaining this, it does seem to indicate that the 
impact of politicians on network governance processes might not be as large as 
we would expect given their prominent position in the political system. These 
findings are consistent with an earlier study in which stakeholder involvement 
did have a significant impact on perceived network performance, whereas the 
involvement of representative bodies did not (Edelenbos et al., 2010).
Studying the mediatisation of network governance corrects the sometimes 
technocratic character of network research. Many studies, and certainly in the 
US, are strongly focused toward technical elements within management and 
performance. This disregards that governance networks are political in nature 
and address public issues that are discussed in media. Mediatised news realities 
are relevant for governance networks as they affect the playground of the nego-
tiations between the (political) actors, which make some of the actors change 
their tactical strategies.
At the same time, we introduce a new managerial question into network re-
search. As news reports can affect network governance, how do managers deal 
with news? Should they look for new managerial strategies? Communication 
strategies such as branding and public relations might be very important in this 
regard. Thus, adding dimensions of mediatisation both broadens the discussion 
and research about governance networks and introduces new research ques-
tions.
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III  Mediatised 
instruments 
for strategic 
communication
Media and their logic can thus affect 
the course of events in and the 
content of governance processes. But 
to fulfil their functions media need 
information; they need input to create 
their news reports. As discussed, news 
media are used as an instrument 
for strategic communication. 
Journalists are called and emailed 
by actors who want to use the media 
to communicate to a larger public. 
However, communication through 
media implies dealing with media 
logic. The third research question is 
therefore about how actors within 
governance networks make use of 
media logic characteristics in their 
communication strategies. This 
question will be addressed in Chapter 
7.
Positive publicity about governance 
processes is important to legitimise 
decisions, to gain social support, create 
trust in its performance and to protect 
the governance process from external 
disturbances. In four cases of public 
infrastructure in the Netherlands, 10 
spokespersons and 12 journalists were 
interviewed. Spokespersons bridge 
the logic of network governance and 
media logic in their activities (cf. 
Tenscher, 2004). Many activities of 
spokespersons are focused on adapt-
ing information to media logic, as 
discussed in many studies (Curtin, 
1999; Philips, 2002; Tenscher, 2004; 
Cook, 2005; Bennett, 2009). However, 
a complicating factor in relation to 
governance networks is the variation 
in perceptions and attitudes on the 
part of network actors.  Strategic com-
munication to gain positive publicity 
about governance processes therefore 
not only involves a translation of the 
content and process of policy pro-
cesses in the media arena, but also a 
translation within the network. This 
also implies a transformation of prac-
tices within the governance network 
(cf. Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2014).
Network actors are requested to 
include proactive news media com-
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munication activities in their regular 
jobs. Moreover, network actors need 
to commit to a coherent, uniform 
communication strategy, which is 
ideally centralised. Such uniform and 
centralised communication strategy 
sharply contrasts with the usual prac-
tice within governance networks, 
which are heterogeneous and decen-
tralised by their very nature. Actors 
thus not only make compromises in 
terms of content to suit media logic, 
but also in order to create a coherent 
image. 
In practice, many of the spokesper-
sons organise pseudo-events to which 
journalists and other stakeholders are 
invited. At these events, journalists 
can observe the progress of the build-
ing process and they can speak not 
only with the spokespersons but also 
with relevant experts in the project 
and with public authorities. This is an 
easy path to news reports about the 
policy implementation; pictures can 
be taken and relevant news sources 
are arranged. In two cases this tactic is 
frequently applied by spokespersons, 
leading to much free publicity. In one 
case they sometimes apply such a 
proactive strategy and in the last case 
they do not have much experience 
with such a strategy. This is an indica-
tion that the communication around 
such infrastructure projects has 
increasingly become professionalised 
through the activities of spokesper-
sons, but not in all network settings. 
A normative question on the basis 
of these findings is to what extent the 
media communication contributes 
to democratic values (cf. van Rooij & 
Aarts, 2014). Spokespersons’ activities 
are largely about making use of media 
logic characteristics in order to gain 
positive publicity, which is criticised 
by many scholars (e.g. Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1995; Davis, 2002; Bennett, 
2009). But spokespersons in network 
settings do more than that, because 
they represent a network of actors 
and sometimes controversial policy 
measures. Communication within 
the network is just as important as 
communication in media, and com-
munication with other stakeholders, 
such as surrounding communities, is 
equally crucial.
Communication within the gover-
nance network and other stakehold-
ers is essential from a democratic 
perspective, but is also necessary on 
pragmatic grounds. As discussed, in 
the other studies outside actors such 
as citizen groups appeared to be 
important news sources for journal-
ists because they provide for some 
heated criticism. Communication 
with stakeholders as well as other ac-
tors could be a proactive measure to 
prevent these actors from expressing 
their criticism in media. Actors within 
the network, responsible for external 
communication, should be the first 
contact to address complaints to.
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7.1 BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN MEDIATISED 
POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE PROCESSES
A broadening gap exists between politics visible in news media and actual 
political decision-making in complex policy processes which is often more or 
less invisible (Papadopoulos, 2012). Visible politics is a pale shadow of the gov-
ernance processes including public, private and societal actors that take place 
more or less backstage. Hajer (2009: 178) claims that whereas classical-modernist 
politics is strong in its mediatised representation it is weak in problem closure; 
conversely, network governance is potentially strong in problem closure but 
weak in its representation. But news media not only zoom in on political au-
thorities, they also have a commercial preference for conflicts, scandals and 
policy failures (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009; Hajer, 
2009; Flinders, 2011). In this respect, it is not surprising that Klijn, Van Twist, 
Van der Steen and Jeffares (2014) find that a significant group of public manag-
ers see media as an external disturbance to what is important in their work. 
However, the supposition that governing actors are powerless in a media-
tised context is a false one (Hajer, 2009: 41; Cook, 2005). Admittedly, in public 
administration little attention has been given to subjects as how governmental 
organisations can deal with media and how media communication can be used 
to advance the work of actors within governance processes (Lee, 2008; Boin & 
Christensen, 2008; Thorbjørnsrud, Figenschou & Ihlen, 2014; Laursen & Valen-
tini, 2014). But that does not imply that it is impossible. Moreover, media com-
munication is important in governance, as positive news-media coverage can 
increase public support for policy decisions as well as trust in the performance 
of governance networks. However, gaining positive publicity in a network 
setting including different actors with varying views and interests is difficult, 
since this complicates the development and execution of a coherent media 
communication strategy. And critical and sensational news media questioning 
the capabilities of governmental authorities need to be addressed. 
Spokespersons within governance networks deal with these challenges. In 
this article we examine how spokesperson bridge the contrasting logics of media and 
network governance to create positive publicity. To bridge the logics spokespersons 
translate the diverging perspectives, activities and interests of network actors 
into a coherent media communication strategy. Spokespersons thereby man-
age relations with the environment (cf. Ankney & Curtin, 2002). Moreover, 
positive publicity that is gained through their activities contributes to the 
long-term survival of the network (cf. Yan & Louis, 1999; Lee, 2008). In other 
words, spokespersons in governance networks seem to perform boundary span-
ning activities. To analyse activities of spokespersons we therefore applied the 
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boundary spanning model of often cited23 and founding scholars Tushman and 
Scanlan (1981), yet reversely.
We have examined the boundary spanning activities of spokespersons in 
in-depth interviews with ten spokespersons and twelve journalists, which we 
analysed through qualitative coding in Atlas.ti. For triangulation purposes the 
interviews are nested in four cases in which public infrastructure is implement-
ed. Implementation of infrastructure policies is typically organised in gover-
nance networks, characterised by divided tasks and responsibilities among not 
only public but also semi-public and private actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). 
Furthermore, public infrastructure policies are generally prestigious projects 
important within the ‘permanent campaigns’ of politicians (Heclo, 2000). These 
cases thus suit our aims of studying how the logic of network governance and 
media logic can be bridged in order to gain positive publicity.
We proceed this article by a theoretical framework in which the concept of 
boundary spanning is discussed in the context of media communication. In the 
subsequent section, the interview data and data analysis technique is discussed. 
The article continues with a discussion of the findings and ends with conclu-
sions and discussion. 
7.2 SPANNING THE NETWORK – MEDIA BOUNDARY TO 
GAIN POSITIVE PUBLICITY
Negative media coverage can be an ‘environmental disruption’ for the gov-
ernance network which can be prevented or at least moderated by effective, 
proactive dealing with the media (cf. Yan & Louis, 1999; Boin & Christensen, 
2008). In and through media actors in governance attempt to achieve and 
maintain public support and legitimacy for policies implemented (Tresch, 2009; 
Lee, 2008). The ability to effectively communicate through news media is thus 
an important aspect of governing (Cook, 2005). Particularly in complex and 
fragmented societies, “government is more difficult, popular support is more 
contingent and effective communication is more vital” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 
1995: 2). An illustration of this importance is the fact that governmental organi-
sations in different liberal democracies spend more and more money on their 
public communication (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999; Tenscher, 2004; Cook, 2005; 
Neijens & Smit, 2006; Bennett, 2009). 
The importance of being able to communicate through media can be seen in 
the perspective of mediatisation (as Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Hjarvard, 2008; 
23. Google Scholar reports 772 citations, December 7th 2014
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Hajer, 2009; Esser & Matthes, 2013, Laursen & Valentini, 2014). While different 
actors, collectives and institutions have become dependent on mass media in 
their central functions, their actions are shaped by the media logic (Mazzo-
leni & Schulz, 1999; Thorbjørnsrud et al., 2014). Actors adapt their behaviour 
to requirements of news media on form and substance, which are based on 
commercial goals of audience maximisation (Landerer, 2013). Mediatisation is 
also claimed to be consequential in the context of governance networks (Hajer, 
2009; Flinders, 2011; Korthagen & Klijn, 2014). 
The commercial news-media logic and the logic of network governance are 
however hard to combine (see Esser & Matthes, 2013). Whereas news media 
often focus on conflicts and sensationalism (Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009; 
Korthagen, 2014), network actors need to build trust relations and collaborate 
because of their interdependencies in relation to problem solving (Ansell & 
Gash, 2008). Moreover, news media tend to concentrate on political authorities’ 
actions and personal efforts (Hajer, 2009) and rapid responses (Esser & Matthes, 
2013), while network actors necessarily strive for efforts of public, societal and 
private actors and collective decision-making in the long term (Koppenjan & 
Klijn, 2004; Esser & Matthes, 2013). Hence, bridging these logics of media and 
governance networks involves considerable effort. To study the activities of 
spokesperson we use the concept of boundary spanning. 
Boundary spanning activities of spokespersons
Boundary spanning activities are about the management of relations and in-
teractions with the environment of the organisation (Aldrich & Herker, 1977; 
Springston & Leichty, 1994; Yan & Louis, 1999; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2014). 
Boundary spanning activities are meant to overcome communication obstacles 
between internal and external actors, due to specialisation and to local norms, 
values and languages. Tushman and Scanlan (1981: 291-292) explain boundary 
spanning as follows: “communication across organisational boundaries requires 
learning the local coding schemes and languages as well as specialised concep-
tual frameworks. Boundaries can be spanned effectively only by individuals who 
understand the coding schemes are attuned to the contextual information on 
both sides of the boundary, enabling them to search out relevant information 
on one side and disseminate it on the other”. 
Aldrich and Herker (1977) distinguish two classes of functions performed by 
boundary roles: information processing and external representation. Informa-
tion processing involves the selection, transmission and interpretation of infor-
mation from the environment. External representation includes maintaining 
the organisational image, enhancing its social legitimacy and influencing the 
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behaviour of target groups. However, the activities within external representa-
tion are much more one-sided than in the information processing function, 
Aldrich and Herker (1977) argue. This is comparable with the view of Tushman 
and Scanlan (1981) who claim that external communication only involves a 
one-step information flow and boundary spanning a two-step information flow. 
The two steps of a boundary spanner are (1) obtaining information from outside 
units and (2) disseminating this information to internal users (Tushman & Scan-
lan, 1981). According to them external communication would only involve the 
one-step information flow of representation. ‘External communication stars’ 
would have strong linkages externally but not internally (Tushman & Scanlan, 
1981: 292,301). 
In this study we show that particularly the network setting in which poli-
cies are realised requires a two-step flow of activities that bridge the logic of 
governance networks and media logic. The steps are only taken in the reversed 
order, as is illustrated by figures 7.1a and 7.1b. Where boundary spanners in the 
model of Tushman and Scanlan (1981) firstly obtain external information and, 
secondly, disseminate this information internally (figure 7.1a); boundary span-
ners in our model firstly obtain internal information and afterwards dissemi-
nate this information externally (figure 7.1b). At the same time, in both models 
boundary spanners are “negotiating the interactions between organisation 
and environment in order to realise a better fit, which often also means that 
practices of involved organisations/systems are transformed” (Van Meerkerk & 
Edelenbos, 2014: 6).
In a governance setting spokespersons have to connect and include vary-
ing organisational views and interests before they can translate information 
 
1 
 
  
    
                  
(1) obtaining 
information from 
outside units 
(2) disseminating this 
information to 
internal users 
(2) disseminating 
information to 
outside users 
[journalists]
(1) obtaining 
information from 
internal actors 
[within the network]
Figure 7.1a Boundary spanning model Tush-
man and Scanlan (1981)
Figure 7.1b Boundary spanning model for 
spokespersons
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into media communication. To span the network – media boundary means to 
understand, discuss, collect and translate information from different network 
actors and translating it into coherent newsworthy storylines for journalists. 
In the two steps we distinguish actor-related and message-related activities (cf. 
Tenscher, 2004):
(1) Obtaining information from network actors: 
a. Message-related activities: creating, discussing and reconciling a coherent me-
dia communication strategy
b. Actor-related activities: building, maintaining and intensifying relations with 
network actors
(2) Disseminating information to journalists: 
a. Message-related activities: supplying information subsidies, adapting to media 
logic 
b. Actor-related activities: to build, maintain and intensify relations with journal-
ists
Below we give some theoretical starting points for the analysis of the specific 
activities of spokespersons within governance networks around policy imple-
mentation. 
(1) Obtaining information from network actors
Many policies are formed and implemented in a network of public, semi-public, 
private and societal actors, such as representatives of municipalities, prov-
inces, private enterprises and interest groups (Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan 
& Klijn, 2004; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Hajer, 2009; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 
2014). The network actors do not have the production resources, expertise or 
money on their own to realise policies, which makes them interdependent. At 
the same time, although they more or less share a common goal, the actors 
can have diverging and even discordant views, values and interests regarding 
the implementation of the policy goal. After all, they have different roles in 
the implementation network, being one of the ordering parties, contractors or 
politicians. 
An important message-related activity is to gather information about the 
activities of the different network actors. The internal communication system 
is essential to underpin an effective external media communication programme 
(cf. Lee, 2008: 15). Furthermore, the media communication strategy should 
connect the different actors. This might be achieved by concentrating on core 
values and (emotional) meaning related to the implementation of the policies 
that are or will be shared among the actors and would be effective in media 
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communication, as Eshuis and Klijn (2012) describe regarding brands in gover-
nance and public management. 
Network actors might have different attitudes toward media and correspond-
ing preferences for media strategies. Klijn et al. (2014) empirically show three 
such attitudes among public managers: actors who feel they need to adapt to the 
media logic; ‘communicators’ who feel their message will be covered in news 
media regardless or the ‘fatalists’ who think that media cannot be influenced at 
all. Spokesperson not only face the task of managing these different attitudes 
of network actors, but also of collaborating with spokespersons from different 
network organisations. 
Spokespersons are thus expected to develop durable relations with the differ-
ent network actors to gain information about their work, to connect them and 
involve them in one coherent media communication strategy. 
(2) Disseminating information to journalists
As a second step, spokespersons will accommodate the coherent media strategy 
to the news-media logic. Pieces of information are made easily accessible to 
journalists, which are referred to as ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy, 1982). 
“Faced with time constraints, and the need to produce stories that will win 
publication, journalists will attend to, and make use of, subsidized information 
that is of a type and form that will achieve that goal. By reducing the costs faced 
by journalists in satisfying their organisational requirements, the subsidy giver 
increases the probability that the subsidized information will be used” (Gandy, 
1982: 62). Press releases, press conferences, pre-arranged interviews and press 
tours are examples of these information subsidies which are nowadays fully 
integrated into the process of news production (Davis, 2002). 
Attractive framing is very important for the success of information subsidies. 
Media want a good story, not just good information. By dramatising, polarising, 
personalising and visualising the message spokespersons adapt to the media 
logic, which contributes to the success of shaping news content (Mazzoleni & 
Schulz, 1999; Tenscher, 2004; Hjarvard, 2008; Landerer, 2013; Laursen & Valen-
tini, 2014). When information subsidies contain news value and are offered in 
a news style, they can pass almost unimpeded through journalistic gatekeepers 
(Curtin, 1999). 
Interpersonal relations between spokespersons and journalists might also be 
decisive in this regard (Tenscher, 2004; Neijens & Smit, 2006; Laursen & Valen-
tini, 2014), as they need each other. Spokespersons need journalists to spread 
the public message; journalists need spokespersons as they are important news 
sources. Phillips (2002: 233) describes their relationship as “one of favors and 
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paybacks, guarded by mutual respect”. Journalists and spokespersons interact 
and collaborate while sharing norms of fairness, objectivity, behavioural propri-
ety (such as anonymity of sources and confidences of off-the-record-disclosures) 
and a framework of news values (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995). At the same 
time, the capacity of journalists and spokespersons to exchange resources is 
constrained by guidelines belonging to their roles and institutions (Blumler & 
Gurevitch, 1995; Davis, 2009). 
Besides making information newsworthy and easily accessible for journalists, 
spokespersons are thus expected to build relationships with journalists. 
7.3 METHODS AND TECHNIQUES
Through the analysis of in-depth interviews with spokespersons and journalists 
the boundary spaning activities that contribute to positive publicity are studied. 
In-depth interviews
The interviews are nested in four cases of large infrastructure projects in the 
Netherlands. The cases include: a new subway line, a new passageway for a large 
highway, a new train and bus station and part of a high-speed train trajectory 
and high-speed trains. The projects are in the implementation phase during 
the period 2009-2013, which was the scope for this study. The projects received 
a considerable amount of media attention, in regional as well as in national 
media; in newspapers as well as on television. 
The ten spokespersons that had been interviewed work for the project organi-
sation (4), the responsible aldermen (3) or one of the semi-public organisations 
involved (3). The twelve journalists that had been interviewed regularly re-
ported on the project and work for national media (5) or regional media (6) (for 
newspapers (8) or television broadcasters (3))24. In two cases two spokespersons 
insisted to be interviewed together. At one medium another journalist joined 
the interview. Having interviewed spokespersons that represent different or-
ganisations in the implementation network as well as several journalists within 
the cases serves as a triangulation of sources, to obtain more valid and reliable 
results in our study25. In addition, documents such as press releases and media 
reports were analysed. Some of the interviewees preferred to be anonymous 
24. The interviewed journalists work for Algemeen Dagblad; Metro (TMG); NOS journaal; NRC 
Handelsblad; de Volkskrant; het Parool; AD Rotterdams Dagblad; de Limburger, de Gelder-
lander; L1; Omroep Gelderland 
25. In one of the cases a few spokespersons refused to be interviewed, because a parliamentary 
survey will be held on the project; in this case less triangulation was possible. 
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respondents, which is why they are described by a number and the cases with 
a letter, see table 7.1. 
The in-depth interviews mostly took about an hour (mean is 67 minutes), but 
varied from 37 till 86 minutes. A semi-structured interview format was used 
that contained more general questions about role perception; frames and events 
within message-related activities; quality and quantity of relations between spokes-
persons and journalists; (coherence of ) media communication strategies of different 
actors in the case; as well as more specific questions about four to five important 
news events in the project (chronologically ordered) about news sources; (the 
coherence of ) message-related strategies, mutual contacts between spokespersons 
and journalists at that moment, competing images, requirements from the editor 
and time pressure. In most cases, the news events were discussed using news 
reports from the journalists that had been interviewed. 
Data analysis
The interviews have been fully transcribed and analysed through qualitative 
content analysis using computer software Atlas.ti 7. Through coding analysis 
the data can be managed, explored and interpreted (Boeije, 2010). Some cat-
egorisation and conceptualisation was done beforehand on the basis of theory. 
During the coding process new categories and concepts were added. We thus 
combined axial coding with open coding to systematically structure and analyse 
our qualitative data (Boeije, 2010). In this analysis an average of 89 codes were 
Table 7.1 The interviewees nested in the four cases.
Case Spokespersons Journalists
A I I
II II
III III
IV
B IV V
V VI
VII
C VI VIII
VII IX
X
D VIII XI
IX XII
X
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attached to interviews. This varied from 57 to 122 coded fragments per inter-
view. Some fragments were coded with multiple codes. 
Important codes are (between brackets is the number of coded fragments): 
news sources (149); actor-related activities (116); information subsidies (107); 
effects of news management on news reporting (97); journalistic norms (91); 
relations with stakeholders (70); background knowledge of journalist (66); 
coherence between communication strategies (62); personal relations between 
spokespersons and journalists (57); message-related activities (53); pseudo-
events (48); knowing journalistic needs (47); images (47); competing interests 
of network actors (44); organisational support of network actors for the media 
communication (43); time pressure for journalists (40); framing (39); correction 
of media reporting (37); adaptation to media logic (27); reciprocity (21).  
7.4 FINDINGS: ACTIVITIES THAT CONTRIBUTE TO 
POSITIVE PUBLICITY
The findings are arranged by the two-step information flow of boundary span-
ning activities, as has been discussed in the theoretical section and illustrated 
in figure 1b. Message-related and actor-related activities are distinguished in 
both steps.
Step 1a: obtaining information from network actors by 
message-related activities
The first step is to internally obtain information from network actors before it 
can be moulded into mediagenic information. This involves message-related ac-
tivities as creating and discussing a coherent communication strategy, handling 
competing interests of network actors and getting informed about the progress 
of the project.
Coherence
As various parties are involved in the infrastructure projects with different 
roles and responsibilities a coherent communication strategy is far from self-
evident. Different spokespersons and varying communication roles of network 
actors can further complicate a strong media communication strategy from the 
network. While it is common for network actors to have varying views and 
interests in the governance process, these do not add up to a strong media 
communication strategy. 
When organisations only feel responsible for communicating about their own 
tasks and not about common goals this result in a lack of coherence: different 
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messages are then communicated about the governance process, which might 
be conflicting. Spokesperson VII, for instance, does clearly separate his com-
munication responsibilities from the others:  ‘We are not the party that ultimately 
needs to say something about that. That is about the order of the ministry. So the ministry 
needs to say something about that. You see, it is a difficult and complex dossier, which 
results in confusion. (...) We sometimes even receive the accusation via mail or telephone: 
“You with those trains...” To be clear: we do not own any trains’. Such separated media 
communication tasks make it difficult to get a full coherent picture of the proj-
ect for journalists. Journalist VIII reporting on the project above concludes: ‘This 
was, in retrospect, a complicated dossier, also taken into account all the different interests 
involved (…)’. Moreover, journalists will more easily get a grasp on differences 
and conflicts between network actors, which does not contribute to positive 
publicity.  
An alternative strategy is therefore to organise the media communication 
about the infrastructure project in one organisation. Yet, to organise the external 
communication in one organisation, representing an implementation network 
of actors, is quite special. Spokesperson V argues: ‘That is quite a unique position 
and you can sometimes criticise it: should you organise the communication of the client and 
the supplier that close to each other (…), with dissimilar communication responsibilities? It 
is great for the outside world however, because there is only one project and that  is [name 
project] about which they want to know everything’. The centralisation of the media 
communication makes it easier to communicate coherently externally. 
Prerequisite for such centralisation is that other network actors trust the 
judgemental capacities of the organisation that has the responsibility for the 
media communication. Particularly political authorities involved as well as 
their spokespersons should trust the spokespersons of the overall governance 
process. As spokesperson II states: ‘We need to be able to place a message immediately, 
not that an alderman first needs to look at the text. (…) So you need the trust and you need 
a short communication line to his spokesperson. That’s very important, definitely online’. 
Activities that contribute to a strong, coherent communication strategy are 
thus to largely centralise the media communication within one organisation 
involved in the network and to have many meetings for consultation and agree-
ment around common goals and messages. Adapting to media’s logic thus not 
only involves mediagenic framing of information about the governance process, 
but also organising media communication centrally, having one spokesperson 
that can tell journalists ‘everything’ about the project.
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Handling competing interests
Although a coherent strategy might be the overarching goal of all network 
actors, during the process there can still be some competing interests spokes-
persons have to deal with. Like spokesperson X states: ‘Everyone wants the same, 
namely social support to carry out the work. You just represent slightly different perspec-
tives and need to discuss whether something happens or not’. For instance, project com-
munication goals and political communication goals can differ, as spokesperson 
III reports: ‘It can sometimes be: who brings what news? (…) They have a director that 
restored the order there. I have an alderman who restored the order politically, and he is 
actually the head of that director.’ and ‘They concentrate on the press, but there is also the 
city council that is superior, also to the aldermen and the mayor, in a democracy. Then I 
need to say: “not a press release, because we have to inform the Council first”’. 
Commitment and trust from the different network actors are needed to 
handle diverging interests. Centralisation of the communication contributes to 
this as well, spokesperson IV explains: ‘Since we have a joint team for communica-
tion, we see that this discussion [about conflicting interests] is gone. Beforehand, I endlessly 
talked to explain that it can never be the case that the contractor gets a good grade for his 
performance from the environment and the client fails or conversely, that will simply never 
happen. You just share a wonderful grade or you fail jointly’. 
Negotiating competing interests as well as making clear that the common 
communication goal for this project should be more important than the indi-
vidual organisational communication goals of the network actors are thus also 
important message-related activities of spokespersons. 
Getting informed
The spokespersons attentively follow developments in the infrastructure proj-
ect, to look for possible news items. Spokesperson I describes: ‘every week or every 
two weeks, we have consultations on “What is the progress of the construction?”. Everyone 
tells something about his work and then I hear things. (…) In no-time you have a year full 
of milestones and special moments. (…) What I want to say with this though, you need 
your internal information provision to be at least as good as your external information 
provision’. 
Hence, one of the most crucial activities is getting informed on the progress 
within the work of network actors in order to create and organise future media 
moments. 
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Step 1b: obtaining information from network actors by 
actor-related activities
Besides linking information into a coherent media communication strategy by 
message-related activities, spokespersons employ actor-related activities to get 
cooperation of network actors. 
Attitudes toward media
The media communication strategy of governance networks benefits from 
network actors that approach the media with a positive and proactive attitude, 
spokespersons argue. As spokesperson IV tells: ‘you need the organisations on 
board. You need managers, executives and directors and they are sometimes people with a 
fairly old-fashioned or traditional approach that say “on request, we will explain it”’. The 
spokesperson therefore aims to stimulate a positive, proactive approach. 
It helps when network actors just have experienced some positive media at-
tention for their work, spokesperson I sketches: ‘So I call the guy, he says, “Well, 
the press, that’s what I detest. I really don’t want them at my work floor,” I say, “Well, I’m 
actually appointed to get the press on the work floor and I have very good experiences with 
them. Because if you are willing to give a journalist valuable information then you also get 
something in return. (...) In the end these guys also began to see these opportunities, that 
not every piece in the newspaper was negative or worthless. So when they realised that, 
they opened up the gates for our boats to go [through the construction site]. Well, fantastic 
pieces in the newspaper.’ 
Developing positive, proactive attitudes of network actors toward media con-
tributes to a strong media communication strategy. Changing organisational 
practices is needed since spokespersons need network actors to cooperate, such 
as when journalists want information from experts.
Media performances of network actors
For journalists it is much more interesting to speak with directors, constructors 
and builders than with the spokespersons. Spokesperson IV therefore has the 
following media communication strategy: ‘If we have a press briefing or a press visit 
on location, then we prefer construction workers to do the talking as much as possible’. Most 
journalists appreciate this. Journalist VII, reporting on the project spokesperson 
IV works for, states: ‘I also think that that’s a great advantage of [name spokesperson], 
she always gets people on the ground there in person, not just the project manager but if we 
are at such a construction site, then also the supervisor comes by. And I don’t get the feeling 
that he is briefed in advance about what he can and cannot say’. 
Journalist IV similarly mentions experts, who do the actual work on the 
ground, as his most important news sources: ‘particularly the technical people who 
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do the job. A tunnel drilling engineer, the guy with the tattoos, who drills all over the world, 
a commander of the immersion of the tunnel sections, they were the most interesting’. All 
these news sources of journalist IV were facilitated by spokesperson I and II. 
About the tunnel drilling engineer spokesperson I says: ‘Look, one is better than 
the other. We had that [name], one of the main drillers, guy with all the tattoos. That’s a 
natural. That guy is so real and unique, and he fits perfectly in our communication strategy 
of giving the constrction work a human face’. 
So, facilitating contacts with network actors that do the job contributes to 
strong media communication. Journalists appreciate the talks with experts and 
report their stories. This results in a coherent media communication strategy: 
messages are not only underlined by the spokesperson, but also by other net-
work actors. Contact between these network actors and journalists are however 
facilitated by spokespersons.
Relations with other stakeholders
All spokespersons that have been interviewed emphasise that media communi-
cation should be combined with broader environmental communication. Well-
organised direct communication toward stakeholders contributes to gaining 
positive public image. Spokesperson IV argues: ‘Press communication is so much 
easier when your communications and information toward the neighbourhood is very good. 
(...) I think it’s mostly that mix of communication, purchasing marketing items in mass 
media, central external communication, being in contact with people in the neighbourhood: 
that total package ensures that the [positive] atmosphere is as it is now’. 
Good relations with the environment can prevent or soften adversarial sounds 
in media. Public adversaries challenge positive publicity. In one of the cases a 
citizen group has dominated regional news reports for quite a long time. In 
that situation journalists consult the public organisation only to hear the other 
side, spokesperson VI claims: ‘Usually it [our story] is then confronted with [the stories 
of ] the people that are negative. (…) Newspapers then only speak with people who have 
complaints, who go all out, and subsequently my statements are placed’. The journalist 
working for a regional newspaper that reports on this project indeed mentions 
local residents as being his most important news sources. 
All spokespersons explained that they have several platforms to communicate 
with external stakeholders. In addition to news media they use websites, social 
media, newsletters, posters and watch-towers at the construction side to dis-
seminate their information to external stakeholders. 
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Step 2a: disseminating information to journalists by 
message-related activities
In step 1 we described message-related and actor-related activities obtaining 
information from the network. We discussed activities of managing a coher-
ent media strategy which implies the centralisation of media communication 
within governance networks, stimulating proactive and positive attitudes of 
network actors toward media and the investment in relations with other stake-
holders. In the subsequent section we describe activities in which information 
is disseminated to journalists. This step includes the translation of information 
in mediagenic stories. Moreover, information is made easily available for jour-
nalists – providing information subsidies –, often via pseudo-events. 
Messages and framing
Spokespersons transform messages so the framing fits in media logic charac-
teristics such as human interest, dramatisation and personalisation. A message 
about a drilling operation in case A, for instance, has been translated into a 
story about the craftsman that performs the drilling. This translation resulted 
into ‘A very large article in the newspaper de Volkskrant, (…) For the first time we saw 
that that person, that craftsman, can also be described as a hero, even stronger than we 
had expected, had dared hope. (...) That spread in the Volkskrant, also led to a number of 
other journalists saying: Wow, we also want to see that, and can we also speak with him?’, 
spokesperson II tells.
Apparent from the success of the storyline about the craftsmen, some journal-
ists seem to like and even prefer stories that are made newsworthy, adapted to 
the media logic. As journalist VIII: ‘What we, from the perspective of the newspaper, 
have noticed is that organisations who contact us have become more professional. Or at 
least more mediagenic. You shouldn’t come with a thick report with figures, because that 
doesn’t sells it toward us. “Sell” sounds a bit weird, present. How do you present news to 
us? It must be something usable’. 
Key is to make the various developments in the project interesting for jour-
nalists, spokesperson I describes: ‘Journalists must feel like there is another element, 
another aspect. (…) In this case, yes, we have had like a hundred thousand breakthroughs. 
Only, this is the very very last. (… ) And the funny thing is, I have framed it as “the last 
connection, now the tunnel is really open. And if you would like, you virtually would be 
able to walk through it from North to South” (...) So that was again picked up as news’. A 
week later a the Metro newspaper had a front page that people could actually 
walk from North to South. Apparently the spokesperson had succeeded in again 
making that moment mediagenic. 
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The translation of the information on the progress of the implementation 
into mediagenic news stories is thus a crucial message-related activity of 
spokespersons, which contributes to positive publicity.
Information subsidies: many pseudo-events
The majority of the spokespersons that have been interviewed provide lots of 
information subsidies, such as press releases, press conferences, short-films or 
animations, up-to-date information on their website and tweets and they have 
organised many construction site visits for journalists. 
Spokespersons organise (pseudo-)events around milestones in the project 
development. When parts of the construction work are finished or a ‘special’/ 
‘outstanding’  part of the construction work will be done, they invite journalists 
and other stakeholders to take a look and get informed on the progress. ‘Some-
times, those moments are very natural. Then, you’re a step further in the process, there 
is such a moment. It may also be that you feel like well it has been silent for a long time. 
Although quite a lot is happening, we have little communicated externally and we should be 
looking for a reason. So for instance that we sign a contract, or they are concreting a large 
surface or something is finished – which can be something quite small –, but then we invite 
the press’, spokesperson IX explains.
For journalists one important task is to select from the many information 
subsidies they receive during a project. This selectivity is actually part of the 
journalistic autonomy, as is illustrated by the statement of journalist I: ‘We have 
tried to dose, thus not every news fact of the spokesperson, not every press release about a 
breakthrough or an important step in the construction, a turning point or an important 
moment. Wé decide whether we come’. Despite this journalistic selectivity many 
information subsidies lead to news reports.
Journalists need different sorts of news input per day; they use information 
subsidies for varying reasons. It may be a newsworthy event, a funny event or 
an event with striking images. The same journalist I, working for television 
explained why he covered a certain event: ‘That tunnel was finished and that is of 
course a striking image. So that’s also an argument to make an item’. Also in other inter-
views striking images of construction sites form an important reason to cover 
the event, as journalist XII motivates her news decision to cover the placing of 
a bridge for cyclists: ‘Because it is really spectacular. I think that we have filmed the 
whole operation and showed it live on the Internet broadcast and an accelerated version 
[on television]. These are things you can almost never see’.
Most of the journalists that have been interviewed are quite pleased with the 
way spokespersons provide them with information at the pseudo-events and 
they use it for their news items. Journalist VII reflects on such construction site 
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visits: ‘You can talk a lot about the theory, but if you are on the construction site, then you 
only really see, oh that’s how it works, that’s what’s going on and how they build it. That 
is very useful’. Or, as journalist XI argues, it is a good opportunity to stay in touch 
with key actors within the project: ‘Look, the moment that they search for positive 
publicity, is for me the moment to talk with the project leader or project manager, people 
that are normally protected, but then under the charge of a spokesperson they walk with 
me and we can have a short conversation, you keep in touch.’. 
Providing information subsidies increases the chances for positive news re-
porting, that support your communication strategy. As spokesperson II explains: 
‘At the time that you’re the first, you’re the first building block for a story of a journalist. 
(…) that usually gets a more important place in a report then when the journalist confronts 
you with a story’. 
Otherwise, other sources will be providing the first building blocks. Three of 
the twelve journalists that have been interviewed prefer other news sources to 
initiate the news story; citizens, rival companies, builders or other anonymous 
sources. As journalist III: ‘I mainly look for the dirt, the bad news. I rather look for news 
that a municipality does not want to publicly share. Whatever they themselves publicly com-
municate I find less interesting’. In that case the rebuttal of the public organisation 
is only heard as the other side, which results often just in a short fragment in 
the news report. Journalist II states: ‘I rather give much more room for the other side 
[the project organisation]. But in this case the news and the explanation is more important. 
For the rebuttal remains only two or three sentences. This is where the frustration of the 
spokesperson comes from, I think’. 
But although these journalists are reluctant to use information subsidies, at 
the same time, colleague-journalists, even within the same medium, use the 
information subsidies because of the need for news and the felt relevance, 
journalist III ‘admits’: ‘These do concern technical masterpieces and many readers are 
interested in that. Colleagues of mine make these reports. It’s not my style, but we bring it 
big. From time to time we have large reports’. 
Keeping journalists up-to date
The information subsidies serve to keep journalists up-to-date about the 
progress of the project. Information subsidies thereby also direct journalistic 
interpretations of future events. Spokesperson IV therefore ascribes differences 
in interpretation of events to the knowledge journalists have about the project. 
‘The main difference between national media that know little of [name project] and the 
local media is that they can interpret that [the bulge] much better. The bulge was a result 
of a bore. National media even said, because of the word bore: “so you are drilling a tun-
nel and the drilling of the tunnel failed”. They freely associate on the event and greatly 
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exaggerate’. This is claimed by most of the other spokespersons that have been 
interviewed. It is therefore important to take journalist along with you and 
to keep them up-to-date although this will not always directly result in free 
publicity. Also journalists confirm the importance of regularly being updated, 
as journalist VII, who covers the project of the above quoted spokesperson IV: 
‘They regularly organise press conferences, until recently once every month (…) I think that 
is very important, since it keeps you informed’. 
Hence, message-related activities, as providing many information subsidies 
contributes to positive publicity. Although some journalists are quite reluctant 
to use the provided information by the spokesperson, many journalists (even 
colleagues within the same medium) use the information in their news reports 
because it fits in their medium. At least, it keeps journalists informed.
Step 2b: disseminating information to journalists by 
actor-related activities
Having relations with journalists increases the chances of getting information 
across in news media. Actor-related activities are thus focused on relations 
between spokespersons and journalists. 
Personal relations
Relations between spokespersons and journalists are partly built through 
personal conversations, also talking about other things than work. As spokes-
person I describes:  ‘So I invited [name of a journalist] once to chat, just for a nice 
conversation, to meet each other. (...) This led to another appointment at the pub, drinking 
beers together. I like that, drinking beers with journalists’. Spokespersons as well as 
journalists benefit from short communication lines. Small talks at news events 
as well as being available for journalist as a spokesperson contribute to the 
relationship. Journalist IV that was referred to by the spokesperson in the quote 
above argued: ‘They gave the impression that they speak frankly. And they were always 
available, they never hide. Even if they were on holidays for winter sports, [name spokesper-
son] answered the telephone call on the mountain in the snow’. 
Although the contact is partly based on the personal connection between the 
spokesperson and the journalist, it is of course a connection to pursue their 
own business goals (positive publicity versus saleable and independent news). 
That is why journalist II argued that he never has a true friendship with a 
spokesperson: ‘Someone is called a befriended journalist when people get along with each 
other, when there is confidence. Everything is about trust for me. You must be able to look 
each other in the eyes and there has to be trust.’ The personal connection and trust 
make the relationship stronger. This is confirmed by journalist VII when asked 
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about the reliability of different news sources: ‘You do make such a distinction, for 
instance when a citizen calls me and says there is a subsidence, I really do not write that in 
the newspaper, but if [name spokeperson] calls me and says there is a subsidence, I presume 
that that is correct’. The reliability of spokespersons is decisive for a journalist and 
his/her news decisions.
Other spokespersons (particularly the two spokespersons that had been in-
terviewed for case C) experienced more negative contacts with journalists. In 
a period of complaints about noise nuisance around the project trajectory, the 
contacts with journalist felt destructive, spokesperson VII expresses: ‘What I 
found is that it was a bit hostile toward us. As of: you guys are the bad guys’. Beforehand, 
they haven’t had established relationships with journalists. The concerned 
spokespersons sketch that the contacts are different nowadays. Now journalist 
have more an inquiring attitude, spokesperson VI ventilates: ‘[The journalists ask] 
much more questions: what is exactly is going on?’. This however indicates that rela-
tions with journalists are still not that close and not that proactively built by the 
concerned spokesperson. This is also illustrated by a more limited accessibility 
of spokesperson VI: ‘The day before yesterday I was called at home by a journalist at 
my day off. She was startled that she called me at home, so she quickly hung up. But it 
does indicate that she has my private telephone number. And that they can approach me’. 
The relationship here is less close in comparison to the spokesperson that even 
answers his phone being on skiing holiday.
Personal relations characterised by a proactive approach, reliability, mutual 
trust and accessibility are beneficial for positive publicity. Nevertheless, not all 
spokespersons have been building such personal relations with journalists.
Knowing journalistic needs
Spokesperson III argues her activities are about serving journalists’ needs at 
their timing: ‘(…) You always want to help them, also if it doesn’t suit you or if you are 
tired. Then I have to get back to that one man in the project, which I’ve already harassed 
ten times over the last few weeks, again asking something technical that he needs to explain 
to me while I’m not a technician’. Answering information requests is one of the 
activities to invest in a relationship with a journalist, such investments mostly 
pay off. 
Reciprocity only works when both parties know each other for some lon-
ger time, have built trust and know each other’s needs though. Journalist XI 
therefore grumbles about the varying spokespersons he had to deal with in 
the project ‘Well at the municipality it changes not that fast, but at [name organisation] 
I believe I had contact with about seven or eight spokespersons and they know sometimes 
less than I do’.
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Spokespersons need to understand the job of journalists, different spokes-
persons explain in the interviews. A few of them had actually been a journal-
ist before. Spokesperson I discusses an internal conflict about the access for 
journalists, in which other network actors asked him: ‘Can’t they just get a picture 
from us? Can’t they just use our images? - I replied: no, every journalist wants to make one 
of his own. That is where they get paid for. You thus need to ascertain that journalist are 
able to make pictures themselves’. Two journalists that had been interviewed indeed 
felt that spokesperson I forms a valuable information source and facilitator. 
As journalist I: ‘He very well understands how media work. And he feeds you a lot. We 
have filmed numerous times with the camera at a construction site (…). They were very 
accessible and they knew us very well’. 
As a spokesperson you thus invest in the relation with journalists, by handling 
information requests, offering (mediagenic) information and providing access. 
Those investments result in reciprocal gains. 
Correction
Through the (personal) relations with the journalists, spokespersons also aim to 
correct negative reporting. Some spokespersons contact journalists, after or just 
before a negative news report. Spokesperson I describes how he approached a 
journalist that continually made negative news about the project: ‘We watched 
an item together, “you call that positive?” Negative start and ending. “While the [project 
name] has today a breakthrough, we still remember... And there you go, those previous 
images.. Which is fine, these things happened, the [project name] has a negative image, 
that speaks for itself. And quite right that you have attention for it, but there’s been a lot of 
attention for that already. If you look at the new situation, then you should also objectively 
pay attention to that. Otherwise you’re not objective as a journalist, you’re biased.” It 
changed his attitude somewhat’.
Putting some pressure on the journalist and the relation is not always that 
effective. Moreover, it can only have certain impact when the journalist has 
actually had some positive experiences with the spokesperson in the past. Oth-
erwise the journalist will not take it seriously, as illustrated by journalist X: ‘At 
[name organisation] my general experience is that you do not really gain something from 
the spokespersons. The spokespersons are very good at making angry phone calls when you 
have written something they don’t agree with, they are very quick in doing that. Well, not 
really professional spokesmanship I think, they just tell you very little.’ 
In established relations of spokespersons and journalists spokespersons 
sometimes get news reports before they get published. In one of the cases the 
municipality – after some journalistic pressure – wanted to communicate about 
risks in the project, a sensitive subject. Because spokesperson III had facilitated 
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that the journalist could inspect the extensive list of risks, she had the oppor-
tunity to slightly influence the content of the news report. ‘[name journalist] has 
told me: “we are going to place this on the front page”. That was nice to hear in advance. 
He had firstly described the risks alone. I said: “you have to add: those risks are present, 
but we [the municipality] also do something with those risks”‘. But in most instances a 
spokesperson can only check and correct technical details before the piece gets 
published, as is confirmed in the majority of the interviews. 
In sum, actor-related activities of – some of the – spokespersons lead to 
personal relations with journalists that are based on trust and knowing each 
other’s needs. Spokespersons make use of the relationship to keep journalists 
up-to-date on the progress, to provide greater access for information subsidies 
and to be able to slightly correct disproportionate negative reporting. 
Summing-up: boundary spanning activities of 
spokespersons
We conclude our analysis with a scheme of all message-related and actor-related 
activities of spokespersons in governance networks that contribute to positive 
publicity (see figure 7.2). 
 
1 
 
 
 
2: External (in the media arena)
- Message-related activities
- Framing information into newsworthy stories
- Keeping journalists up-to-date by information subsidies
- Organizing pseudo-events 
- Actor-related activities
- Investing in personal relations with journalists
- Knowing and serving journalists' needs
- Striving for corrections in inaccurate or negative publicity
1: Internal (in the network arena)
- Message-related activities
- Discussing coherent communication strategy (centralizing 
media communication)
- Handling competing interests of network actors
- Getting informed on all activities of network actors
- Actor-related activities
- Developing pro-active attitudes of networks actors towards 
media
- Facilitating network actors to be news sources
- Extensive communication with other external stakeholders
Figure 7.2. Concluding scheme boundary spanning activities contributing to positive publicity.
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7.5 CONCLUSIONS
Papadopoulus (2012) has described a broadening gap between politics visible in 
news media and actual – but more or less invisible – political decision-making 
in complex policy processes. Positive publicity around governance processes 
could bridge this gap, as it contributes to the legitimacy of taken decisions, to 
social support for policies and to trust in the performances (cf. Pfetsch, 2008). 
However, up to now little is known about how positive news can be gained 
and how it can advance the work of actors in governance processes (Lee, 2008). 
In fact, often media are seen as a disturbance to what is really important in 
governance processes, particularly because media are claimed to have a prefer-
ence for sensationalism, conflicts and policy failures discussing visible politics 
(Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; Patterson, 2000; Bennett, 2009; Flinders, 2011; Klijn 
et al., 2014). The question this article has addressed is therefore how differences 
between media logic and the logic of governance processes can be bridged in 
order to gain positive publicity. 
The results of this study show that gaining positive publicity around gover-
nance processes is certainly possible, but that it requires considerable boundary 
spanning efforts in the network and media arena. 
In the network arena we found efforts of spokespersons to reconcile the dif-
ferent perspectives into one coherent communication strategy; to overcome 
competing interests during the process; and to stay informed on the different 
activities of network actors. Spokespersons also invest in proactive attitudes of 
network actors toward media, because they sometimes have a more fatalist and 
defensive attitude (cf. Klijn et al., 2014). Furthermore, spokespersons facilitate 
media performances of network actors as they form interesting news sources 
for journalists and contribute to the coherent communication strategy. These 
internal boundary spanning activities indeed imply that practices of network 
actors are transformed to a certain extent (cf. Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2014). 
Network actors are requested to include proactive news-media communication 
activities in their regular jobs. Moreover, network actors need to commit to a 
coherent, uniform communication strategy, which is ideally centralised. Such 
a uniform and centralised communication strategy forms a sharp contrast with 
common practices within governance networks that are heterogeneous and 
decentralised by their very nature. Compromises are thus not only made in 
terms of content that fit in media logic, but also in terms of content that fit a 
coherent image. 
In a governance context it is also crucial that media communication is part 
of wider external communication with other stakeholders, such as surrounding 
communities. This increases their understanding of the project, their support 
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and their trust in the performance of the governance network (see also Lee, 
2008). Moreover, it might prevent that these external stakeholders approach 
journalists because they do not understand the cause of the nuisance and/or 
why they are not being heard by the actors implementing policies. 
Such activities of spokespersons in the network arena have been largely 
neglected in literature on political and governmental communication through 
the news. In these studies most attention is devoted to activities of spokes-
persons in the media arena, in which primarily adaptation of information to 
media logic and relations between spokespersons with journalists have been 
described (as Curtin, 1999; Phillips, 2002; Tenscher, 2004; Cook, 2005; Bennett, 
2009; Laursen & Valentini, 2014). Comparable activities are found in the com-
munication strategies of spokesperson in the context of governance. Yet, the 
addition of activities of boundary spanning spokespersons in the network arena 
distinguish communication in governance from political and governmental 
communication. Such activities are particularly relevant due to the specific set-
ting of governance networks, in which different actors with varying interests 
and value preferences are involved in the decision-making processes around 
policies. Further research could address the differences between policy and 
political communication more comprehensively.
Besides providing new insights about media communication around gover-
nance processes, this article included an innovative application of the concept 
of boundary spanning. The concept of boundary spanning has been often used 
in relation to governance networks and other forms of inter-organisational col-
laboration. Boundary spanning activities are then typically analysed as gaining 
useful information from the other network actors/collaborative partners that 
can be applied in the organisation to create a better fit with the network/the 
collaborative partners (see Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; Williams, 2002; Baker, 
2008; Van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 2014). In the literature less attention has 
been paid to how organisations or a network can be protected against potential 
external disturbances (cf. Van Meerkerk, 2014) and how the environment of the 
overall network can be influenced and used to its advantage. This article shows 
that boundary spanning activities of spokespersons that focus on the external 
environment can be studied through a reversed application of the two-step 
information flow model of Tushman and Scanlan (1981). Future research could 
examine applications of this reversed model in other external contexts, such as 
the wider political contexts in which governance networks operate. 
Because we have focused on infrastructural policies, some of our findings 
might be less applicable in other policy areas. For instance, anticipating on the 
attractiveness of images for journalists might be more applicable in the infra-
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structural domain than in other policy areas. Secondly, the use of pseudo-events 
for journalists and stakeholders, in the form of construction site visits, might 
be more realisable in the context of infrastructure projects. At the same time, 
inviting journalist to other organisations or project meetings is not unthink-
able, as Boin and Christensen (2008) illustrate in the case of the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons. Nonetheless, the exact translation of information from within the 
network to mediagenic information will probably have diverging characteris-
tics in different policy areas. It would be interesting to study these diverging 
characteristics more in-depth.
Another limitation of this study is the focus on the implementation phase 
of the policies. The implementation of policies leads to other dynamics than 
phases of agenda setting or policy formulation (see McBeth & Shanahan, 2004). 
During these phases different actors will be even more motivated to solely focus 
on their own interests, goals and images and conflicts around policies are often 
more public. 
Despite these limitations, what are the implications of the findings in societal 
perspective? A relevant question on the basis of these findings is to what extent 
the media communication contributes to democratic values (cf. van Rooij & 
Aarts). Critics have major concerns regarding the adaptation of communication 
of public institutions to make it fit with the media logic. They claim accom-
modation to journalistic demands leads to a decrease in the political value 
of public messages (as Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; 
Davis, 2002, 2009; McBeth & Shahanan, 2004; Hjarvard, 2008; Bennett, 2009). As 
Blumler and Gurevitch (1995: 43) argue: “The system has more or less settled for 
the reduction of political messages to the demands of journalism, with its em-
phasis on the dramatic, the concrete, the personalizable and the arresting – and 
with its turbulent and episodic view of the flow of civic affairs”. These scholars 
worry about the information voters obtain from media reports on public affairs. 
This is why spokespersons should also have much attention for communication 
with stakeholders. Information about the governance process should also reach 
them without the interference of the news media and their logic. Moreover, 
interactive conversations with them would greatly increase the democratic value 
of communication around the governance process (Aarts & Leeuwis, 2010).
At the same time scholars question to what extent journalists are still able to 
perform their watchdog role. The relationships of mutual dependencies might 
be getting skewed at the expense of journalistic autonomy. The number of 
journalists has decreased within news organisations while at the same time the 
number of spokespersons increased. As journalists have less time for research 
and verification, they will use more input from spokespersons and other com-
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munication professionals within public institutions (Curtin, 1999; Davis, 2002). 
While public organisation should strive for more understanding and legitimacy 
for their policy plans through media, journalists must always keep an inde-
pendent, critical perspective. Most of the time the interviewed journalists kept 
such a perspective, but sometimes this could be improved by taking more time 
and having more news sources. 
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Chapter 8
The media logic versus the logic of network 
governance
In this research, the focus was on the impact of mediatisation on governance 
processes. The findings and sub-conclusions on how media and their logic affect 
governance processes have been discussed in the empirical chapters and in the 
interludes about mediatised democratic fora, mediatised agenda setters and media-
tised instruments for strategic communication. This chapter addresses the overall 
conclusions of the research and analyses its implications.
The implications of mediatisation for governance processes appear to be some-
what paradoxical:
- The often-criticised news media biases have democratising effects
-  News coverage not only contributes to complexity, but also to more ad-
equate decision-making
-  Strategic communication through the media about governance networks – 
decentralised by nature – requires centralisation. 
In the different studies reported in this dissertation, many decisions in research 
design were made that have consequences for the findings that were reported and 
the conclusions that were drawn. These theoretical and methodological decisions 
are reflected on in this chapter as well, which also leads to an identification of 
directions for future research. 
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8.1 MEDIATISATION IN THE CONTEXT OF GOVERNANCE 
PROCESSES
This book began with the debate about the presumed problematic interconnec-
tions between media and politics. News media are presumed to considerably 
shape political realities, in part by having the tendency to highlight negativity, 
conflicts, emotions and failures, while politicians in turn seem to get carried 
away by these mediatised political realities. The dramatics in news reports 
can thus be enhanced by the dramatic actions and reactions of political ac-
tors. Moreover, politicians do not just sit back to watch media dominate their 
game, but they aim to influence news media with authoritative information 
subsidies which often appears to be a successful strategy. Such connections 
between media and politics are seen as fundamentally problematic, as they 
can undermine democracy (Blumler & Gurevich, 1995; Davis, 2002; Cook, 2005; 
Bennett, 2009). Instead of the demos governing, the media seems to be governing; 
Western democracies such as the Netherlands are therefore characterised as 
being a ‘mediacracy’ or a ‘drama democracy’ (Brants, 2002; Elchardus, 2002; 
Meyer & Hinchmann, 2002).  
These far-reaching statements are often done in the context of visible politics, 
regarding national politicians and/or politics in times of elections. Yet the terms 
‘mediacracy’ or ‘drama democracy’ suggest that the power of news media is not 
only present in politics, but also in other stages of the democratic process – such 
as in decision-making processes around policies. Effects from the interference 
of media and their logic in governance processes can indeed be expected, as 
some clear tensions exist between the logic of news media and the logic of 
complex decision-making processes. News media’s attention for sensationalism 
and conflict contrasts with the need for network actors to build trust relations 
and to collaborate. Furthermore, the focus of media on actions by public au-
thorities and their personal efforts contrasts with the collaborative efforts of 
public, societal and private actors in governance settings. 
On the basis of the research reported in this book, several effects of mediatisa-
tion on governance processes can be described. 
8.2 CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF MEDIATISATION ON 
GOVERNANCE PROCESSES
Despite the grand statements about the power of media in democracy, the find-
ings of my sub-studies do not add up to an overall state of affairs that we may 
rightly call a mediacracy or drama democracy. News media and their logic do 
not constantly interfere in governance processes, as the findings in Chapters 5 
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and 6 indicated. Moreover, if media even give attention to governance process-
es, news coverage often only concentrates on certain phases or aspects of the 
decision-making process. This should tone down discussions about media and 
political processes: the presumed close and dramatic interconnections between 
media and politics are often not so tangible at the level of governance processes.
At the same time, when news media do interfere in governance processes, 
then this has considerable impact. However, it results in different dynamics 
than predicted in much of mediatisation literature, because these studies 
mostly focus only on effects of media and their logic on political authorities. 
Effects of mediatisation in the more complex context of governance processes 
are not that clear-cut, but paradoxical. 
Democratising effects of the criticised news media biases
Information biases within news media are often criticised for distorting infor-
mation on public issues and political decision-making processes (e.g. Bennett, 
2009). The information biases appeared to be clearly present in the majority of 
the news reports concerning five governance processes, analysed in Chapter 
4. About two-thirds of the news reports was found to be dramatised by zoom-
ing in on conflict; half of the news reports was found to be negative about 
the policy; in about half of the reports, action by authorities was requested 
(authority-disorder bias); and the personalised, human interest bias was found 
in approximately a quarter of the news reports. The information biases are thus 
indeed consequential for the framing of the policy issues and the governance 
processes. 
Nonetheless, these information biases also appeared to preserve democratic 
potential. In my research, the information biases of dramatisation, personali-
sation and negativity were particularly related to unauthoritative and outside 
actors in governance processes, as shown in Chapter 4. These results indicate 
that particularly the often-criticised sensationalism and dramatisation in news 
reports have a positive side as well: these media biases contribute to checks 
and balances within the media debate. These findings are in line with claims 
of Schudson (2009), but the mediatisation literature pays little attention to this 
democratising mechanism. Because of the news coverage of non-authoritative 
and outside actors, governance processes might open up to these actors and 
their views on the issue.
At the same time, this democratic potential is also limited to the extent that 
messages and events fit media logic criteria. Mainly actors that are willing to 
communicate messages and events that are dramatic, personal and/or critical 
and to ‘sell’ these to journalists are able to open up the governance processes 
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for their input. In Chapter 5 we saw that actors were less able to sell their state-
ments to journalists when they showed commitment to collaborating with the 
other network actors. Controversies better fit media logic characteristics, but 
this more or less assumes that actors have a go-it-alone strategy. Nonetheless, 
mediatised input should certainly not be rejected altogether because of its focus 
on controversies or emotions. The mediatised input of outsiders can open up 
relevant perspectives on the policy issue that had been neglected before. Media 
and their logic can thus help to bring such perspectives to the attention of 
decision-makers in governance processes. 
News media coverage contributes to complexity AND adequateness of decision-making 
processes
As discussed, media’s focus on conflicts, sensationalism and political authori-
ties’ actions that encourages go-it-alone strategies of actors contrast with gover-
nance processes in which network actors collaborate on integrative solutions. 
A media spotlight therefore puts pressure on all actors; negotiations under a 
media spotlight are much more complex than negotiations that are more or less 
shielded from the larger public. News media coverage makes actors position 
themselves more strongly or even differently from before. Actors might be less 
inclined to give in, while this is often necessary in governance processes. Such 
dynamics presumably explain the negative relation between news that is more 
sensational and negative and trust relations between network actors, as found 
in Chapter 6. Furthermore, if news media focus on certain policy proposals and 
zoom in on failures, possibly just a limited amount of policy options can be 
publicly legitimised as a result. Negotiating under the media spotlight therefore 
not only makes governance processes more complex, it limits the content that 
is negotiated, potentially leading to less innovative and integrative results. 
The mechanism could explain the negative relation between negative and 
sensational news and perceived network performance as reported in Chapter 6. 
Hence, news media coverage contributes to the complexity of decision-making 
in networks, and negative and sensational news media coverage may ultimately 
have negative effects on governance processes. 
However, as discussed in the previous paragraph, negative, emotional and 
dramatised news coverage also has democratic potential, since this news 
especially covers the views of outside actors. And actors in governance net-
works – particularly politicians – want to be quick to respond. The voice and 
deliberative process became more inclusive in the governance processes ana-
lysed in Chapter 5, because the unauthoritative and outside actors are heard 
in and through media. It also resulted in some changes in the content of the 
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governance processes: some modest changes in policy decisions were found. 
Hence, it is through the negative and sensational news coverage that gover-
nance networks are also prevented from making inadequate decisions that 
exclude views of other stakeholders. The news media coverage, and particularly 
the coverage characterised by the much-criticised news media biases, breaks 
open the governance process for alternative views. This mechanism has been 
described in the agenda-forming literature (e.g. Baumgartner & Jones, 2009), 
but has been virtually neglected in the literature on mediatisation. Negotiations 
between actors with the most powerful resources are challenged by news cover-
age that has many characteristics of the commercial news media logic, which 
could be positive and democratically enriching for the content and process of 
governance networks. 
It also leads to important dilemmas for actors in the network, however. For 
why would it be more valid and legitimate to respond to such mediatised input 
in comparison to the input of other stakeholders already involved in the net-
work? Governing authorities are thus compelled to strike a balance between 
mediatised requests and the input of network actors. 
Strategic communication about (decentralised) governance networks requires centralisation
Media should however not only be seen as an external disturbance to the gover-
nance process. News media coverage can also be an instrument for actors within 
governance to strengthen their position in the network, to legitimise decisions 
and to create public trust in and support for the performances of the network. 
Such positive publicity can be created: media need to be fed with information 
and by adapting to the news media logic, news coverage can to a certain extent 
be ‘managed’, as the analysis in Chapter 7 showed. Increasingly spokespersons 
are hired that are able to bridge the logic of governance and news media logic 
in their communication about the overall processes and content within the 
governance network. 
This takes considerable effort, since actors in governance networks have vary-
ing interests and perceptions. Spokespersons therefore not only need to have a 
constantly updated overview of all responsibilities and activities of the actors, 
but they also need to create and negotiate a coherent communication strategy 
with them. Paradoxically, spokespersons need to ‘centralise’ communication 
lines, which is actually the exact opposite of how communication lines within 
governance networks are organised. Conflicting perspectives and interests of 
network actors are common in a network context, but in media such differ-
ences are likely to be dramatised. An overall media strategy of the network thus 
necessarily includes all network actors, which to a certain extent contrasts with 
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their autonomous position in which no actor can be commended to act or think 
in a certain way. A communication strategy therefore needs constant discussion 
with and information provision from network actors and spokespersons. Only 
then can spokespersons provide journalists with the quotes of authorities and 
experts within the network, images and other information, and use media logic 
characteristics to their advantage. Spokespersons that only communicate about 
the responsibilities of their organisation – which they clearly differentiated 
from their own responsibilities – have more difficulty in managing the news. 
Journalists then find it harder to understand the governance process, see more 
conflicts, or zoom in on other (outside) news sources, as discussed in Chapter 7. 
In addition, in the context of governance processes the success of strategic 
media communication measured in positive publicity not only depends on 
good internal network communication, but also on extensive environmental 
communication or consultation. The spokespersons that were interviewed all 
emphasised how media communication should be embedded in an overall 
communication strategy, which includes extensive communication to and 
conversations with surrounding communities and other stakeholders. As we 
saw before, outside actors disagreeing with policies can also easily generate 
negative publicity around governance processes. 
8.3 LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH AND DIRECTIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In the paragraphs above I described the conclusions that can be drawn from my 
research. Many decisions were taken in the course of the study that had implica-
tions for the answers obtained to research questions and the conclusions that 
could be drawn.  In this paragraph I will therefore reflect on important choices 
and limitations of this research, which should be taken into account before 
generalising findings and conclusions to other contexts. By doing so, directions 
for future research are identified. 
What about social media?
In this research, the effects of media and media logic were studied with respect 
to mass (news) media. This means that, for the most part, no ‘new’ media – 
social media such as Twitter and blogs – were included.  This is a common 
approach in mediatisation literature (Landerer, 2013). Despite contemporary 
technological developments, mass media are still a very important channel for 
news consumption and also an important intermediary institution for news 
to have effects. Although new media like Twitter, Facebook and other internet 
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platforms are gaining prominence in society, individuals still massively consume 
television and newspapers (SCP/NPO, 2014; Groot Kormelink & Costera Meijer, 
2014). Issues discussed in mass media and online media also partly overlap: the 
content of news discussed online and offline often correlates (Bennett, 2003; 
Cornfield, Carson, Kalis & Simon, 2005; Meraz, 2009). Moreover, and even more 
relevant to my research, in order for ideas and statements in new media to have 
effects on governance processes, mass media still tend to be an important inter-
mediary institution that amplifies such effects. Mass media play an important 
role by strengthening the frames that individuals publish in new media and by 
giving these a larger ‘well-known’ and respected platform, which helps to draw 
political attention and to open policy windows (Bekkers, Beunders, Edwards & 
Moody, 2009). 
This makes research on the effects of mass media and their logic very valu-
able. But a natural next step would be to study communication among network 
actors and outside actors that only takes place through social media such as 
Twitter, Facebook and blogs. Direct online communication, either among citi-
zens or between citizens and network actors could influence policy processes 
and problem definitions and solutions as well. For instance, future research 
could examine whether online conversations between citizens and municipal 
councillors or aldermen could have such effects in governance contexts. This 
is especially relevant since local and regional mass media are declining and 
even disappearing in many parts of the Netherlands (Commissariaat voor de Media, 
2014; Kik & Landman, 2013). Such research should take into account that new 
media have their own characteristics that results in a distinctive ‘new media’ 
logic (Couldry, 2008) or logics. Examining professionalism, commercialism and 
formats (cf. Esser, 2013) in new media will identify different features than the 
characteristics of mass media logic. Professional journalistic norms such as audi 
alteram partem – to hear the other side too – and independence are scarcely ap-
plied in online media like Twitter (but will be important for online journalistic 
blogging platforms, though). Regarding commercialism, the number of clicks 
and views of online contributions are very important, so these might form the 
commercial motives that guide online production. (However, the commercial 
goals are often achieved in a much more personalised manner than in mass 
media and until now it appears to be quite difficult to earn money with jour-
nalistic products online.) An endless number of formats can be applied online, 
some of which limit the content (such as the number of words in a tweet), while 
others offer and link all sorts of information on the internet (images, videos, 
texts). Formulating one overall online news media logic might be much more 
Chapter 8
168
complicated, if not impossible, due to the different reporting and communica-
tion practices online. 
What about other governance contexts?
The four empirical chapters reported on data collected in three different gover-
nance contexts, which all relate to spatial planning. For the studies described 
in Chapters 4 and 5, data was gathered in a spatial planning context that pri-
marily concerned water storage and other water management goals, besides 
other issues of land use and the building of dwellings. The study in Chapter 6 
concerned urban planning projects, such as urban regeneration projects. In the 
last study, data was collected in four cases of public infrastructure. A next step 
would therefore be to examine whether the findings and conclusions also hold 
for other governance contexts in other policy domains, such as education (as in 
O’Toole & Meier, 2004); safety (as in Prins, 2014) or health (as in Wehrens, 2013). 
After all, some policy issues  are simply more mediagenic (or ‘hot’) than others 
(Voltmer & Koch-Baumgarten, 2010; Ruigrok, Jacobi, Janssen & Van der Beek 
2013), for instance because they perfectly fit the media logic characteristics. It 
could be examined whether more effects of mediatisation occur in the case of 
more mediagenic policy issues. 
A second characteristic of the governance processes that were studied is that 
they are situated in the Netherlands. In this country, decision-making processes 
tend to proceed according to a Dutch democratic tradition of consensual politics. 
Other countries have other democratic traditions to facilitate the functioning 
of governance networks (Skelcher, Klijn, Kübler, Sørensen & Sullivan, 2011). In 
addition, the Netherlands as empirical context implies a media system which 
differs from that of other countries. In comparison, the overall political infor-
mation environment is shown to be significantly better in the Netherlands than 
in the United States, for example (Aalberg, Van Aelst & Curran, 2010; Esser 
et al., 2012). But although comparative studies show differences in the degree 
to which commercial news media logic shape news production in different 
countries, it is certainly not a situation limited to the United States (Strömbäck 
& Dimitrova, 2011; Brekken, Thorbjørnsrud & Aalberg, 2012; Hasler, Kübler 
& Christmann, 2014).  The discussion about media logic characteristics in the 
news and their effects is therefore also important in European countries such 
as the Netherlands (e.g. Raad voor de Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, 2003; Brekken 
et al., 2012; www.nieuwsmonitor.org). Future international comparative stud-
ies could examine differences in the impact of mediatisation on governance 
process across different countries, with different political traditions and media 
systems. 
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The third characteristic of most of the governance processes that we studied 
is that regional and local actors were at the heart of the network. These ‘central’ 
governing actors and network managers work for municipalities. Although ac-
tors from national government were also involved, most of the more specific 
decisions were taken at a local level. Moreover, the decisions taken had the 
most impact for local actors. This is a common level of analysis for governance 
studies (as Verweij et al., 2013; Torfing, 2010; Ansell, 2003), which only becomes 
more relevant as important tasks are decentralised, as is currently happening 
in the Netherlands. By contrast, in mediatisation studies scholarly attention 
has been devoted primarily to the mediatisation of politics at a national level 
(as in Kepplinger, 2002; Cook, 2005; Brants & Van Praag, 2006; Bennett, 2009). 
Exceptions are studies by Uitermark and Duyvendak (2010) and Hajer (2009), 
which examine mediatisation in the context of local governance processes. At 
the local/regional level, media organisations often decrease in both number and 
size (Commissariaat voor de Media, 2014; Kik & Landman, 2013), which makes the 
media landscape at this level less diverse than at the national level. This might 
make media more ‘manageable’ by network actors as well as by outside actors, 
because there is less time to check the information provided by communication 
professionals. At the same time, the culture of political communication at this 
local level seems to differ from the political communication culture nationally; 
media communication tends to be less professional at the local level. Media logic 
might therefore be less invasive in local governance processes in comparison 
to national governance processes. A comparative study between the mediatisa-
tion of governance processes with local actors at the centre versus governance 
processes with national actors at the centre could test for such differences. My 
studies showed however that mediatisation can also be relevant in the context 
of local governance processes and should therefore not be overlooked. 
What about the positive function of emotions?
Although I have been formulating my conclusions about information biases in 
the news with caution and have also shown positive sides to information biases 
(making room for unauthoritative and outside actors as news sources), the use 
of the word information biases alone implies that these characteristics are unde-
sirable. This is comparable to the term ‘drama democracy’, which more or less 
equates emotions with melodramatics, as discussed in Chapter 2. It seems that 
in literature on mediatisation, the positive functions that emotions can have in 
decision-making processes and in the political judgements of citizens are ne-
glected. Emotions and conflicts are inevitably part of political decision-making 
processes, and are also desirable as they improve the governance process by 
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contributing to a mutual understanding between actors (Hoggett & Thompson, 
2002). 
The expression of emotions in media can indeed function in a hindering 
way, when these distort an open-minded evaluation. Hindering emotions in 
news reports let one ignore new evidence and doubt its reliability, for the 
sake of internal coherence. A newspaper with a right-wing orientation might, 
for instance, use hindering sensationalistic emotions in its media reports to 
complain about the actions of a leftist party. Such emotions distort the informa-
tion citizens receive about the actions of the leftist party and might unjustly 
affect their judgement. But emotional contributions or controversies in media 
reports can also show that what actors think is really important and help other 
actors to understand that. Issues that citizen groups bring forward through the 
media are of major concern to them, and these concerns may become more 
understandable for others when their emotional stories are covered as well. If 
decision-makers hear through emotional news stories what it would mean for 
farmers to have to abandon their house and enterprise due to spatial planning 
measures, they might better understand the position of a this group of farmers 
in the governance process.
This study, and comparable research that measures to what extent media 
logic characteristics can be found in news content (see e.g. Brants & Neijens, 
1998; Patterson, 2000; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; Brants & Van Praag, 2006; 
Strömbäck & Shehata, 2007), does not establish to what extent the focus on 
conflicts, emotions and criticism distorts our views and reasoning (as Bennett 
(2009) emphasises) or help to reflect on the governance processes. This would 
however be an interesting question for future research to address. It might be 
complicated to study this though, particularly since the exact mechanisms that 
take place between emotions and decision-making processes are still unclear 
(Evans, 2002). One possible approach could be to combine qualitative content 
analysis of media reports with interviews with actors, journalists and citizens 
about the emotions they feel and the journalistic decisions made in reporting 
the issue. Questions would need to check whether news reports are framed in 
a way to preserve emotionally held idées fixes, due the need for internal coher-
ence within a specific medium or because of commercial interests that guide 
the use of emotions. Consider for example a journalist interviewed for Chapter 
7, who was explicitly instructed by the editor to always give issues in the news 
a human face. This per definition results in emotional human interest news 
stories. However, this does not necessarily apply for all journalists. Another ap-
proach to studying positive and negative functions of emotions in media biases 
could be to set up experiments using different news reports with presumably 
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helping, hindering and no emotions, and then to see how these affect respon-
dents’ decision-making. These  are just some initial and tentative suggestions 
for future research; the main point is that the possibility that emotions in news 
can aid reflection on reported political issues should not be simply brushed 
aside by future mediatisation studies. 
What is the way forward?
Mediatisation research is a relatively new branch of research, which is flour-
ishing at the moment. A clear illustration are the lists of books and articles 
offered on the site of one of the leading scholars in mediatisation research, 
Jesper Strömbäck, devoted to theory and research on the mediatisation of 
politics (http://mediatisation-of-politics.com/). These lists show an exponential 
growth of relevant articles and books in recent years.  Before 2000 it lists only 
3 articles and 3 books; from 2000 to 2009 11 articles and 3 books; from 2010 
to 2014 38 articles (21 of these in 2014) and 7 books. Although these lists are 
definitely not complete, they clearly demonstrate that during my research, the 
literature has been developing significantly. In 2013 and 2014, several theoreti-
cal contributions were published that redefine the mediatisation of politics and 
address more realistic models of political decision-making processes (e.g. Esser 
& Matthes, 2013; Marcinkowski, 2014). However, empirical research addressing 
mediatisation in these decision-making processes is rare. My research clearly 
contributes to this line of research. 
Furthermore, in the other fields of public administration research – studies on 
network governance and on policy processes – the scholarly attention for media 
is gradually growing as well (as Klijn, 2008c; Hajer, 2009; Bekkers & Moody, 
2015). Nonetheless, only a few theoretical and empirical publications can be 
found in the field of public administration. My research is an important first 
step in this regard. However, as discussed in the prior paragraphs, my research 
also leaves open many questions with regard to other media and other contexts. 
Due to the interactions between media and society, the degree of mediatisation 
and its impact can differ in different local contexts. Research in different con-
texts is therefore needed to formulate more comprehensive conclusions about 
the impact of mediatisation on governance processes. Longitudinal studies that 
examine media reports as well as the policy process would be an ideal approach 
to gain more knowledge on decisive factors and mechanisms. 
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8.4 THE MISMATCH BETWEEN MEDIA LOGIC AND 
GOVERNANCE LOGIC
On the basis of my research I argue that using terms like mediacracy or a drama 
democracy to characterise the Dutch democracy is jumping to conclusions. 
While these terms are quite often used in societal debates about the relation 
between media and politics, they overrate the influence of media on day-to-day 
political decision-making processes. Many governance processes are not even 
covered by the media or only in certain policy phases. Looking at other arenas 
of the democratic process than party politics, which is often more visible on 
television and in newspapers than governance processes, reveals many more 
nuances. 
More fundamentally, many statements about a mediacracy or a drama de-
mocracy and even various statements about mediatisation show a lack of un-
derstanding as to how day-to-day political decision-making processes function 
in practice. Political decision-making is much more than the visible political 
debates between political figures. On the other hand, actors in governance pro-
cesses don’t always know much about media and their logic. Moreover, network 
actors may lack the capacity to react to or to anticipate media logic interference. 
Many actors therefore see media as an external disturbance, disrupting the 
fragile collaborative governance process. This mutual misunderstanding can be 
found in practice, both in media reporting and even in scientific publications. 
Media in governance
So, should media be blamed for not understanding governance processes? 
Although media logic may partly explain this flaw, media always operate in 
interaction with society. In all three of their roles (as differentiated in Chapter 
3), it is a matter of media and governance. Media provide fora to present and 
discuss information from societal actors and this information can affect the 
views of other societal actors. Media are moreover able to influence the agendas 
of decision-makers, but only if decision-makers think it is important and ap-
propriate to respond to media reports. Lastly, media are used as instruments for 
strategic communication by societal actors to reach a larger public and thus to 
serve their own interests. Mediatisation is thus both driven by and has effects 
on both media and governance. 
The main drivers of mediatisation’s effects on governance might not be 
due to the media but to how actors in governance processes deal with media 
and their logic. In the end it is about them anticipating or even integrating 
media logic in their own behaviour, instead of brushing media reports aside. 
The significant increase of communication professionals is illustrative in this 
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regard; governmental organisations attach considerable importance to their – 
potential – media image. This is understandable, as governmental organisations 
need media to explain and legitimise their decisions. They should also be able 
to defend their position in response to negative publicity (as well as to other 
actors in governance networks). However, their ‘professionalisation’ of public 
communication and adoption of media logic also contributes to the presence of 
media logic characteristics that simplify governance processes in news content. 
Governance in media
Frequently, journalists as well as many (political) communication scholars ap-
proach governance processes as if it is only ‘the government’ making policies 
for which political authorities are responsible. The reality of governance pro-
cesses is much more complicated, as different government entities collaborate 
with numerous private and societal actors. Nevertheless, in practice, media 
usually ask political authorities to solve societal problems (authority-disorder 
bias) and more or less ignore the interdependencies and collaborative relations 
with other government bodies, private actors and societal associations. 
In the short term, such media interference can help open up policy processes 
for unauthoritative actors; but a media spotlight makes negotiations more 
complicated as well. In the longer term, media interference might result in 
governmental organisations striving for more control and supervision, as they 
are the ones who are publicly held responsible. Governmental organisations are 
inclined to structurally overreact to mediatised risks, and seek to control these 
risks through rules and extensive policy measures (in Dutch this is referred 
to as the ‘risico-regelreflex’26). Such a controlling response by governmental or-
ganisations obstruct the principles of collaborative decision-making processes. 
It would diminish the potential of governance processes to more extensively 
address the varying perspectives, interests and values of stakeholders in more 
integrative policy solutions. Such a controlling response also demonstrates the 
fundamental mismatch between the features of governance processes in rela-
tion to the functioning of media. Moreover, in such a case media and their logic 
do not just provide checks and balances; media and their logic would then come 
to dominate decision-making processes. 
26. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/kwaliteit-en-integriteit-overheidsinstanties/
verantwoord-omgaan-met-risicos 
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
BESTUURD DOOR HET NIEUWS?
De rol van nieuwsmedia in de politiek wordt vaak bekritiseerd. Nieuwsmedia 
zouden alleen maar oog hebben voor dramatiek en voor poppetjes aan de 
macht. Daarnaast worden media verweten teveel invloed te hebben op de poli-
tiek; terwijl politici weer worden bekritiseerd omdat zij media manipulatief 
inzetten voor eigen gewin. Veel mensen ervaren de verwevenheid tussen media 
en politiek als zodanig dat zij claimen dat Nederland een ‘mediacratie’ of een 
‘dramademocratie’ is. In meer dan 1000 artikelen in journalistieke dag- en 
weekbladen zijn de termen te vinden, die aanduiden dat niet het volk maar 
de media en hun dramatiek zouden regeren. Deze verstrekkende begrippen 
impliceren dat de rol van media niet alleen groot is in de politiek, maar ook 
in andere fases van het democratisch proces, zoals in besluitvorming rondom 
beleid. Ook in veel andere landen wordt de rol van media in democratische 
processen bediscussieerd. 
In de wetenschap is daarbij recentelijk de aandacht komen te liggen op de 
invloed van de medialogica in democratische processen. In zijn algemeenheid 
duidt medialogica het proces aan waarmee media informatie presenteren en 
overbrengen (Altheide & Snow, 1979), hoe journalisten nieuwsberichten maken 
dus. Maar meestal doelen wetenschappers vooral op bepaalde kenmerken van 
nieuws wanneer ze medialogica en mediatisering bespreken. Zoals dat het 
nieuws vaker inzoomt op negatieve dan op positieve gebeurtenissen; nieuws 
vaak dramatisch is en inzoomt op conflicten en emoties; en dat er veel aandacht 
is voor (politieke) autoriteiten en hun fouten (zoals Bennett, 2009). Deze ken-
merken zijn te relateren aan commerciële aspecten in het proces van nieuws 
maken, want zulk nieuws verkoopt beter en is vaak efficiënt te vervaardigen 
(Bennett, 2009; Landerer, 2013). De commerciële aspecten staan zo centraal in 
het onderzoek omdat ze andere aspecten kunnen overschaduwen. Het willen 
beoefenen van goede, kwalitatieve journalistiek kan botsen met het streven 
naar efficiënte productie en hoge verkoopcijfers (Hjarvard, 2008). De aandacht 
voor het negatieve, het dramatische en het persoonlijke in het nieuws zijn ook 
bepalend voor hoe nieuwsmedia interacteren met samenleving, politiek en 
beleid.
Hoewel relaties tussen media en politiek vaak onderzocht zijn, is er nog 
weinig bekend over interacties tussen media en besluitvormingsprocessen 
rondom beleid. Om beleid te formuleren en uit te voeren zijn vaak verschil-
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lende partijen nodig die verbonden zijn in netwerken (Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004). Dit wordt ook wel network governance genoemd. Voor het ontwikkelen 
van een passende oplossing bij complexe maatschappelijke vraagstukken zijn 
overheidsorganisaties afhankelijk van private en maatschappelijke actoren die 
bijvoorbeeld in het bezit zijn van bepaalde kennis of productiemiddelen. Door 
die afhankelijkheden vormen zich relaties tussen actoren die gemodelleerd 
worden als een governance netwerk. Actoren in een governance netwerk ope-
reren relatief zelfstandig, vanuit hun eigen percepties en belangen. In reeksen 
van interacties onderhandelen ze met elkaar, werken ze samen en maken ze 
besluiten, waarmee de actoren niet alleen hun eigen doelen, maar ook een col-
lectief doel trachten te realiseren. 
Hoe staat het met de verwevenheid van media en besluitvorming in netwer-
ken? Maarten Hajer (2009) stelt dat niet alleen de politiek maar ook network 
governance is gemediatiseerd. Dat betekent dat niet alleen bepaald nieuws effect 
heeft op besluitvorming, maar de logica van nieuwsmedia het verloop van 
besluitvormingsprocessen en de communicatie hierover beïnvloedt. 
De medialogica en de logica van netwerk governance staan echter op gespan-
nen voet. De interesse van media in conflict en drama contrasteert met de 
behoefte aan vertrouwen en de noodzaak tot samenwerking in netwerken. Bo-
vendien zoomen nieuwsmedia in op prestaties van politieke autoriteiten waar 
het in netwerken nadrukkelijk gaat om collectieve inspanningen van publieke, 
maatschappelijke en private partijen. De vraag die daarom centraal staat in dit 
onderzoek is welke impact media en medialogica hebben op de inhoud en het 
proces van besluitvorming. Oftewel hoe beïnvloedt mediatisering besluitvorming in 
governance netwerken?  
DE ROLLEN VAN MEDIA IN RELATIE TOT NETWORK 
GOVERNANCE
Nieuwsmedia kunnen grofweg drie rollen worden toebedeeld. Het nieuws is 
belangrijk voor de publieke beeldvorming over de inhoud en het verloop van 
besluitvorming in governance netwerken. Daarbij geven media idealiter ruimte 
aan verschillende geluiden en vormen ze dus een democratisch platform. 
Daarnaast zijn nieuwsmedia van invloed op de agenda’s van betrokken actoren. 
Omdat nieuwsberichten in zekere zin de publieke opinie vertegenwoordigen, 
kunnen actoren hun agenda’s daarop aanpassen. Ten slotte kunnen actoren 
media gebruiken om een groter publiek te bereiken met hun boodschap. Media 
vormen dus ook een instrument voor (strategische) communicatie. Dat media 
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deze rollen vervullen via een commerciële medialogica werkt door in de impact 
van nieuwsmedia op network governance. 
De hoofdvraag van het onderzoek - de manier waarop mediatisering besluit-
vormingsprocessen beïnvloedt - is uitgesplitst over de drie functies.
Gemediatiseerd democratisch platform
Om de rol van medialogica in de democratisch platform-functie te bestuderen 
heb ik bekeken in hoeverre de medialogica terug te zien is in berichtgeving 
over besluitvormingsprocessen. Daartoe heb ik nieuwsberichten rondom vijf 
water governance projecten in Nederland onderzocht. Deze water governance 
projecten zochten een oplossing voor beleidsvraagstukken met betrekking tot 
openbare wateren en andere ruimtelijke opgaven. In Lent bijvoorbeeld werden 
dijken verplaatst om meer water te kunnen opvangen, wat werd gecombineerd 
met onder andere het bouwen van nieuwe huizen en een nieuwe brug naar 
Nijmegen. De andere projecten waren IJsseldelta-Zuid, Noordwaard, de Zuid-
plaspolder en Wieringerrandmeer. 
In totaal zijn 566 nieuwsberichten gecodeerd, afkomstig uit regionale en 
nationale nieuwsmedia (kranten en televisie). Uit de kwantitatieve inhouds-
analyse bleek dat ongeveer een kwart van de berichten inzoomde op emoties 
en het persoonlijke. Ook bleek twee-derde van het nieuws dramatisch te zijn 
gezien het conflicten uitlichtte. Ongeveer de helft van de berichten beschreef 
autoriteiten en hun falen en riep hen op nieuwe maatregelen te nemen. Ten 
slotte evalueerde ongeveer de helft van de berichten het beleid negatief. De 
medialogica-aspecten zijn dus aanwezig in het nieuws rondom de water gover-
nance processen. In meer dan 70 procent van de nieuwsberichten was één of 
meer van de medialogica-aspecten te vinden.
Maar hebben die medialogica-aspecten invloed op welke  actoren  werden 
beschreven in het nieuws? Om die vraag te beantwoorden zijn nieuwsberichten 
met verschillende groepen actoren als hoofdpersoon met elkaar vergeleken. 
Daarbij bleek het overigens wel mee te vallen met de hoeveelheid berichten die 
primair focussen op autoriteiten. Autoriteiten aan de macht (zoals de minister(-
president), gedeputeerde, wethouder of ‘de gemeente’) zijn hoofdpersoon in 
iets minder dan een derde van de berichten. Naast deze groep krijgen vooral 
minder invloedrijke actoren veel aandacht (zoals bewoners(organisaties), boe-
ren en milieuorganisaties), in maar liefst 43,5% van de berichten zijn zij de 
hoofdpersoon. 
Een statistische vergelijking toont aan dat in nieuwsberichten over de min-
der invloedrijke actoren significant meer medialogica-aspecten te vinden zijn 
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dan in berichten met autoriteiten als hoofdpersoon27. Nieuwsberichten over 
deze actoren zijn significant vaker gedramatiseerd, gepersonaliseerd en zijn 
negatiever van aard dan nieuwsberichten over autoriteiten. Verhalen van o.a. 
bewonersgroepen, boeren en milieuorganisaties lijken dus goed te passen bij 
die medialogica-aspecten. 
Gemediatiseerde agendabepaling
Maar welke effecten heeft die berichtgeving voor de bewonersgroepen, boeren 
en milieuorganisaties gehad? Drie van de vijf water governance projecten –de 
projecten waarin het belangrijkste beleidsvraagstuk waterberging betrof– zijn 
daarop verder onderzocht. Samen met Ingmar van Meerkerk heb ik betrokken 
wethouders en vertegenwoordigers van bewonersorganisaties geïnterviewd. De 
media-aandacht was zeer ongelijkmatig verdeeld over de verschillende fases 
van besluitvorming in de water governance projecten. 
De media-aandacht nam duidelijk toe op momenten van conflict tussen be-
wonersgroepen en politieke autoriteiten. Bewonersgroepen hadden dan veel 
contact met journalisten en leerden snel wanneer hun verhaal aantrekkelijk 
werd voor journalisten. Via protestacties en het verschaffen van nieuwshaakjes 
wisten zij hun boodschap vaak in media te krijgen. Daarbij waren hun conflict, 
emoties en kritiek belangrijk, want die sloten goed aan op de belangrijke media-
logica-aspecten. De media-aandacht versterkte de positie van bewonersgroepen. 
Bovendien verbreedde de media-aandacht het besluitvormingsproces inhoude-
lijk. In een van de projecten is een door de bewonersorganisatie uitgedacht 
scenario voor waterberging bijvoorbeeld opgenomen in de besluitvorming. Ook 
hebben de tegengeluiden uiteindelijk geleid tot (relatief ) kleine aanpassingen 
in de inhoud van de plannen. Zo is bij een van de projecten de woningbouw 
beperkt naar aanleiding van zwaarwegende kritiek van een bewonersgroep. 
Dergelijke interacties tussen nieuwsmedia(logica) en besluitvorming dragen 
positief bij aan de legitimiteit van het proces.
Tegelijkertijd beteugelt de medialogica die positieve effecten. Immers, vooral 
actoren die bereid zijn hun boodschap te verpakken op negatieve en dramati-
sche wijze krijgen (eenvoudig) aandacht in media. Een van de bewonersgroepen 
merkte bijvoorbeeld dat journalisten niet meer geïnteresseerd waren toen zij 
samenwerking in het netwerk prioriteerden boven conflict. Het netwerk zal 
daarom goed evenwicht moeten vinden tussen het ingaan op eisen die via 
media tot hen komen en eisen die binnen het netwerk worden gesteld. Im-
27. Met behulp van de non parametrische ANOVA toets (Kruskall Wallis test) met post-hoc 
testen in SPSS 20.0
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mers, in praktijk is netwerk governance al een strategie om meer stakeholder-
betrokkenheid te creeëren. In hoeverre is het gerechtvaardigd te luisteren naar 
harde schreeuwers in de media terwijl dat misschien ten koste gaat van de 
samenwerking met actoren in het netwerk? Dit is geen eenvoudige afweging, 
gezien de druk die media kunnen uitoefenen op hun agenda’s.
Niet alleen de inhoud van netwerk governance kan onder druk komen te 
staan door nieuwsberichtgeving gekenmerkt door negativiteit en dramatiek, 
ook het proces. Dit negatieve verband tussen negatieve, sensationele media-
aandacht en het proces vond ik dan ook in het kwantitatief onderzoek dat ik 
verrichte in samenwerking met Erik Hans Klijn onder 141 projectmanagers van 
ruimtelijke projecten in de vier grote steden van Nederland. 
Allereerst wat terughoudendheid. De impact van mediatisering in de 
bestudeerde grootstedelijke, ruimtelijke governance processen lijkt in het 
algemeen relatief bescheiden te zijn. Bij lang niet alle projecten ervoeren de 
projectmanagers de berichtgeving als vooral negatief of als meer sensationeel 
dan informatief. Ook verwijten veel van de projectmanagers de betrokken po-
litici niet mediaberichtgeving en hun eigen imago belangrijker te vinden dan 
ontwikkelingen in het betreffende project. In meerderheid oordelen ze dus dat 
betrokken politici niet gemediatiseerd handelen.  
Aan de andere kant toonde statistische analyse wel negatieve verbanden 
tussen negatieve en sensationele media-aandacht en het onderling vertrouwen 
en (gepercipieerde) uitkomsten28. En hoe meer het gedrag van politici als ge-
mediatiseerd werd gekenmerkt, hoe lager het vertrouwen van actoren in het 
netwerk werd ingeschat. Als er impact van mediatisering wordt ervaren, blijkt 
dit dus wel in relatie te staan tot een moeizamer proces van besluitvorming in 
een governance netwerk.  
Gemediatiseerde strategische communicatie
Aspecten van medialogica zijn dus van invloed op de publieke beeldvorming 
rondom en op proces en inhoud van besluitvorming rondom beleid. Maar om 
te functioneren, hebben media informatie nodig. Die informatie komt van ver-
schillende actoren in de samenleving, die media vaak gebruiken als instrument 
om hun boodschap naar een groter publiek te communiceren. Daarvoor moeten 
zij wel de medialogica adresseren. We hebben al gezien dat tegenstanders daar 
vrij gemakkelijk in slagen, maar hoe kan een governance netwerk positieve 
publiciteit genereren? 
28. Met behulp van structural Equation Modeling in AMOS
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In vier grote infrastructurele projecten heb ik tien woordvoerders en twaalf 
journalisten geïnterviewd om te analyseren hoe woordvoerders een brug kun-
nen slaan tussen de medialogica en de logica van netwerk governance. Dit is 
ingewikkeld door de verschillende percepties van betrokken partijen en ver-
schillende houdingen van hen jegens media. Om de brug te slaan ondernemen 
woordvoerders daarom niet alleen activiteiten richting media, maar ook in het 
netwerk zelf. Met de betrokken actoren komen zij een mediastrategie overeen 
waarover continue afstemming plaatsvindt. Richting media is het handig dat er 
één lijn is per project, dat betekent het bijeenvoegen van de communicatie van 
actoren met verschillende verantwoordelijkheden. Immers, uiteindelijk wordt 
het project als geheel beoordeeld door de buitenwereld en krijgen verschillende 
partijen geen afzonderlijk eindoordeel, zo stelt een geïnterviewde woordvoer-
der. Als partijen alleen over hun eigen verantwoordelijkheden communiceren, 
leidt dat in de eerste plaats tot een veel ingewikkelder dossier voor journalisten. 
Bovendien zullen verschillen in visies snel worden vertaald in conflictsituaties. 
De verschillende actoren kunnen wel als afzonderlijke nieuwsbronnen fungeren 
voor journalisten passend in de overkoepelende mediastrategie. Dat vereist wel 
een pro-actieve houding van hen jegens media, welke niet vanzelfsprekend is. 
Om vervolgens door nieuwsmedia te worden opgemerkt, vertalen woord-
voerders informatie in voor journalisten aantrekkelijke ‘informatie subsidies’ 
met behulp van sprekende quotes, beelden en (pseudo)events. In alle projecten 
worden momenten gekozen die nieuwswaardig worden gemaakt. Het invaren 
van een enorm tunneldeel dat geplaatst wordt onder een historisch monument 
(‘wereldprimeur’) kan op die manier een positief verslag in het NOS-acht uur 
journaal opleveren. Daarbij blijken ook goede relaties tussen woordvoerders en 
journalisten van belang. Woordvoerders weten waar journalisten behoefte aan 
hebben en anticiperen daarop. Goede relaties met journalisten kunnen er ook 
voor zorgen dat negatief nieuws makkelijker te corrigeren is. 
Naast de mediacommunicatie is directe communicatie met de omgeving cru-
ciaal. Gesprekken met actoren in de omgeving (zoals omwonenden) zijn belang-
rijk vanuit democratisch perspectief, maar ook vanuit pragmatisch perspectief. 
Dergelijke outsiders zijn immers alternatieve nieuwsbronnen voor journalisten 
die potentieel kunnen zorgen voor negatieve, sensationele berichten.
CONCLUSIE: MEDIATISERING IN DE CONTEXT VAN 
NETWERK GOVERNANCE
Hoewel network governance in zekere mate ook interacteert met nieuwsmedia 
en hun logica, lijkt de verwevenheid minder in vergelijking met de verweven-
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heid tussen nieuwsmedia en (nationale) politiek. Termen als mediacratie en 
dramademocratie veronderstellen een dominantie van media en medialogica 
in alle aspecten onze democratie, dus ook in besluitvormingsprocessen rondom 
beleid. De bevindingen van dit onderzoek tellen echter niet op tot een me-
diacratie of een dramademocratie. Nieuwsmedia en hun logica mengen zich 
niet constant in ‘alledaagse’ besluitvorming rondom beleid. Als ze al aandacht 
schenken aan de processen, dan alleen in bepaalde fases of ten aanzien van 
bepaalde aspecten. 
Tegelijkertijd, als medialogica in interactie komt met de logica van netwerk 
governance, treden er wel effecten op. Effecten van mediatisering in de context 
van netwerk governance verschillen van effecten beschreven in de context van 
de politiek. Effecten zijn minder zwart-wit, maar eerder paradoxaal. 
Bekritiseerde aspecten van medialogica werken democratiserend
De kritiek op de voorkeuren van media voor drama, persoonlijke aspecten, 
een roep om actie van autoriteiten en negatieve aspecten lijkt terecht, kijkend 
naar de studie over de beeldvorming rondom water governance projecten. Die 
medialogica-aspecten zijn duidelijk te vinden in berichtgeving over de besluit-
vormingsprocessen en dat kan de democratische informatie over het besluit-
vormingsproces en het beleid versimpelen. Tegelijkertijd tonen de resultaten 
van mijn onderzoek ook het democratisch potentieel van deze aspecten van 
de medialogica. Ze verlagen de drempel voor minder invloedrijke actoren om 
te worden toegelaten tot het democratisch platform waar informatie over het 
beleid en het proces wordt uitgewisseld. Dit kan bijdragen aan democratische 
checks and balances in het besluitvormingsproces. 
Nieuwsmedia dragen bij aan complexiteit EN adequaatheid van besluitvorming
In de context van negatieve en dramatische berichtgeving en/of van politici die 
erg gefocust zijn op media blijkt het in een netwerk moeilijker om onderling 
vertrouwen tussen de actoren op te bouwen of in stand te houden. Medialogica 
lijkt opportunistische strategieën van actoren in het netwerk, en in het bijzon-
der van betrokken politici, te stimuleren. In de spotlights van nieuwsmedia 
zullen zij bijvoorbeeld eerder geneigd zijn hun individuele standpunt sterker 
neer te zetten of hun eerdere strategie te wijzigen, wat het collectieve besluit-
vormingsproces bemoeilijkt. Een kritische evaluatie van beleidsplannen in het 
nieuws kan bovendien het scala aan beleidsopties inperken; het is niet aantrek-
kelijk om een beleidsplan te kiezen dat veel kritiek kreeg in het nieuws. Deze 
mechanismen kunnen het negatieve verband tussen de negatieve, sensationele 
media-aandacht en (gepercipieerde) uitkomsten in mijn onderzoek verklaren. 
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In het licht van negatieve, sensationele media-aandacht blijkt de kans op veel 
onderling vertrouwen en passend, integraal en innovatief beleid kleiner.
Negatieve, sensationele aandacht voor besluitvorming kan echter ook 
betekenen dat er onderbelichte perspectieven worden ingebracht door buiten-
staanders. Die inbreng kan de besluitvorming verbreden en democratiseren. 
Bovendien voorkomt het dat er te snel besluiten worden genomen door actoren 
met de meeste machtsbronnen. In de praktijk leiden deze mechanismen tot 
relatief bescheiden correcties in het besluitvormingsproces. Grote wijzigingen 
zouden ook niet wenselijk zijn, omdat de kritiek van actoren in media niet veel 
zwaarder moet worden gewogen dan die van actoren betrokken in het onder-
handelingsproces. Een afweging van de input in het governance netwerk en de 
gemediatiseerde input blijkt echter nog geen eenvoudige evenwichtsoefening.
Strategische communicatie over (gedecentraliseerde) netwerken vereist centralisatie
Media-aandacht moet tegelijkertijd niet alleen gezien worden als een externe 
verstorende factor. Media-aandacht kan ook een instrument zijn waarmee be-
slissingen publiekelijk kunnen worden gelegitimeerd, wat bijdraagt aan draag-
vlak en vertrouwen van burgers. Om de verschillen tussen de netwerklogica 
en de medialogica te overbruggen is het nodig de mediacommunicatie te cen-
traliseren. Dit is tegenovergesteld aan hoe communicatielijnen in netwerken 
zijn georganiseerd en kan op gespannen voet staan met de autonome posities 
van actoren in netwerken. Daarom is continue afstemming met de betrokken 
actoren nodig om tot een coherente mediastrategie te komen die zij allen on-
dersteunen. Met een coherente me diastrategie wordt voorkomen dat onnodig 
verschillen tussen visies van actoren als conflicten worden uitgelegd. Actoren in 
het netwerk zijn bovendien niet alleen van belang voor de afstemming van de 
strategie, zij zijn ook degenen die informatie aanleveren aan woordvoerders en 
kunnen optreden als nieuwsbron. Woordvoerders werken dus net zo goed aan 
hun relaties in het netwerk als aan hun relaties in media en kunnen daarom 
gezien worden als boundary-spanners. Door vervolgens journalisten te voeden 
met informatie subsidies en goede relaties met hen op te bouwen, blijken er 
veel mogelijkheden om positieve publiciteit te genereren. 
DISCUSSIE VAN HET GEDANE ONDERZOEK
Als eerste beschouw ik kort de generaliseerbaarheid van mijn bevindingen. Ik 
heb drie empirische onderzoeken uitgevoerd in governance netwerken rondom 
water, stedelijke ontwikkeling en infrastructuur. Dit zijn allemaal ruimtelijke 
opgaven. Mijn bevindingen kunnen niet één op één generaliseerd worden naar 
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andere governance contexten. Meer mediagenieke vraagstukken, zoals veilig-
heid, zullen naar verwachting meer aandacht krijgen van media waardoor de 
impact van media en hun logica hoger zal zijn. Bovendien ligt het zwaartepunt 
van de onderzochte besluitvormingprocessen veelal op het regionale of lokale 
niveau. Dat is een kracht van het onderzoek, omdat dit niveau niet veel wordt 
onderzocht in studies rondom mediatisering. Echter, de dynamiek in de lokale 
politiek en lokale media is anders, waardoor deze niet zomaar te generaliseren 
is naar dynamiek rondom netwerken met een zwaartepunt op nationaal niveau. 
Als tweede beschouw ik kort de methoden van onderzoek. Veel van mijn 
onderzoek is gebaseerd op percepties; interviews en enquêtes zijn belangrijke 
bronnen geweest. In de eerste studie zijn interviews wel gecombineerd met 
kwantitatieve inhoudsanalyse van berichten en ook in de laatste studie rondom 
mediacommunicatie is triangulatie van bronnen toegepast. In de enquête is dat 
echter niet gedaan. Vervolgonderzoek zou enquêtes kunnen uitzetten onder 
verschillende respondenten in het netwerk. Hoewel onderzoek op basis van 
percepties niet ongewoon is in de sociale wetenschappen, moeten resultaten 
wel altijd met een zekere voorzichtigheid geïnterpreteerd worden. Bovendien 
zijn de metingen in interviews en enquêtes op één moment in de tijd verricht. 
De veronderstelde causale mechanismen kunnen diepgaander worden onder-
zocht in vervolgonderzoek op meer momenten in de tijd.
MEDIALOGICA VERSUS NETWERKLOGICA
Veelal wordt besluitvorming rondom beleid door media beschreven als een po-
litieke strijd of als een taak van de overheid. Hieruit spreekt een fundamenteel 
onbegrip van hoe in praktijk besluitvorming rondom beleid verloopt. Dat moet 
overigens niet alleen journalisten, maar ook informatieverschaffers worden 
aangerekend. In het nieuws worden vaak politieke autoriteiten of ‘de overheid’ 
aangesproken iets aan de gestelde problematiek te doen, zonder oog te heb-
ben voor de afhankelijkheden en netwerkrelaties tussen publieke, private en 
maatschappelijke partijen. Op de korte termijn leidt dergelijke inmenging van 
media en hun logica tot het openbreken van netwerken ten gunste van minder 
invloedrijke actoren, maar ook tot een complexer proces van besluitvorming. 
Op de lange termijn kan het leiden tot een risico-regelreflex: het indammen 
van problemen en risico’s onder mediadruk met regels en vergaande maatre-
gelen vanuit het Rijk. Dan zou de medialogica echt gaan overheersen over de 
logica van governance netwerken. Dat zou fnuikend zijn voor het potentieel 
van netwerk governance om in samenwerking meer integrale oplossingen te 
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ontwikkelen die de diverse perspectieven, belangen en waarden van actoren in 
acht nemen. 
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